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ABSTRACT
A joint effort by the Jct Propulsion Laboratory and the California
Institute of Technology Division of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering has
brought together sponsors from both the public and private sectors for an
analysis of the prospects for methanol use as a fuel in California, primarily
for the transportation and stationary application sectors. Increasing
optimism in 1982 for a slower rise in oil prices and a more realistic
understanding of the costs of methanol production have had a negative effect
on methanol viability in the near term, (before the year 2000). Methanol was
determined to Have some promise in the transportation sector, but is not
forecasted for large-scale use until beyond the year 2000. Similarly, while
alternative use of methanol can have a positive effect on air quality
(reducing NOx, SOx and other emissions), a best case estimate is for less
than k% reduction in peak ozone by 2000 at realistic neat methanol vehicle
adoption rate3. Methanol is not likely to be a viable fuel in the stationary
application sector because it cannot compete economically with conventional
fuels except in very limited cases. On the production end, it was determined
that methanol produced from natural gas will continue to dominate supply
options through the year 2000,, and the present and planned industry capacity
is somewhat in excess of all projected needs. Nonzubsidized coal-based
methanol cannot compete with conventional feedstocks using current technology,
but coal-based methanol has promise in the long term (after the year 2000),
prow =-ding that industry is willing to take the technical and market risks and
that government agencies will help facilitate the environment for methanol,.
Given that the prospects i-or viable major markets (stationary applica-
tions and neat fuel in passenger cars) are unlikely in the 1980s and early
1990s, the next steps for methanol are in further experimentation and research
of production and utilization technologies, expanded use as an octane enhancer,
and selected fleet implementation. In the view of the study, it is not advan-
tageous at this time to establish policies within California that attempt to
expand methanol use rapidly as a neat fuel for passenger cars or to induce
electric utility use of methanol on a widespread basis.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MCKGROUND
The California Methanol Assessment was organized by the Jest Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) through
an interagency aagreemo.nt with the National Aeronautics and grace Administra-
tion. The 18-month s^'ady was a joint effort of JPL 4nd the CaaltocL Division
of Chemistry and Chemical Engineearia o and was sponsored by vtriou>s private
companies and public; agencies tbau ;4 11 are potential stakeholders in methanol use,
production, and distribution. An in-depth analysis was performed of the
status and prQ/opects for methanol a:^;P As a fuel in' California, primarily in
the transportation and utility secters. Technical data were synthesized from
ongoing JPL studies, the sponsors, and other sources. The data were then
analyzed for California markets to determine the role that methanol can play,
the gaps in the current state of knowledge, and the efforts that are warranted
to ensure an efficient and appropriate transition into the marketplace.
Methanol has long been used so a chemical and chemical feedstock. The
United States currently produces about 3 million tuuslyear with an energy
equivalent of 100 trillion British thermal units (101 ' Btu). Methanol has
many potential benefits as •a fuel. Or. an overall basis, it has been argued
that it could be the lowest cost synthetic liquid fuel. ene technology exists
to produce methanol, from the country's 'extensive coal reserves as well as from
peat, petroleum, coke, natural gals, and bioenergy feedstocks. In automotive
and some other applications, the performance of methanol is superior per Btu
to that of ;gasoline and other oonventi,onaal, fuels. Widespread methanol use
could have a net positive. effect on the environment because it is a clean-
burning, low-polluting :duel that ostensibly yields lower atmospheric contri-
butions of NOx and unburned hydrocarbons. Gasoline-fueled vehicles could be
built and stationary power plant's could be readily adapted to use of methanol.
Metharnol can be produced from a variety of domestically available feedstocks
and used in a variety of applications. In addition, it is noncareinogeni.c.
Expanded production of methanol, unlike other synfuels, will require
dedicated storage facilities and delivery systems. Thus, because it is'`not
now in general use as a fuel, more extensive methanol use would require either
Crew dedicated delivery systems or conversion of current systems. On a volume
basis, methanol has half the energy content of gasoline, so both storage and
vehicular tanke would probably need to be increased in size, with some mitiga-
tion because of better fuel performance. Although safety and toxicity
problems seem to be no greater than those for gaasol",ne, they are different
from today's fuels, and their solutions would require additional education and
training. Methanol is hydroscopic, but as small froction of water can be
tolerated in its use as a fuel.. Also, methanol would be transported in
existing pipelines if some adjustments were made for the fuel's greater
miscibility, and if batched load delivery systems were set up.
For methanol to become as viable transportation fuel in the tong term,
both the fuel and automobile industries must participate in a strategy
I
involving risk on itivestmonts that will not he returned quickly. The issue of
nc&le is important, for it has been sugkested that:
(1) Methanol must ultimately be made from coal in lar&# (25,000
tons/day or larger) western minemouth pl pt3.
(2) Methanol must be pipelined to end-uxe markets as high-volume
pipelines (50,000 tons/day).
(3) Automobile manufacturers must mass-produce (at least 30,000
vehicles per year at a given company) optimized methanol-fueled
vehicles to achieve end-use economies of scale.
(4) Putenti,11 private passenger car buyers must ¢ee an established fuel
distribution network ?^efore they will purchase neat methanol-fueled
vehicle$.
Each of the above points has been evaluated for the California Methanol
Assessment to determine if it is a critical element in the viability of
methanol as a fuel in California. Once this basic characterization of the
methanol fuel system was made, the analysis focused on what could be done as
the next step to facilitate all efficient evolution into the marketplace.
The State of California was chosen as a focus for the study because
methanol has many Untential lines as A fuel for RtAtiOnArV And trAnxportatinn
applications in 'a iifornia *
	are unique benefits that could be derivedC
from widespread use of methano. ,."n California because of the State's air-
quality problems and its number of potential feedstock sources for methanol.
Relative to the use of conventional fuels, use of methanol could reduce the
emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and reactive hydrocarbons into
the atmosphere of California urban renters.
During the past several years, there has been an increase in the number
of test programs for vehicles using methanol and methanol/gasoline blends.
The State of California has begun fleet tests, and in 1980 the California
Energy Commission (CEC) issued a policy resolution on alcohol fuels. Also,
utilities and policy-makers in California have shown an interest in methanol's
role in the utility sector, where it could have environmental and fuel
diversification benefits.
Clearly, methanol has the potential for much ;rester use as an altern^-
ative fuel in California. Caltech and JPL were gi:eatly interested in exam-
ining the realities of that potential, and together they were equipped to
provide a useful interdisciplinary study of the problems and potentials.
JPL I s long-term commitment to the national energy program, coupled with the
Laboratory'u 30-year history as a leader in fuels research for space And other
applications, provided unique experience with chemical processes, combustion,
engines, turbines, fuel cells, environmental control, safety, toxicity,
systems analysis, and policy analysis. Current methanol-based fuel cell
research at JPL and emissions characterization studies at Caltech provided a
rich data base. Related efforts, suph as the Advanced Coal Extraction Systems
study, and detailed cost models being developed for photovoltaic and other now
2
energy systems, ensured r b!-:kground and otructure conducive to a well-rounded
overview of the problem.
The emphasis of the California Methanol Assessment has not been placed
on generating new basic data, but rather on resolving conflicting information,
performirR a more 'hailed market analysis in California submarkete than has
been published to a&te, and synthesising this information into a California
strategy. Some of the questions that needed to be addressed were:
(1) Could methanol become a significant fuel for California (and
elsewhere) beginning in the 1980s and 1990s?
(2) When compared to alternatives, which options for the use of
methanol should be encouraged for California?
(3) What are the attributes of methanol in terms of cost, value,
environmental impacts, supply reliability, safety, and health?
(4) What are the possible and probable sources cf supply ana modes of
transportation and distribution?
(S) What are viable near-term approaches for the use of methanol am it
fuel in California?
APPROACH
The goals of this research effort have been to:
(1) Synthesize, evaluate, and document key technical issues (e.g., neat
methanol engine efficiency, economies of scale in methanol
praduction, environmental effects of methanol use, etc.).
(2) Identify the essential features of a mature methanol fuel industry
if it should develop.
(3) Identify and characterize potential near-term and long-term
meth..nol fuel markets.
(4) Characterize the next steps in terms of research or studies that
would further refine the potential role for methanol.
(S) Determine if selected policy alternatives cats significantly alter
methanol potential.
After evaluating these key issues, a determination was made of the next steps
to be taken in the methanol market. These steps were then evaluated from the
perspective of each of the key participants (producers, users, equipment
manufacturers, distributors, regulators, legislators, etc.).
Thus, the end result of this study has been to determine if there are
useful transition-period strategies, policies, research activities, regulatory
changes, or avenues of cooperation among the participants in the methanol
3
market that would facilite methonol achieving its longer-term role Mre
efficiently. This is a very e'°ficult problem and challenges fuel producer^
and distributors, autemobile manufacturers, end users, government agencies,
and researchers to determine sensible processes and policies within a
time frame that will allow methanol to be efficiently available for future
demands.
The choice was made of the specific time periods used for near-term
(1981 through 1987), transition-period (1988 to 1997), and long -term (199'
beyond) market analyses because of constraints on the evolution of methai .' as
a fuel, i.e.:
(1) The near-term period of S years is short enough so that changes in
methanol production capacity can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy (plants are already in planning or construction stages)
and the state-of-utiliaetion technology is relatively fixed.
(2) The tr - Ation period from 1988 to 1997 is tho timefranie in which
methanva use would have to expand rapidly if it were to make a
significant impact on fuel markets by the tern of the century.
(3) The long-term market is simply defined as beyond 1997 because that
is u period by which some results would have to be realized to
motivate action now in planning, technology development, and policy
implementation.
An effort of this study has been made to examine the possible transition
paths of methanol into long-term fuel and stationary source markets. There-
fore, this study looks more deeply than other recent studies at the submarkets
U	 nsportatiosi, utilities, and industry that could be important in building
.,pply, production, and delive ►•y infrastructure necessary for widespread
-t of methanol. For example, in the transportation fuel market potential
e,emand for methanol as an octane enhancer in Califonia is examined as a complex
market in itself. The perspective of large refiners and the independents in
terms of the value each would place on methanol for octane enhancement is
quite different. Similarly, in the case of utilities, an attempt has been
made to carefully differentiate the value of methanol in various types of
generating units and under a number of environmental conditions and regula-
tions. The results, when aggregated across the market sectors, provide the
framework for identifying opportunities for structuring a transition strategy.
It is not suggested, however, that this study substitutes for the project-
specific analysis a company would have to do to commit to a nethenol venture.
The level of detail necessary for such an evaluation is simply beyond the
scope of this study.
The study has also taken a fairly detailed look at the methanol produc-
tion industry in the near term (1982 to 1987), as this period may also he
crucial to a transition strategy. This period is significant because methanol
production is already in a period of transition.. The deregulation of natural
gas that is now in progress will greatly alter the structure of methanol
auoply in the long term and may lead to significant price changes in the near
term.
4
Individuals that contributed to this study represented a broad spectrum
of disciplines, including chemical engineering, economics, petroleum engineer-
ing, policy analysis, and thermodynamics. The sponsors of the study also
provided substantial data in the following areas:
(1) Production: Atlantic Richfield Co., Chevron USA, Inc., Conoco Coal
Development Co., Exxon Research 6 Development Co., Phillips
Petroleum Co., Sun Co., and Texaco, Inc.
(2) Chemicai: du Pont de Nemours anA Co.
(3) Utility: Electric Power Research Institute. Pacific Gas and
Electric Co., Southern California Edison Co.
(4) Automotive technnology: Ford Motor Co., General Motors Corp.
(5) National synfuel incentives: Synthetic Fuels Corp. (SFC).
(b) State roles: California Energy Commission (CEC).
(7) Production equipment: Litton Energy Systems.
The findings were synthesized into an assessment framework and reviewed by JPL
and by the Technical Advisory Group, which is composed of representatives of
the sponsors. A key feature of the assessment approach was that the informa-
tion was exchanged and discussed by the Technical Advisory Group in the same
meetings that were held to review drafts of she interim and final reports.
Although agreement was not reached on all points, these meetings provided an
opportunity to discuss specific issues from the perspective of companies that
are or might be potentially involved in methanol production, distribution, and
use. Thus, although the study does not represent a consensus position of the
sponsors (the conclusions are solely those of JPL), there was a free exchange
of ideas so that a wide range of positions could be considered. The reader is
referred to ApF• endix B in Volume 11: Technical Report. for the posit:ona of the
various sponsor- on the findings.
FINDINGS
Competitive Environment
A review was made of studies of the present and projected competitive
environment for methanol in Califonia with emphasis on: (1) the availabililty
and price of natural gas and residual oil to California utilities, and (2) the
likely range of cost for motor fuels in California. Table 1 projects the
likely (base case) fuel consumption and cost for California for the utility
and transportation sectors. The Precise values of the forecast prices and
quantities are not as important as the general climate for synthetic fuels in
the transition period of 1982 through 2000. The key factors during this
period are:
(1) The United States and California will remain dependent upon
imported oil, although recent off-shore oil discoveries will
improve California's position.
S
Table 1. Base Case Fuel Forecast Summary for Califor..ta
(quad/year)
1980 1	 1985 19?0 1995 2000
VEHICLES
Gasoline 1.44 1.23 1.10 1.08 1.05
Distillate 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.37 0.40
SUBTOTAL 1.69 1.53 1.45 1.47 1.45
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
Natural Gas 0.52 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.45
Oil 0.48 0.36 0.49 0.37 0.13
SUBTOTAL 1.00 0.95 1.03 0.86 0.58
INDUSTRY
Natural Gas 0.54 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.37
Distillate Oil 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
Residual Oil 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
SUBTOTAL 0.63 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.43
PRICES	 (1981	 $/10 6 Btu)
Gasoline 10.66 9.8!) 12.42 14.39 fi5.9/	 IIII
Residual Oil	 (0.5% sulfur) 5.47 5.49 6.68 7.58 8.18	 I
Distillate Oil 6.30 6.12 7.89 9.37 10.60
NaLural Gas:	 Utilities 3.84 5.01 6.37 7.44 8-,06
Natura? Gas:	 Industrial 3.97 5.07 6.51 7.47 8.09
(2) Natural gas after deregulation will tend toward parity with the
price of residual oil.
(3) The contribution of synthetic fuels nationally will probably be
less than 500,000 barrels (bbl)/day by the year 2000.
(4) Although there is significant oil worldwide and unused capacity in
OPEC to supply anticipated demands in the next 20 years at real
escalation rates of 2% annually or less, political disruptions
could drive prices up much taster.
(5) There is a plausible wide range of oil price scenarios in the
1990s, which work against those large-scale capital projects that
must rely on high-price scenarios for viability.
(6) The real price decrease, since the peak 1981 oil price level, has
severely impacted the enthusiasm for synthetic fuels and will
probably negatively impact such prcjects even if another sudden
prize rise occurs.
"s
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- - --M.11-Air Quality
A special effort of the study that ciA ncided with ongoing research at
Caltech was to perform a screening analysis of the likely impact of methanol
fuel on the air quality of the South Coast Air Basin. The Basin includes the
areas within the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernar-
dino, which has a population of about 11 million people. The Basin has
persistent and severe problems of air pollution caused by a combination of
factors. There has been an extensive gathering of emissions and weterological
data for this Basin, which enabled the application of analytical models.
For this analysis, an existing Caltech air-quality model vas further
adapted to treat methanol as a specific pollutant. The methanol ciemistry was
included in the model for completeness to determine how methanol would contri-
bute to the formation of ozone. Thus, the model was able Lo distinguish seven
classes of reactive organic compounds: alkanes, ethylene, other olefins,
formaldehyde, other aldehydes, aromatics, and methanol. The various reactive
hydrocarbons have different rates of reaction with NOx and with the
oxygenated species that promote the formation of photochemical smog. The
model uses s Langrangian form for representation of the equations of motion
that describe the diffusion and convection of eh-­Qical species within the
modeling region. It calculates the concentrations of chemical species along L
given trajectory of an air parcel traversing the Basin.
All calculations were based on the projected emissions inventory of
pollutants for the year 2000. The air-quality impacts of methanol use are
quite sensitive to this initial baseline, thiis the findings discussed below
should not be attribu^.ed to the intervening years between now and the year
2000. At that future: date, the potential benefits of existing pollution-
abatement regulations would have been realized. At the same time, it is a
feasible date by which, if methanol were to become an important fuel in
California, air-quality effects from this change would be felt. Calculations
were performed to indicate the likely effect on air quality of using methanol
as a substitute for gasoline; no estimates were made of the effects of use of
methanol for stationary applications or diesel vehicles because o r '• er study
findings indicated these uses to be relatively small contributors to the
emissions baseline.
Some of the following conclusions apply to the complete substitution of
methanol for gasoline in the SoutL Coast Air Basin, based on projected emis-
sions for the year 2000. Even though this is not a feasible scenario for
methanol use, the intent was to bound the air-quality implications of
substituting methanol for gasoline and to calculate a limiting case.
Therefore:
•
	
	
Even with an optimistic rate of neat methanol vehicle adoption, the
maximum impact by the year 2000 would be only a 3% to 4% reduction
in the peak hourly-average concentration of ozone.
•	 In the long term (beyond the year 2000), even the complete
substitution of methanol-fueled vehicles for gasoline-fueled
vehicles could lead to a reduction of 14% to 20% in the peak
hourly-average concentration of ozone.
I•	 weak ozone concentration decreases approximately linearly with
methanol substitution, starting with the year 2000 emissions
inventory.
•	 The photochemical reactivity of methanol is relatively low.
•	 With use of methanol, peak ozone concentration is reduced as
emissions of NOx are reduced. The ozone concentration, however,
is much less sensitive to emissions of NO, than to reactive
organic emissions.
•	 With methanol substitution, the ambient concentration of
formaldehyde would not increase significantly.
•	 Total suspended particulates in general would not be greatly
affected by methanol substitution; however, fine non-volatile
carbonaceous particulates would be reduced slightly if methanol
were substituted for gasoline. Methanol substitution for diesel
fuel would make this reduction much larger.
While the assessment of effects of methanol on air quality is only an
initial investigation and while the accuracy of the data used in the modeling
calculations could possibly be improved, the studv 7- ... • lts cleArly indicate
that the impact of methanol of the South Coast Air Basin would be bereticial
in the long term. For some pollutants, the potential improvements are signi-
ficant. The most significant impact would be to reduce the peak level of
ozone, but only if a major portion of vehicles in use were methanol-fueled.
Even a small reduction in peak level would cause a reduction in the number of
days that the smog episodes occur, and thereby would cause an improvement in
the air quality for the residents of the Basin. Obviously, the use of methanol
is no panacea for the problems of air pollution. Other pollution-abatement
measures would still be needed. If neat methanol-fueled passenger cars were
to become over-the-road competitive with gasoline vehicles in 1990, and from
that point achieve a rate of sales consistent with the rate of adoption for
deisel-fueled vehicles since 1978, the vehicle stock would be about 12% neat
methanol-fueled vehicles by the year 2000. With this percentage of
methanol-fueled vehicles on the road, the peak ozone would be reduced about
3.7% from the base case. Obviously, the adoption of methanol vehicles could
occur more quickly, but this is unlikely given that neat methanol will not be
over-the-road competi- tive for some time. Neat methanol has more barriers to
overcome than diesel, so its rate of adoption will tend to be less, if
anything, than the diesel experience since 1978. Therefore, the 3.7% impact
on ozone by the year 2000 for neat methanol-fueled vehicles is probably
optimistic and, in any case, only a modest factor in that timeframe.
PROJECTIONS
One of the goals of the study was to characterize the projected value of
methanol in the private marketplace. Such a determination will reveal whether
there are potentially viable markets for methanol in the near to mid term that
might help transition to widespread use of methanol as a transportation fuel.
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sNvar Term (1482 through 1987)
The methanol supply industry is already in a transition period. Add ► ng
to the progressing deregulation of natural gas and a worldwide oversupply of
methanol, there is a prospect for coal-based methanol plants supported by
SFC. Also, there is much uncertainty surrounding the near-term structure
of the industry.
	 it,
Factors acting upon the methanol industry in the near tone will be:
(1) by 1985, Aetural gas will be deregulated and will movo toward
parity with the mid to low sulfur (approximately 0.51) residual oil
price. In the study's baseline scenario. this is expected to bo in
the $4.75 to =5.00 per 1 millon (106 ) Btu range in 1987 (1981 $).
(2) Contracts for inexpensive natural too, currently supplying the
conventional feedstock for methanol in the United States. will
virtually all have expired b y 1485 to 198A. As a result, domestic
producers will be paying do-tgulated market prices for feedstock
natural gas.
(3) There will be excess capacity in methanol production to supply
traditional chemical markers. Evan it demands in traditional uses
such as formaldehyde return to pre-recession levels (it the housing
industry expands), the 1485 excess supply capacity will probably
exceed 1 billion (109 ) gar/year in tree.-world markets unless fuel
uses expand.
Production
Given the above factors that are operating within the industry, three
possible marginal comimorcial production sources by 1987 aret (1) methanol
from conventional natural-gas plants with unregulated gas feedstock cost, (2)
new remote natural-gas-board plants, or (3) STC-supported coal-to-methanol
plants.
Virtually all of the existing plants will be operating on deregulated
natural gas by 1967. Aso"ming a $5.50/106 Btu feedstock cost for natural
gas in fully amortised plants, the plant Kate market price for methanol is
estimated at a minimum of =0.76 /gal for methanol in 1967 (in 1981 $). It is
expected that these ,slants will remain viable at least through 1990, but that
no now conventional plants will he built based on pipelino natural gas.
The concept of barge-mounted plants producing 2000 to 3000 tons /day from
remote natural gas may become viable in this period. The key assumption here
is that the remot* natural gas used would be available at far-below-market gas
prices. Two plant locations wore evaluated for feedstock and transpo ► t costs
appropriate for methanol: Cook Inlet (Alaska) and Indonesia. The implications
of these; cost projections +are hat barge-mounted plants could yield a 201
after-tax nominal return with a minimum acceptable delivered price of $O.SK
to =0.66/gal (in 1981 P.
9
Coal-based methanol plants supported by price or loan guarantees have
been proposed to SFC. The etudy modeled a western-sited coal-to-methanol plant
and unit train transportation to the West Coast. It was found to require a
price of $U.82/gal delivered to California, even with loan gu.-anteec. Thus,
even with SFC support, western coal-to-methanol production will not be competi-
tive with the other options, and it seems likely that any coal--to-methanol
plants started in the 1980s will have to be subsidized with price supports.
Further, subsidized methanol might tend to displace domestic production in the
chemical sector, rather than in the fuels merket as intended.
Use
Although methanol can be used in utilities and in industry as a boiler
or peakin; fuel, it must compete with conventional fuels. In the 1987
timeframe, residual oil -nd natural gas are expected to cost approximately
$5.50/10 6 Btu, and methanol should cost approximately $9.00/10 btu.
Thus, the only potential for methanol use in the utility/industry sector would
be where environmental constraints force a willingness to pay a significant
premium ($3.00 to $4.00/10 6 Btu) for methanol. One utility application that
seems to have some promise to justify premiums in this range is overfiring
boilers using 10% methanol with natursi gas or residual oil. Full-scale
boiler tests must be done to confirm if such premiums can be justified in
selected power plants where capacity is restricted because of emissions
limitations.
As in utility and industry applications, there are significant near-term
barriers to the expan°ion of refining and blending submarkets on the West
Coast because of lack of availablility of other necessary blending agents such
as isobutylene for methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and tertiary butyl
alcohol (TBA) for low-level blends. It is expected that methanol dexind for
blending and refining will be only 300 to 500 tons/day in the near term
because of these constraints.
There now exists a very small methanol market for commercial fleet
vehicles, supported by several small companies performing vehicle conversions
to neat methanol. Even if factory-optimized methanol vehicles were available
and the price of methanol fuel was such that these vehicles would h&ve an
over-the-road cost competitiveness with gasoline, the near-term potential
market is probably still limited to 4000 to 10,000 vehicle sales per year in
California. This is due to constraining factors such as uncertainty of resale
value, ready availability of methanol fuel, and required maximum trip lengths
for the vehicles. If methanol vehicles were in fact sold at this volume, it
would imply an increase in methanol demand of between about 20 and 75 tons/day.
Such a volume is quite small in comparison to a remote natural-gas methanol
plant size of 2000 to 3000 tons/day.
As shown in Figure 1, the most likely outcome in the near term is for
very limited quantities of methanol being consumed within the state. The
maximum competitive market size would be approximately 4000 tons/day, even if
all the low-level blend potential of California were exploited. A more likely
outcome is that demand -dill be approximately 1000 tone/day, with perhaps
800 tons/day to blending markets, 100 tons/day to vehicle fleets, and 100 to
10
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Figure 1. Projected 1987 California Methanol Market 0 981 $)
200 tons / day utilized for utility experimentation. TtNe only way that this
outcome could to significantly affected would be for: ( 1) the West Coast TBA
capacity to be expanded, (2) the regulatory climate in California to be eased
to facilitate the blending with a higher allowed Reid Vapor Pressure, or
(3) utility overfiring to be expanded if the potential gains are proven in
large - scale tests.
Transition Period ( 1987 to 1997)
A characterization has been made of the effects of letting the market-
place determine methanol introduction and evolution for the timeframe of 1987
to 1997. The transition period is the most interesting aspect of the evolu-
tion of the methanol market because it is t timeframe in which production
methods and sources will change, end-use technology will improve, and the fuel
market in which it competes may also experience significant changes. The
10-year period from 1987 to 1997 is defined for the purposes of this study as
the transition period in which major changes must occur if methanol is to be a
significant fuel by the year 2000. Obviously the planning, testing, experi-
mentation, and policy changes might begin sooner, but the impact of these
activities on the market will be felt in the 1987 to 1997 timeframe.
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Production
There are already capacity additions planned through 1987 based on
natural-gas feedstocks that ma y
 add as much as 1 billion gallons of excess
capacity relative to projected chemical demands. Thus, there is an ample
supply of methanol for early utility experiments, fleet use, and octane
blending in the next few years. Beyond 1987, the potential exists for
additional capacity.
After a detailed comparison of the methanol production costs from both
California feedstocks (bioenergy, petroleum coke, heavy oil in rock) and other
out-of-state resources (western coal, Alaskan coal and remote natural gas), it
has been cancluded that only two options would be important to California's
transition period: remote natural gas, and SFC-supported coal-to-methanol
plants.
A key factor in he conclusion that remote natural gas is the most
important source for methanol in the transition period is the expectation that
the markets will evolve slowly. Methanol from remote natural gas is not
likely to be extremely elastic in supply. At large levels of fuel demand,
production costs from this aocrce would begin to rise for two reasons: longer
transport distances to California, and higher collection costs in less-
developed remote sites.
The major findings in the production cost analysis are that:
(1) Methanol is most efficiently produced from remote natural gas
in the transition period.
(2) Production costs from remote natural gas vary from the
reference case of $0.53/gal in 1992 up to $0.66/gal at a 25%
return and down to $0.42/gal at a 15% return.
(3) The quantities of remote natural gas available on the Pacific
Rim at $1.50/10 6
 Btu or less seem sufficient to support
California's near- to mid-term fuel demands.
(4) Rapid expansion of methanol supply from remote gas resources
will induce price increases as longer transport and higher
collection costs are incurred.
(5) California resources are not critical to a methanol fuel
transition.
(6) Methanol does seem to be in the competitive range with shale
oil or to be significantly cheaper than methanol-to--gasoline
or Fischer-Tropsch liquids.
(7) A high oil price scenario may also tend to induce methanol
production cost increases, which offset some of the apparent
gains in viability.
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(8) There does not appear to be a case in which unsubsidised
coal-to-methanol plants become coslmercial before the year 2000.
MICANAL PACE IS
Use	 Of POOR QUALITY
Given the starting point illustrated previously in Figure I for the
bounds on the California fuel market for methanol in 1987, similar snapshots
of utility, industrial, blends and neat transport fuel markets are made for
1992 (Figure 2). During the transition period, the most important factor in
the status of the methanol fuel market in California will be the competitive
environment in which it must compete. The pertinent submarkets are blends,
fleets, private passenger cars, industrial fuels, and utility fuels. All of
these market potentials are shown in Figure 2 in terms of both breakeven
prices and market sizes. Some significant changes from Figure 1 are evident,
especially in the scale of the potential stationary applications market and
the addition of a light-duty vehicle submarket.
As shown in Figure 2, the transportation markets are the submarkets
where methanol can have a limited impact in the .ransition period. Low-level
blends (4.5X) of methanol and a co-solvent with gasoline should be competitive
at some level by 1992. The maximum methanol use would be about 3000 tons/day
in California for this purpose, but actual use given TAA limitations will
W T H"Ol
PRICE(1/w .!
1.40 4	 _ _` OCTARt E
1.30
1.20_.
1.10 ^• ^	 ••	 ••	 ^	 •
1 00	 •	 .	 •	 •
i • SFC SUPPORTED •O." •
	
AIAI AA COI► TO I111101101
` —I _ A- J
0.so
0.70
0.40
0.60
7.40
0.30
I 
	
1,000	 10,000
	
100.000
QUMTIT1 (TORS PER OAT)
Figure 2. California Methanol Market in 1992 (1981 0
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probably be smaller, about 900 to 1000 tons/day. The fleet market is the next
increment in methanol demand that would be competitive at prices up to about
=0.90/gal, but would imply a maximum methanol demand of 1201 tons/day and a
moire likely demand of approximately 100 tons/day.
.1
The passenger car marks. would also achieve parity in the early 199Gs
with the over-the-road costs of gasoline, although the margin would be slight.
A key factor in this analysis is that only remote ti , tural-gas feedstocks yield
methanol prices in the competitive range of fleets and passenger car markets.
Because this feedstock source is not highly elastic, a very rapid penetration
rate for methanol-fueled vehicles would lead to methanol production-cost
increases. At rates of penetration consistent with diesel vehicles in the
period of 1978 to 1982, remote natural gas is sufficient to supply both fleet•
and passenger cars through the 1987 to 1997 period.
t
Rapidly rising oil prices consistent with the high oil price scenario
may inprove methanol viability somewhat, but there will elso be feedbacks in
methanol production costs that offset part of the apparent gain in competi-
tiveness. As a result, with either the base case or high-price scenario, ;A
methanol from coal does not seem viable through the transition period. In
the low oil price scenario, light-duty vehicles do not become over-the-road
competitive until beyond the year 2000, even for methanol from remote natural
gas. For this optimistic case scenario, the only viable methanol market is in
blending for octane enhancement or possibly overfiring in highly selective
utility applications.
The potential for methanol as a fuel in stationary applications is very
: ; mated in the transition period because it cannot be produced competitively
with pipeline gas or even liquefied natural gas (LNG). This situation is
actually strengthened under a high oil-price scenario, where feedback effects
in methanol production costa will offset likely increases in pipeline gas.
Under the assumption that natural gas remains available to utilities (which
seems likely), the margin for error between costs for natural gas and methanol
is est mated to be Sufficiently wide that methanol cannot compete on strictly
an energy basis.
The only other rationale for using methanol fo.- stationary applications
in this timeframe would be that it has environmental value beyond its energy
^ontent. The problem with environmental premiums is that there are current
programs in place that rely primarily on nuclear capacity, out-of-state coal
generation, ant! renewables to achieve environmental compliance. Burning
methanol within the South Coast Air Basin is neither as cost-effective as
these options nor as environmentally benign with respect to NO x and sulfur
output in the Basin. The one exception to the lack of environmental premiums
is the case where ,p lants are operating well below rapacity because of NOx
output limitations. These few plants are really the only transition-period
methanol market in the utility sector. If bench-scale tests are verified in
large-scale tests, the value of methanol may exceed that of oil or gas by more
than $3.00/10 6 Btu, which would make it a viable application.
lv
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In the period beyond 1997, if the preconditions on methanol developow nt
have been successfully achieved, there are really only two potential feedstock
sources for methanol: western coal and Alaskan North Slope natural gas. Roth
of these feedstocks exist in sufficient quantities to supply an established
and growing methanol fuel demand, and hr. ,,e further strategic value as domestic
sources which are not subject to Middle Eastern political and social insta-
bility. For natural gas the -upply elasticity is such teat quantities og
10,000 to 20,000 tons /day can probably be supplied before large supply cost
t	 increases take place. These cost increases result from increasingly higher
feedstock acquisition and collection costs, and also from costs associated
with longer product transport times. As a result, there costs would incrt.se
-,ntil the potential for North Slope gas could be exploited (about 10,000 	 0)
tons/day). Of course, if the gas pipeline to the North Slope 1.e constructed,
methanol will cease to be a relevant option. For coal - to-methanol plants,
larger quantities might lower production costa for a period while productions
and transport economies are exploited. The minimum acceptable selling price
for coal-to-methanol production, shown in Figure 3, is expressed
100	 1.000	 10,000	 100,000
100	 1,000	 10,000	 100,000
QUANTITY (TONS PER PAY)
Figure 3. Methanol Fuel Md rkets Beyond the Year 2000 (1981 $)
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as a range reflecting uncertainty about the potential economies of scale,
required rates of return, and transport options. Even under the most
optimistic assumptions, coal-based methanol mould not be competitive in
stationary applications, while in the baseline case (20% return, modect
economies of scale and pipeline transport), methanol would not be competitive
with gasoline until beyond the year 2000. Thus, it is not anticipated that
unsubsidised corl-to-methanol plants in the United States will be initiated in
Zhis cortury.
Use
The dominant long-term market for methanol as a fuel, as shown in
Figure 3, is in light-duty passenger vehicles. That is not to say that there
will not be other important markets, but they will be much smaller in site; in
this smaller but important category, methanol may be used in utilities in the
period beyond the year 2000 for limited peaking requirements, and by industry
and utilities as a boiler fuel in environmentally sensitive areas.
The highest value submarkets are for octane blending, but these mar-
kets are very small, totaling to no more than 2000 tons/day. Light-duty
vehicles should be the next highest value market which is also small
initially. Figure 3 also shows that the prospects for methanol use in
statiorsr: applica tions are fiat very optimistic in the c9se where natural
gas is available. In fact, as strictly an energy source, methanol is not
likely to compete with LNG or medium Btu gas ; h► `G) as a fuel source fov
combined -cycle plants or for repowerirj oil -fi.ed boilers. There may be a
small utility role for methanol in dual-fueling plants under strict control
for NOx emissions.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ROLES
From California ' s perspective, there are two overriding motivations for
examining methanol so an alternative fuel in stationary and transportation
applications: securitj of supply and environmental improvement. Hnwev.:r,
both of these factors may not be sufficient to induce methanol implementation
if their value is not sufficient to make methanol viable in specific applica-
tions. An e,, jmi .nation was made based on the available data to see if there is
justification for government intervention in the private marketplace to either
facilitate or accelerate methanol production and use, given the projection of
what the consequences would be of letting the market determine methanol intro-
duction and evolution. Thus, the goal here was to determine from the data
developed in the study and other sources whether a government role is justi-
fied and, if so, what the impact of government policy would be on the methanol
fuel market.
The first step in determining the appropriate policies for the public
sector in the evolution of methanol as a fual in California is to examine to
what degree the private market is not providing proper incentives for methanol
use. Rationales for justifying a public role were examined for an oil import
premium and an environmental premium based on lower emissions. Although
quantitative estimates on these types of premiums are admittedly imprecise, n
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they do provide some rough guidelines on whether the social benefits of
methanol are sufficient to justify its cost.
In areas where there was simply too much uncertainty to formulate ^-
policy for methanol use in the state, the objective is to evaluate whether
the preconditions exist in terms of efficient markets and other institutional
mechanisms for the expansion of methanol - fuel use if it meets the n,.:ket
test. Emphasis was placed on examining mechanisms that help the market
reflect the cost and be,tefits of methanol as they become known and that
efficiently transmit them to both potential producers and consumers.
The rapid changes in events and trends in the last decade are an
indication that our understanding is quite limited of how energy markets in
general and international oil markets in particular will evolve. During the
last 8 years since 1974, the forecasts of energy demand have changed dramat-
ically in response to a better understanding of supply and demand elastici-
ties, Middle East politics, and the evolving policy of the United States.
Oil Import Premium Policy
Implementing an oil import premium policy, such as a tariff on oil
imports, is more efficient than subsidizing a specific option ( like methanol
or shale oil) in that it does not bias the selection process. Baled on
recent study* which placed a bound on the likely value of a United States
import premium from $8.00/bbl to =20.00 /bbl, Table 2 shows the impact of the
premiums on the baseline cost of gasoline. The implication is that if
methanol were competitive with gasoline at $1.74 in 1990, there world be
reason to believe that a national policy of imposing an import pr e mium (for
instance through a tariff) would induce a methanol market. If iethanol
required a gasoline price of more than :2.03/gal in 1990 (in 1981 $) to be
competitive, then even a premium would not induce a methanol market. The
study analysis indicates that an increase in gasoline prices of =0.19 /gal (in
1981 $) does significantly accelerate the period at which methanol becomes a
viable transport fuel ( by about 4 years) for methanol made from remote natural
Table 2. Gasoline Prices With the United States Import Premium
Baseline
	
Gasoline with
Gasoline	 import Premium
Year
	
Market Price, $	 $8 bbl	 20/bbl
1990	 1.55	 1.74	 2.03
1995
	
1.80	 1.99	 2.28
*World Oil, Energy Modeling Forum, Institute for Energy Studies, Stanford
University, EMC Report 6, February 1982.
t
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Ras. For methanol from coal, the breakeven timetrame is so far in the future
that an import premium would not have a significant impact.
The concl ►attons of this study on the issue of national security are
that. (1) if there is a value ($8/bbl) above the free-market oil price to oil
import reduction in the United States, there would be little impact on coal-
based methanol; (2) any attempt to implement such a policy should be done at
the national level, where the costs are spread among all beneficiaries; (3) an
oil-import premium should be implemented in a neutral manner (e.g., oil-import
tariff) to allow the market to select the best alternatives; (4) an import
premium of $8/bbl would raise the retail price of gzmoline about =0.19 /gal,
which would accelerate the over-the-road competitiveness of methanol and other
synfuels 4 to S years if the premium were believed to be of a stable duration;
(5) from a fuel security viewpoint, methanol is not significantly different
from other synfuels that substitute for imported oil; and (6) within Cali-
fornia, the value which can be justified for a California-only oil import
premium is smaller because the market power component (impact of substitution
on lowering the world oil price) is reduced considerably compared to the
nation as :a whole, as most of the benefits would accrue to others.
Environmental Policies
Another nationwide concern with special significance for California is
the air-quality problem in its urban centers. In this regard, methanol does
have uniquo properties compared to other transportation synfuels such as shale
oil, Fischer-Tropech liquids, and products of direct coal liquefaction, as
well as conventional gasoline and diesel fuel. It is also clear that substi-
tution of methanol for oil in utility applications can lead to some benefits
as a result of reductions in NOX , SOX , anti particulate emissions. The
value of these benefits to the utilities, however, is not as clear.
Utilities in the South Coast Air Basin (Los Angeles and vicinity) and in
the Ventura Country Air Pollution Control District (especially Southern Cali-
fornia Edison and Los Angeles Department of Water 6 Power) are required to
reduce their NOX emissions by 60% by the year 1990. Use of methanol in
some units could be included as part of an overall strategy to satisfy this
requirement. This could lead to p ment of a premium for methanol. A similar
requirement is under consideration to limit SO X emissions in the South Coast
Air Basin, and there may be requirements to reduce particulate emissions.
The premiums for the values for methanol as a pollution abatement
strategy would be an additive for NOX and SOX . Thus, the potential
premium value is approximaCely $0.65 to $0.90/10 6 Btu, or about 10.05/;al
of methanol. This .size p remium is not likely to induce use of methanol in
many plants. The cost difference that has been calculated between methanol
and conventional utility fuels is much larger than this value. Nevertheless,
in the longer term it wo.ild be highly desirable if a market system were
established to create a stable mechanism for determining the value of the
premium that methanol or other clean fuels should have as pArt of an efficient
environmental program. Based on the data that exist to date, however,
implementation of a policy to internalize these environmental attributes of
methanol would not significantly accelerate methanol use. 	 fm
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nSubsidies
As far as the gate of California is concerned, there is little to tie
gained from subsidising production of methanol because the Federal Government
has alrt^dy sasumed that role. Pventrrally it may be in Californis't*
 interest
to h&.e a western cc-al-LL.
	
.hanol project among those Awarded assistance by
SIC. The State can improve the likelihood of this type of project by helping
prospective project sponsors and supplying data on California markets for
methanol. There does not stem to be a justification, however, for any
state-sponsored production subsidy to either augment or duplicate SIC's
program.
The one area where the State, through its Public utility Commission
(PIIC), can make a contribution to lowaring the cost of methanol production is
in further development and thw eventual denonstration of the o u e-through
methanol, coal-gasitication, combined-cycle concept. Potential efficiency
gains in the once-through process imply t:.at a cost sAving of about 202 (aside
from utility financing impacts) may be possible from such a system when
compared with a dedicated methanol plant. Proposed experimental programs by
California utilities for development of this process should be Riven careful
consideration by PUC.
Near-Tenn Programs
To improve the acceptance of methanol As a fuel, the State of California
might implement the removal of institutional barriers arising from regulations
and restrictions not conceived with methanol in mind. The California Energy
Commission (CEC) has been active in searching for s.ich unintended barriers and
has been successful in eliminating the most important obstacles. For example,
the state gasoline tax will be levied on methanol on a Btu basis equivalent to
gasoline rather thati on a gallon hasis. Taxing methanol on a gallon basis
would have penalised methanol relative to gasoline. The State has also
sponsored tax credits for converting vehicles to neat-methanol use, which have
been responsible for initiating fleet conversions within California. In
general, CEC ties been diligent in encouraging alcohol-fuel use through barrier
elimination, developing test information through its Alcohol float test
program, And providing incentives for vehicle conversion.
The focal point of the State's plan currently is the $5 million pro-
gram to purchase and su,+ort ap;;oximatsly 1000 fleet vehicles, to establish
50 to 100 commercial refLeling stations in California, and to test methanol-
fueled California Highway Patrol pursuit vehicles. These activities are
intended to help develop mar ►-et stimulus, which will eventually lose', to a
self-sustaining methanol fuel market. Related efforts are also under way to
demonstrate methanol in heavy-duty diesel engines and in stationary applica-
tions (repowerinR and co-firi:gl). These other program- for different types of
applications are important to Cc.^'s atrategy of developing methanol uses that
displace the majority of refined products from crude oil. Tire Commissions's
rationale for this atrategy is that an alternative fuel that only displaces
gasoline, for example, could have adverse effects on the existing petroleum
product slate, necessitating refinery modifications and/or relative price
changes in refined products. The stated goal of these programs is to
accelerate the "take-off" point for self-sustained commercial market growth.
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Given the abrupt seduction in the expectation for conventional fuel
prices that has occurred in the past 2 years, and the significant rise in
projected cost of synf-sels, it is important to assess what government programs
can realistically accomplish in this environment. First, it is clear that the,
liability of synthetic-fuel projects has deteriorated significantly in this
2-year period, as evidenced by the cancellation or postponement of numerous
synfuel projects. Second, the excess capacity in OPTIC oil production makes a
near-term oil disruption less likely than it was a few years ago. The net
effect of these factors is that the market viability of the long-term neat
methanol-fueled vehicle market supplied by western coal has been pushed back
until after the year 2000 in the most likely scenarios. The major fuel
producers have little incentive, in the view of this study, to move aggres-
sively toward creating the supply and distribution network needed for the use
of neat methanol an a large-scale transportation fuel in the foreseeable
future. There are, however, other selected markets where methanol will be
used successfully during this period: octane enhancement, some captive
fleets, and limited tine by utilities. Programs that are oriented toward these
limited goals can bo successful in the period before 1990, but not if they are
expected to lead to a private passenger car market.
In stationary applications, the potential market with the greatest
promise for beingeconomically viable to overfiring with a smell percentage
(10% to 151) of methanol. This concept:, if successful, car lead to a
_justifiable premium for methanol sufficient to overcome its added coat if the
capacity factors of plants constrained by NOx emission restrictions are
expanded. In effect, the value c•f this additional operational capacity added
to the value of methanol fuel can he substantial, but it is limited to those
plants that are NOx-constrained. This study strontly suppo.ts the condact-
ing of t*sts to confirm the potential performance of methano l in the over-
firing mode. To be of greatest value„ however, it is important for overfiring
with methanol to be tested against overfiring with natural gas. A significant
proportion of the benefits of overfiring may be achievable at lower cost with
natural gas overfiring, which would reduce the justifiable premium for
methanol. This submarket 4 utility operations-is relatively small (1750
tons/day of methanol) compared to utility fuel use, but quite significant
relative to current use of methanol an a :uel. Thus, although a major use of
methanol is not anticipated as a fuel substitute for residual oil or natural
gas in utilities, it may be beaefically used in highly selective applications
(e.g., overfiring in environmentally restricted plants).
One possible method for achieving greater use of methanol within
California is for government policy to be used to promote (perLap ►i even
require) utility applications as a means to provide a base for expanding fuel
use into transportation markets. For a number of reasons, it is believed that
this policy would not be a desirable means to transition to large-scale use of
methanol as a transportation fuel. First, the value of methanol in transpor-
tation, markets (especially octane enhancement) is considerably higher (i.e..,
at least double) than its value as a utility fuel. As a result, methanol will
be used first in these higher value markets and will be applied only to lower
value uses as the methanol competition increases production and lowers price.
Second, the cost of producing methanol in large quantities will be too high to
compete with conventional utility fuels. Thus, utility customers would have
to pay •i large premium 33/10 6 Btu for methanol from remote natural gas)
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over current utility fuels, which cannot be justified by any realistic
assessment of the benefits. 'ritird, the experience gained in transporting,
handling, purchasing, storing, and using methanol would he based on utility
use, which would not carry over to transportation fuel companies. Fourth,
although the Quantities of fuels used by utilities are sufficiently large to
utilise the output of a coal-to-methanol plant (once thought to lower cost
through voltimk production), the cost of me:nanol would be considerably higher
than from much smaller plants based on remote natural gas. Thtis, the strategy
of inducing utilities to use methanol through public policy as a means of
transition to more widespread use in other applications is not attractive.
This conclusion is not intended to imply that public support of programs is
inappropria.e to test methanol use in potentially viable utility applications,
but rather that these programs should be justified based on their own merits
as to their ability to benefit utilities and their customers.
One often discussed obstacle in implementing widespread use of methanol
ikt transportation is that the retail distribution system must expand rapidly
in anticipation of autotc.,oile manufacturers producing anti 	 neat
methanol-fualed vehicles to the general public. The problem with distributing
methanol is the! part of the existing gasoline distribution system (seals,
hoses, patches in _anks, etc.) would :lot bc compatible with methanol tint.
Compounding the problem is the fact that the most rocent cycle of replacements
at retail outlets has been dine with fiberglass tanks instead of steel, which
makes the existing system even les o compatible with methanol. Crrating a
parallel system for methanol by Y.-eplacing functional equipment nov; used for
gasoline presents a significant cost and hence an obstacle to methanol. The
lead time that exists, however, be:-1re methanol can compete as n private
passenger car fuel provides time to create a threshold distribution system
much more efficiently. Currently in California there are approximately 19,000
retail gasoline stations supplying transportation feels to the public. As a
general rtile, tha tanks and pipes in tt,ese stations Dave an expected life of
20 years, which, with a uniform replacement rate, would imply about 900
replacements ter year. F:ven s single company therefore could create a
threshold distribution system in a she.rt lead time. For example, if 20% of
the regularly scheduled replacements (tanks, pipes, pumps) were made fur
methanol-compatible systems each year, that would imply approximately 150 to
180 conversions per year. Thus, if thin program were started in 1990, by 1996
about 1000 systems would he in place that could be used to distribute
methanol. Some cleaning of the %vstem would have to he done when the
conversion actually took place, but that would not impose a major cost.
The cost of methanol-cotpatible systems versus conventional systems installed
without this program is a crucial factor in its usefulness. The cost for
replacing s tank, piping, and two pumps at a typical service station is
approximately $50.000 (in 1481 t) for a fiberglass system, and somewhat less
expensive for a steel system. The latter, although less expensive, has a
lifetime that can be considerably smaller, depending on the climatic condi-
tions to which it is exposed. In addition to the costs of more frequent
replacements with a steel system, there are additional costs arising from
station disruption anti 	 risk of damage caused by undetected leaks. With
the relatively dry climate in much of California, the added cost for methanol-
compatible systems should not be great or a major impediment to methanol use.
The coats of such a program would ueem to be fairly modest when compared with
a coal-to-methanol plant. For example, if the extrw cost for a methanol-
compatible s y stem were $5,000 per installation, then 150 stations per year
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would cost $750,000. Although this is not a trivial sum of money, the cost
cver 6 years is $4.5 million to create a threshold distribution system of 900
retail outlets, which is less than 1% of the cost of a 5000 tons/day coal-to-
methanol plant. If instituted in this type of incremental fashion using the
normal replacement cycle, the retail distribution barrier need not be a
mase:ve obstacle to widespread methanol use. Obviously, the transport system
would involve more than the retail distribution outlets, but the delivery
,system is well within the capability of the private tartar if the economic
viability of methanol is favorable.
CONCLUSIONS
A successful strategy for making a transition to widespread use of
methanol as a fuel must be consistent with the realities of the fuel m— ket in
which it must compete. It is clear that in the last year and a half, the 	
,i
climate for introduction of synthetic fuels has changed dramatically. In
1981, oil prices in constant dollars reached a peak from which they have since
fallen approximately 20%, but even more important is the change in expectations
for the future. It is widely believed that real oil prices will fall in 1983
acid then remain constant in real terms through 1985 and only rise to 1981
levels by the end of the decade.
When this study was first conceptualized in 1980, the expectation was
that more emphasis could be placed on actual mechanisms to implement large-
scale methanol use in the next 10 to 20 years. However, as a result of
changes in the oil market as well as more realistic estimates for methanol
production costs, elaborate transition strategies are not possible at this
time. Methanol is simply too costly for large-scale implementation (e.g.,
substitution for utility fuels or gasoline as a neat transportation fuel) to
be feasible.
These general conclusions, and the more specific ones that follow,
represent the beat judgment of the study's au ►.hors based on the data and
analysis incorporated in Volume II: Technical Report. Not every finding can
be rigorously proven, because this subject requires some judgment on future
behavior of fuel marke •-s, technologies, and government polity, which cannot be
known with certainty. Thus, the conclusions are offered as logical
inte.pretations of the existing data.
Supply
•	 The sources of methanol in the near term will be dominated by
natural gas as the feedstock. After deregulation of pipeline gas,
no new plants are likely to be built based on this resource,
although it is anticipated that most existing plants will continue
to operate for the rest of the 1980s and early 1990s.
•	 New plants throughout the world, already under construction or in
planning stages using remote natural gas, will be sufficient to
satisfy modest fuels demands through 1987.
I
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Ie	 the projected excess methanol production capacity relative to
chemical market demands through 1987 could exceed 1 billion gal/
year.
s	 While large quantities of western coals exist that are potentially
available for methanol conversion for use in California (in
particular, the subbituminous coals of Black Mesa, San Juan, Yampa,
and Powder River), substantial support including price supports and
loan guarantees would be required to be viable.
•	 In the near -term and transition periods, the likely quantities of
methanol demanded could not justify a methanol pipeline from
western coal fields.
s	 Where large volumes or distances are required, th.,re is a clear
economic advantag,3 of transporting methanol by means of tankers or
p ipelines wi.^,n compared with rail or truck.
s	 Indigenous California resources are either too limited in supply
(bioenergy, petroleum coke) or too expensive (heavy oil in rock) to
support a major transition to methanol fuel within the State.
Small selective markets, however, will probably be served by these
in-state resources.
rp	 Existing wethanol producers will compete successfully in chemical
markets at production , :oats of $0.67/gal through 1987.
e	 There is sufficient remote gas to supply California demands for the
next 15 years at prices that would undercut any unsubsidised
coal-to-methanol project.
s	 One of the implications of SK's proposed support of coal-to-
methanol plants may be to displace methanol produced by the United
States chemical indu3try.
e	 Methanol produce :s should be able to compete for use of some remote
natural ga y with i•NG producers given that methanol has a higher
value per Btu in tt!nsport-ation applications than LNG and methanol
has a production advantage in smaller Ras reserves.
Demand
e	 The stationary applications market will be small. If the dual-
fueling concept can be demonstrated to work effectively and plants
currently limited in operation by NOx regulations can be operated
at rated capacity using 10% methanol, the implied premium may be
sufficient to make methanol competitive in these plants. The
maximum market in this case is only 1500 tons /day, and the
dual - fueling technology is yet to be demonstrated at full scale.
•	 No economic use exists for methanol as a fuel for repowering
boilers, even with the credit for eliminating the need for
environmental control technology.
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•	 A small market will exist for methanol as a gasoline blending agent
by the Smaller (topping and hydro-skimming) refineries. This
market seems to be presently existent at current methanol prices.
•	 Blends (low-level) have a maximum market in California of approxi-
mately 4000 tone/day of methanol, but it is limited by the
a ,isilablitiy of tertiary butyl alcohol. Thus, the actual demand
will probably be small in the near term.
•	 Neat methanol-fueled vehicles will experience a slow growth rate
because they will not achieve even a slight over-the-road cost
advantage (based on remote natural gas-based methanol) until after
1990, although this advantage will increase over time (coal-based
methanol would not be competitive until beyond 2000).
•	 If methanol-fueled vehicle use were to grow as quickly as the
diesel market, which is doubtful, the proportion by the year 2000
would be about 12%, which would present a level of demand
consistent with remote natural gas-based methanol from the Pacific
Rim.
•	 With likely improvements in cunventional gasoline vehicles,
projected fuel factors as low as 1.3 for neat methanol-fueled
vehicles are unrealistic in the long term. Potential improvement
from a 1.7 fuel factor (existing technology) to a 1.6 fuel factor
in the long term (advanced technology) is possible.
Strategy
•	 Methanol availability in the long term can be effectively aided by
the State of California by facilitating methanol transport by
tanker and pipeline. In the near term, port facilities at Long
Beach and San Francisco Bay, and at costal power plants are suffi-
cient for any anticipated needs. In the long term, pipelines from
western coalfields will be crucial links in efficient systems if
the methanol demand expands.
•	 Given proper incentives to act, utilities would need a 4- to 8-year
development period for widespread conversion and use. The trans-
portation sector would require a 20-year period. At current
prices, however, there is little incentive to begin this process.
Artificial demand created by regulations to induce greatly
increased methanol use (i.e., 50,000 tons/day) will lead to rising
methanol supply costs as longer transport and higher remote gas
collection costs are incurred, and thus would be self-defeating.
•	 Attempts to favor the use of in - state feedstocks will only slow the
methanol transition by raising methanol production costs.
•	 Methanol can f,^rm part of an effective strategy for the control of
photochemical smog and fuel diversification after the year 2000.
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•	 Even in the absence of government intervention, the private sector
is fully capable of implementing large-scale use of neat methanol
as a transportation fuel when it becomes viable.
Mere is no evidence that the "derived likely roles" for methanol
resulting from government policy to correct externalities signifi-
cantly affects the free market rate of methanol use in the period
through 1995.
RECOMlU. NDATIONS
•	 rechnology development should be pursued to improve methanol
viability in the long to nn. Production technologies (e.g.,
co-production, once-through concepts), utilisation technologies
(e.g., advanced neat methanol automobile engines, methanol
overfiring), and demonstrations (e.g., California fleet program)
can contribute to improving the viability of methanol versus
conventional fuels.
•	 Further work may be done to improve the demand analysis of methanol
in selective target markets where methanol may command a premium
value: performance automobiles, selected fleet operators, specific
refiners, etc.
•	 In the policy area, the most productive activities would be to
create better institutions to take into account the environmental
value of methanol (e.g., markets for licenses to emit NO x
 or
50x).
•	 The selective markets that seem viable in the near term (octane
enhancements, utility boiler overfiring, selected centrally-fueled
fleet operators) should be pursued to gain the experience in
handling, maintaining, and operating with methanol fuels.
•	 Policies that attempt to rapidly expand methanol use through
mandates should not be enacted because they would be self-
defeating. Relatively inexpensive feedstocks cannot supply a large
methanol fuel market, opportunities for technological advance would
be lost, and the chance to use the normal replacement cycle for
distribution systems could not be taken advantage of if methanol
were forced into the fuel market too rapidly.
•
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
The California Methanol Assessment was organized by the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) through
an interagency agreement with the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion. The study was a joint effort by JPL and the Caltech Aivision'of
Chemistry and Chemical Engineering and was sponsored by various private
companies and public agencies who are potential stakeholders in methanol
use, production, and distribution. ) State-of-the-art technical data were
synthesized from these sponsors and other sources, and then analyzed for
California markets to determine the appropriate roles that methanol can play
and the efforts that are warranted to ensure an efficient and timely tran-
sition into the marketplace.
Methanol has many potential uses as a fuel in stationary and transpor-
tation applications in California. There are unique benefits that could be
derived from widespread use of methanol in California because of the state's
air-quality problems, its number of potential feedstock sources for methanol,
and its high vunerability to oil disruptions given relatively 'high oil use in
utilities and a population highly dependent on automobile transportation.
Relative to the use of conventional fuels, use of methanol could reduce the
emissions of sulfur oxide (SO.) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) into the atmos-
phere of urban centers.
A.	 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The barrier to widespread methanol use as a fuel has been character-
ized by potential participants and other knowledgeable observers of the meth-
anol market as a problem of the nature of "the chicken or the egg." By this
they mean that neither the production technology nor efficient utilization
technology can be established in anticipation of the other; that is:
Potential methanol producers will not make the large investments
neceosary in the production and distribution system until they have
large markets to supply, and the automobile industry is reluctant
to manufacture vehicles for which there is virtually no distribu-
tion network or fuel available.
The implication of this statement is that both the fuel and automobile indus-
tries must act simultaneously on a large scale to make methanol fuel viable.
The issue of scale is potentially important, as it has been suggested that:
(1) methanol must ultimately be made from coal in large (25,000 tons/day or
larger) western minemouth plants, (2) methanol must be pipelined to end-use
markets in high-volume pipelines (50,000 tons/day), (3) automobile manufac-
turers must mass-produce (at least 30,000 vehicles per year) optimized
1The sponsors of the California Methanol Assessment are listed in the
Acknowledgments.
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methanol vehicles to achieve end-use efficiencies, and (4) potential vehicle
buyers must see an established fuel distribution network before they will
purchase neat methanol-fueled vehicles. Each point represents a hypothesis
that can be evaluated to determine if it is a critical element in the via-
bility of methanol fuel. Once this basic determination is made of what
characterizes a mature methanol delivery system, the real problem remains:
to find transition mechanisms to facilitate an efficient evolution of the
methanol fuel market.
The particular focus of this study has been tr.i determine if there are
useful transition-period (defined in this study As 1,982-1995) strategies,
policies, research activities, regulatory changes, 6r avenues of cooperation
among the participants in the methanol market that w, ,uld facilitate methanol
achievingits longer-term role (1995-2000) more efficiently. This is a very
difficult problem and challenges fuel producers, automobile manufactors, Fuel
distributors, end users, government agencies, and research organizations to
determine sensible processes and policies within a timeframe that will allow
methanol to be efficiently available for future demands,.
B.	 STUDY GOALS AND .APPROACH
The goals of this research effort have been to: (1) synthesize,
evaluate, and document key technical issues (e.g., neat methanol engine
efficiency, economies of scale in methanol production, environmental effects
of methanol use), (2) identify the essential, features of a mature methanol
fuel industry if it should develop, (3) identify and characterize potential
near-term and mid-term methanol fuel markets, (4) evaluate whether there is a
viable transition strategy, and (5) determine if selected policy alternatives
can significantly alter the transition period. Overriding all the specific
goals, above is the goal of identifying the next steps in methanol market
evaluation for each of the key participants (producers, users, equipment
manufacturers, distributors, regulators, legislators). It is trot the intent
of this study to offer a blueprint of the entire transition process because
each successive step is contingent upon information developed along the way.
The uncertainties are too great to compound them in series by laying out
elaborate scenarios over the next 20 years. Instead, the intent has been to
F ocus on the next steps and then to look for flexible processes or mechanisms
which establish the preconditions for an efficient market to operate. If
uncertainties are resolved satisfactorily, then the market will respond
accordingly.
The framework used in this study is based on a few key premises:
(1) private markets will be the ultimate test of whether methanol becomes an
important fuel source; (2) there are some strong technology and cost uncer-
tainties in methanol and other synfuels that are not resolvable at this time;
(3) there are institutional barriers and externalities that prevent existing
market forces from properly valuing all the attributes of synfuel alterna-
tives; (4) there are positive steps that can be taken now to establish the
preconditions for an efficient methanol market; (5) some dominant aspects of
the transition path (e.g., where potential fuel costs, such as methanol and
M-gas, are closely related) can be specified now because, in a relative
sense, they are insensitive to many technical and market uncertainties; and
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(6) California has unique fuel requirements because of environmental problems
that make it a valuable study focus.
The basic framework of the study was constructed by assembling as
sponsor organizations, which are either involved now or would be instrumental
in a successful methanol market. The intent of this approach has been to work
directly with many of the most knowledgeable sources of information on: fuel
production (ARCO, Chevron, Conoco, Exxon, Phillips, Sun, and Texaco), chemical
methanol (du Pont), utility potential (EPRI, PG&E, SCE), automobile technology
(Ford, General Motors), national sy°:fuel incentives (Synthetic Fuel Corpora-
tion), state governmental roles (California Energy Commission), and production
equipment (Litton), and to synthesize the collective wisdom of this group and
subject it to analysis by JPL teams. Thus, the emphasis has not been placed
on generating new basic data, but rather on resolving conflicting information,
performing more detailed market analysis in California submarkets than has
been published to date, and synthesizing this information into a California
strategy.
Although many sponsors were involved in supporting this study, provid-
ing data, and reviewing its findings, the conclusions are not necessarily
agreed upon by each of the sponsors. This document does not represent a
consensus view in any respect; in fact, with such a diverse set of sponsors,
it is not surprising that there are many divergent viewpoints (see Appendix B
of the Technical Report for sponsor comments).
Although the focus of the study is on methanol utilization within Cali-
fornia, examination of methanol production, however, was not so constrained,
as it would have artificially distorted the results. This broader view was
given to policy issues as well, and includes an examination of national policy
toward synfuels, but concentrates on options that can be implemented at the
state level. Thus, although it is recognized that there is a world market for
methanol with inherent supply/demand implications, the study has concentrated
on California's particular markets, regulations, air quality problems, and
competitive environment.
C.	 ORGANIZATION
This Summary Report contains eight sections that are drawn from the Cali-
fornia Methanol Assessment - Volume II, Technical Report, JPL Publication
83-18, JPL Report 5030-562, March 1983. The technical chapters deal with
particular subjects (e.g., feedstocks, methanol production, transport, util-
ization in vehicles, etc.) throughout the analysis period from 1982 through
the year 2000, covering the pertinent aspects of technology, economics, and
policy. In this Summary Report, these topic areas are synthesized by time-
frame (near-term industry, transition paths, and long-term markets), and
cross-cutting topics (policies, environmental implications). The choice of
the specific time period used for near-term (1982-1987), transition-period
(1988-1997), and long-term (1997-beyond) market analyses was made partly for
convenience in organizing the discussion and partly because of real constraints
in the evolution of methanol as a fuel. For example, the near-term period of
5 years is short enough so that changes in methanol production capacity can be
estimated reasonably accurately (plants are already in planning or construction
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stages) and the state of utilization technology is relatively fixed. The
transition period from 1988 to 1997 is the timeframe in which methanol use
would have to expand rapidly if it wore to make a significant irpact on fuel
markets by the turn of the century. Finally, the long-term market is simply
defined as beyond 1997 because that is a period within which some results
would have to be realized to motivate action now in planning, technology
development, and policy implementation.
An array of individuals representing a broad spectrum of disciplines
contributed to this study, including; chemical engineering, petroleum
engineering, policy analysis, and thermodynamics. Their work was synthesized
into an assessment framework and reviewed both internally at JPL and by the
Technical Advisory Group, composed of representatives of the sponsors. A key
feature of the assessment approach was that information was exchanged and
discussed by the Technical Advisory Group in three 2-day meetings held to
review drafts of the interim and final reports. Although agreement was not
reached on all points, these meetings provided an opportunity to discuss
specific issues from the perspective of companies who are or might be
potentially involved in methanol production, distribution, and use.
D.	 STATUS OF THE CURRENT UNITED STATES METHANOL INDUSTRY
1.	 Background
At the turn of the last century, methanol was exclusively produced
by extracting it from pyrol i gneous liquor (obtained during the destructive
distillation of wood). In 1926, synthetic methanol from Germany entered, the
United States market at two-thirds of the price of natural methanol. The
average cost in New York in 1926 was $0.40/gal for natural methanol. Facing
this threat, the wood distillers managed to have the tariff increased to $0.1b
and to have legislation passed to the effect that only natural gas could be
used as a denaturant, which gua,.:anteed them a third of the market at that
time. In 1926, the production of synthetic methanol began in the United
States, and production has grown steadily since. Increasing production
capacity and competition eventually brought the price down and stabilized it
at around $0.30 /gal. Early plants were designed in conjunction with other
plants to make use of carbon-dioxide or hydrogen byproducts.
Interestingly enough, synthesis gas was originally made from coal. A
major process for the gasification of coal is the Winkler process, discovered
in Germany in 1922. Later, however, the feedstock was shifted to oil and then
to natural gas as large petroleum discoveries were made and the cost of these
carbon sources dropped. Natural gas was particularly appealing because of its
low sulfur content and Federally-regulated low prices. By the 19608, syn-
thetic methanol in the United States was almost entirely manufactured from
natural gas by a high-pressure process similar to that used to produce
ammonia. In this high-pressure process, pressurized synthesis gas is normally 	
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made by the reforming of natural gas and consists of a mixture of carbon
monoxide, carbon dixoide, and hydrogen. Because natural gas contains more
than the ideal amount of hydrogen, carbon dixoide is usually added to balance
the excess hydrogen. As a result, methanol producers usually located their	 k
plants close to ammonia plants, because large amounts of carbon dioxide
F
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iare removed from the synthesis gases used to produce ammonia. In a typical
process, the above-mentioned synthesis gas is desulfurized, cooled, compressed,
mixed with recycled gas, and passed to the methanol converter. Zinc chromium
oxide catalysts are used in the conversion of synthesis gas to methanol. The
methanol-containing gases Formed are cooled, condensed, and purified.
In 1957 0 Imperical Chemical Industries introduced a low pressure syn-
thesis process based on newly developed copper-based catalysts that are much
more reactive than the zinc chromium-based catalysts. The lower pressures and
temperatures allowed by this process lower the cost of production 6ubstan-
tially. The price of methanol, in East, dropped from $0.23/gal in 1971 to
around X0.10/gal in 1972-1973 (see Table 1-1).
2,	 Present and Future Demands
The pattern of methanol use in the United States has also changed
somewhat over time in response to new uses being found for methanol in
Table 1-1. HISTORICAL U.S. METHANOL PRODUCTION AND PRICES
YEAR
ANNUAL PRODUCTION
(106 gal)
PRICEa
U/gal.)
1965 432 27
1967 517 26.7
1968 575 25
1969 633 25.4
1970 743 26.7
1971 755 22.8
1972 897 10.7
1973 1064 12.5
1974 1036 20.9
197" 780 39
1976 940 39
1977 973 39
1978 1006 43.1
1979 1100 44
1980 1070 62
1981 1260 75
1982 b 1260 70-75
aWholesale price in current year dollars.
bFirst quarter.
SOURCES:	 Chemical and Engineering News 1/22/79, 1/28/80 01726782 
'
3 29 82; Predicasts Inc.'s Basebook;
U.S. Department of Commerce;
	
Data Resources, Inc.
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chemical, and fuel applications. Figure 1-1 indicates the pattern of use in
1980, which is representative of methanol demands for the late seventies.
In 1980, the fuel use of methanol in the United States was under 100
million gallons per year and a very small proportion (about 6%) of total
methanol demand. This usage pattern can change quite rapidly, however, given
that the potential fuel uses of methanol are so large relative to its chemical
uses. Currently, methanol is used primarily as a feedstock in the production
of resins, glues, and plastics.
The largest single methanol market is use of methanol-based formaldehyde
in the production of resins, in a typical year, ut'eau formaldehyde resins
take about 25% of formaldehyde output and phenol formaldehyde resins nearly as
much. Housing is the biggest single user of these materials. Consequently,
methanol production depends very strongly on movements in the housing market.
Methanol used for the production: of formaldehyde constituted only 30% of
methanol production in 1981. This percentage has dropped from 412 in 1980 due
to the fact that the housing market has declined substantially.
It should be noted that, in general, modernisation and expansion of
existing houses use a higher proportion of plywood and particle board than
FORMALDEHYDE
MISCELLANEOUS/EXPORT --f 14 4
GASOLINE OLENDING (3%)
D M T
b+:
6%	 METHYL AMINES
SOLVENTS
	 7'^	 7%
METHYL HALIDES
METHYL METIIACRYLATE
	
ACETIC ACID
Figure 1-1. 1980 U.S. METHANOL DEMANDS (1980 total; 1070 10 6
 gal)
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does new construction. Therefore, the demand for resin-based housing materials
increases when fewer new houses are built and there is instead more modernizer
tion and expansion. The demand for formaldehyde in construction of mobile
homes and other semipermanent living quarters is not counted in housing starts.
It is possible there could be a moderately strong demand for plywood and
particle board if building trends shift toward these lower-cost living
quarters.
The second largest chemical derivative market for methanol is methyl
methacrylate (MMA). The largest end use of this chemical is acrylic sheet
production; other end uses are surface-coating resins and molding and extru
Aon powders. Dimethyl terephthalate (DMT) is used in the manufacture of
polyester fibers. Except for minor quantities used in the preparation of
herbicides, resins for adhesives, printing inks, and specialty coatings, most
are used to make polyester films and thermoplastic polyester engineering
plastics. The other major current use of methanol is for production of acetic
acid. The largest end uses for acetic acid are vinyl acetate monomer, which
accounted for 44% of acetic acid consumption in 1978, and acetic anhydride,
which accounted for 28%. In 1978, about 17% of the acetic acid produced was
based on methanol, a percentage which is expected to grow substantially.
During the 1979-H2 period, exports averaged 70 10 6
 gal/year and imports were
approximately 40 10b
 gal/year. The future growth of chemical markets was
not examined in detail because it is not critical to the analysis of the
potential for methanol use in California. Other studies were surveyed and
their conclusions are summarized in Table 1-2.
The most important growth market for U.S. chemical uses of methanol is
as a feedstock in acetic acid production, where it will likely capture a large
Table 1-2. CURRENT AND PROJECTED DEMAND FOR CHEMICAL
METHANOL APPLICATIONS (10 9
 gal/year)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Formaldehyde 0.43 0.44-0.79 0.49-0.97 0.56-1.20 0.63-1.46
Solvents 0.13 0.10-0.14 0.12m-0.17 0.14-0.21 0.16-0.26
DMT 0.04 0.04-0.05 0.05-0.07 0.06-0.07 0.06-0.08
Acetic Acid 0.07 0.14-0.20 0.19-0.29 0.26-0.46 0.35-0.74
Others 0.37 0.28-0.55 0.33-0.064 0.39-0.77 0.47-0.92
MTBE :4 other Fuel 0.03 0.18-0.30 0.07-0.53 0.17-0.53 0.17-0.53
Additives
Total 1.07 1.18-2.03 1.35-2.67 1.58-3.24 1.84-3.99
SOURCES:	 Hagler-Bailey, The Emerging U.S. Methanol Industry; "New
Prospects for Methanol and Opportunities for Developing
Countries," World Book.
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share of the market because methanol in lower in coat titan ethylene and butane
feedstocks. Other growth areas are in the production of a single-cell
protein, which will probably develop in Europe but not be a ,f4jetor in U.S.
methanol demand. The development of the fuel additive market, specifically
methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), is of course very promising and has been
considered directly in the California assessment. The national projection in
Table 1-2 includes MTBE. The study analysis of octane enhancement was made
only for the California market, which is quite kAifferent frord the market in
other parts of the country.
3.	 Near-Term Supply Outlook
As shown in Table 1-3 (page 1-9), there is a significant amount
of U.S. methanol capacity to be added during the 1960s (about 20%, or a
375-10 6/year increase from 1982 through 1988). When this capacity increase
is compared with free world capacity additions of 2.8 10 9 gal/year between
1982 and 1988 (see Table 7-3 of the Technical Report), it is clear that the
production capability is growing , rapidly compared to traditional chemical
demands. In fact, by 1985, the excess production capacity will be over 109
gal/year worldwide if no fuel markets develop. This balance is shown in
Table 1-4. Obviously, this situation will change somewhat over time. If
the expectation of this oversupply continues, some of the proposed plants
may be deferred or cancelled and downward pressure on prices may expand
methanol use as an octane enhancer or chemical feedstock.
1-8
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Ta blot 1-3. U, S, METHANOL PRODUCTION CANACI:'1X (106 gal/year)
PRODUCER 1980 1981 1982 1 4 63 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Alit PRODUCTS
Pensacola, LA 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
ALLLiMANI.A C1111M.
Plaquemine, LA 100 130 130 130 130 180 130 130 130
ARCO (;11CM.
Gulf C048ts --- .mow.. --- 200 200 200 200 200 200
1)ORDEN, INC.
ueismatkl,	 LA :1651 180 ISO 180 180 100 180 160 180
CHLANI SE CORP
1)i oho)a, TX
Clear Lake, TX 37'i 385 385 385 385 305 385 385 385
DUPONT
Beaumont 0 TX
bear Park, TX 340 450 450 1 50 450 450 430 450 450
EASTMAN CR M. --- --- 50 50 50 50 5 0
GEORGIA PACIFI C
Plmjoem ue, LA 120 125 125 125 125 12 5 W) 125 ;125
OET 1`Y 0114 _w_ --- ---- 100 1001 100 10 0 100 100
MONSANTO
Texas City, TX 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
'1.ONECO, INC.
^Houston,	 `1'X 80 82 1130 1130 130 130 130 130 130
To tal U.S. 1,325 1,502 1 0 560 1,860 1 0 910 1,910 1,0)101 1,910 1,910
Other Vree World LLLLO 2,200 2.740) .22,885 K.,254 5 4 415 5,085 5. ,
4
15 5"?$5
TOTAL 3 605 51782 4„3:00 I#j7^t45 a^4^5 6y:325 6 9955 . Jr ^D, 	 25 7,It95
SOURCES: Conoco,	 "',1'lie Production, Economics, and marketing of M00141101,01
prosootati,on to i3ooeratl Motors Corp. , MaXcte 1982; Energy Modeling
Forum, "Energy Modeling Forecast," Wor1^, EMl' Report 60
:Main.- oxd Univf cs ity, Stanford, Cttlif. , Feb.	 1982' 0
T
j
m
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Table 1-4. FREE WORLD METHANOL BALANCE 1981-1987 (10 9 gal/year)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Existing Production 3.11 3.11 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22
Effective New Capacity -- 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.86 2.43 2.76
(cumulative)
Effective Production 3.22 3.52 3.92 4.42 5.08 5.64 5.98
Free World Imports 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.17
Production b Imports 3.25 3.59 4.02 4.55 5.25 5.71 6.15
Consumption 2.91 3.47 3.74 3.97 4.17 4.30	 1 4.47
Balance 0.34 0.12 0.28 0.58 1.08 1.51 1.68
SOURCE:	 Conoco,	 The Production, Economics, and Marketing of Methanol,"
presentation to General Motors Corp., March 1982.
SECTION 11
NEAR-TERM METHANOL INDUSTRY
An effort of this study has been to examine the possible transition
paths of methanol into long-term fuel and stationary source markets.
Therefore, this study looks more deeply than other nonproprietary studies at
the $ubmarkets in transportation, utilities, and industry that could be
important in building the supply, production, and delivery infrastructure
necessary for use of methanol as a fuel. For example, in the transportation
fuel market, octane demand in California is examined as a complex market in
itself. This point of view is quite different for the large refiners and the
independents in terms of the value each would place on methanol for octane
enhancement. Similarly, in the case of utilities, an attempt has been made to
carefully differentiate the value of methanol in various types of generating
units and under a number of environmental conditions and regulations. The
results, whei aggregated across the market sectors, provide the framework for
structuring a transition strategy.
The study has also taken a fairly detailed look at the methanol produc-
tion Industry in the nearer term (1982-1987), as this period may Also be
crucial to a transition strategy. This reriod is significant because methanol
production is already in a period of transition. The deregulation of natural
gas now in progress will greatly alter the structure of methanol supply in the
long run and may lead to significant price changes in the near term.
This section describes the study-based interpretation of the projected
methanol industry evolution during the period frou, 1982 through 1987. This
time period is important because it is a period in which major capital stock
changes in production and end-use sytems will be difficult to make.
A.	 NEAR-TERM PRODUCTION OPTIONS AND COSTS
As described in Section I, the methanol supply industry is already in a
transition period. Adding to the progressing deregulation of natural gas and
a worldwide oversupply of methanol (see Table 1-4), there is a prospect for
coal-based methanol plants supported by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation
(SFC). Also, there is much uncertainty surrounding the near-term structure of
the methanol supply industry.
Of particular interest to this analysis is the production cost of the
marginal supplier2 of methanol in both the chemical and fuel markets. It is
the selling price of the marginal supplier that establishes the price observed
in the market. There may be more efficient producers, some producers with
access to cheaper feedstocks, or others with fully amortized plants that could
undercut the marginal producer, but they will sell at the marginal price
established in the market. The nearer-term supply issue has been examined
2A supplier whose product is or is not cost-effective to produce depending
on minor fluctuations in production costs and market rates.
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re by making estimates of the production costs of various classes of pro-
cera to determine the marginal production, price in the mid to late 1980s.
Three possible marginal production sources are (1) methanol from
nventional natural gas plants with unregulated gas feedstock cost, (2) new
bating barge natural gus plants, or (3) Synthetic Fuel Corporation-supported
al-to-methanol plants. As a basis of comparison 0 3 1987 was selected as
e year of commercial operation for all three types of plants. By this time
riod, a number of significant events will influence the methanol industry:
(1) By 1985, U.S. natural gas will for the most part be deregulated and
will move toward parity with residual oil prices at the point of
use of natural gas. For California, this pricing will be based
upon 0.25% or 0.5% sulfur fuel oil, depending upon the environmental
requirements within the state. In the study ' s baseline scenario,
this is expected, to be in the $4.75 to $5 . 00 per million Btu range
in 1987 (in 1981 dollars).
(2) Contracts for inexpensive natural gas, supplying the conventional
feedstock for U.S. methanol, will virtually all have expired by
1985-86. As a result, domestic producers will be paying market
prices for feedstock natural gas.
(3) There will be excess capacity in methanol production to supply
traditional chemical market uses. Even if demands in traditional
uses like formaldehykLa return to pre -rece psion levels as the
housing industry e y .:ands, the 1985 excess supply capacity will
probably exceed 10 gal /year in free world markets ( unless fuel
uses expand).
1. Existing United States -Based Natural Gas-To-Methanol Plants
The most profound impact of the above changes will be on the
existing U.S. methanol supply industry, which will be operating virtually 100%
on market natural gas in 1987. Because the investment in these plants is sunk
and some are undoubtedly fully amortized, the decision to maintain operations
will be a function of whether the incremental capital costs (retrofits for
older high-pressure plants and working capital requirements), operating costs,
and some contribution to company overhead and profit can be covered by selling
at the market-dez?^rmined price. In order to quantitatively evaluate this
supply source, the minimum required selling price to cover the working capital
requirements, feedstock costs and operating costs has been calculated. Given
the very modest risks involved ir. this type of operation, a rate-of-return of
15% after taxes on the working capital requirement was assumed. Feedstock and
selling prices were both assumed to escalate at 8% in nominal terms starting
in 1987. For this case, retrofit costs for improving plant efficiency were
not examined. Given these assumptions and others documented in the Technical
30ther standard assumptions on these cases are detailed in the Production
Cost section of the Technical Report, Chapter 4.
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rReport,k it was concluded that production coat would be 10.76 per gallon at
the plant gate in 1981 dollars. At market prices below this level, it would
be more profitable for the companies in question to simply shut down. Another
implication of the analysis of methanol production from natural gas feedstocks
is that it would not be expected for any new capacities to be added that
relied on residual oil parity-priced natural gas.
2.	 Barge-Mounted Methanol Plants
Barge-mounted methanol plants are another interesting production
source which could be the marginal methanol producer in 1987. These plants
are fully self-contained units which are constructed in shipyards and towed to
their operating location. A number of plant cost and operating cost estimates
made by Swedyards, Litton, Mitsui, and Nissko Iwai has been considered here in
evaluating the barge-mounted concept. 5 A product cost estimate of
$185.3/year in ;millions of 1.981$ is a synthesis of this data. Given that this
concept is not the standard operating procedure within the industry, it will
require some risk premium compared to conventional plant investments. It was
assumed a 20% after-tax (nominal) return would be required, although a
sensitivity analysis at a 25% rate of return was also made. Tn addition, it
was assumed that both feedstock and product price would escalate at 8% (2%
above inflation) for the life of the plant. The key assumption, however, is
that remote natural gas would be available at prices far below "market" gas,
which has both access to a pipeline transport system and end-use demand. Two
p1Fnt locations are of particular interest in this timeframe: Cook Inlet and
Ii;donesia. There are many other possible plant locations, but these two serve
to illustrate the impacts of different transport costs and the impact of the
duty on imported chemical methanol. For ease of comparison, it has been
assumed that plant capital costs and operating costs are the same for both
locations. 6 The major differences arise in transportation cost, with
Indonesian methanol covering a much longer distance (partially offset in
transport cost by using foreign carriers) to an assumed destination at Long
Beach, California. Another possible difference in methanol production costs
between these locations is the feedstock cost. Certainly, even though the gas
used would not have an.oil-based parity price, it would have to cover the
collection costs as well as the owner's opportunity costs for holding the gas
in the ground for possible sale later into a future pipeline or for local
use. It is calculated that a minimum feedstock price in Cook Inlet is around
$1.00 per million Btu, given that collection costs are moderate and the
potential for a pipeline is very remote. The case of feedstock at $1.50 per
million Stu was also considered. Natural gas in Indonesia may be more
4Primary assumptions are for a 2000-ton/day plant operating at 65%
efficiency with an annual operating cost of $189.3/year in millions of 1981$
and a working capital requirement of $39 million, all in 1981 dollars.
5See Technical Report (Chapter 4.B.2) for a discussion of barge-mounted
methanol plants.
6For a 2000-ton/day plant, $290 million in capital cost has been assumed and
$22 million per year in operating cost, all in 1981 dollars.
COOK INLET FEEDSTOCK INDONESIA FEEDSTOCK
COST ($/10 6 Btu) COST ($/106 Btu)
1.00	 1.50 1.50	 2.00
PLANT GATE COST 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.70
TRANSPORTATION 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.12
(to Long Beach)
TOTAL 0.63 0.69 0.76 0.82
expensive to collect and transport to the plant given less development of a
collection system, and thus feedstock prices would be expected in the $1.50 to
$2.00 per million Btu range. Table 2-1 summarizes the barge-mounted methanol
cases.
The implications of these cost projections are that foreign remote
natural gas -to-methanol could compete on the West Coast for fuel, but not in
the Gulf Coast for chemical markets. If one were to add an 18% duty to the
Indonesian projections in Table 2-1, and the added transport cost to the Gulf,
it would make Indonesian methanol uncompetitive with Gulf Coast methanol in
chemical uses. The Cook Inlet option is particularly interesting because with
lower transport costs than from Indonesia, possibly lower gathering and
collection costs, and the absence of any duty for an American producer, it
would appear to have a competitive edge. If the required rate of return were
higher than that assumed above as a result of some risk perception, it would
somewhat erode this advantage. At a 25% return on 100% equity, for example,
the initial price would rise $0.06 per gallon for all cases, making the
delivered minimum price of Cook Inlet methanol very close to that of existing
producers.
3.	 Synthetic Fuels Corporation-Supported Plants
A third candidate for the marginal production source in the late
1980s is a coal-based methanol plant supported by a SFC loan and/or price
guarantees. As an illustrative case for coal-to-methanol, a western-sited
plant utilizing the Lurgi Dry Bottom Gasification Technology is assumed (it is
a commercial technology which is consistent with a late 1980s operation date).
It is further assumed that the plant is scaled to 4000 ton/day to take advan-
tage of significant economies of scale up to one full production train. Given
SFC participation, it is assumed that this plant could obtain significant
leveraged financing. With 60% debt financing at 16% interest, and a 25% after-
tax return on the 40% equity participation, the project would be financed at
below market rates, which would significantly lower its cost of construction.
Even given this .favorable financing at subsidized rates, it is estimated that
Table 2-1. BARGE-MOUNTED METHANOL PRODUCTION AND
TRANSPORTATION COSTS (1981$/gal)
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Ethe initial required selling price would be $0.78 per gallon at the plant
gate. ?
 With the most favorable transportation system (pipeline), it would
require a price of $0.82 per gallon delivered to a California central distri-
bution point. With :ail transport of methanol, coal-to-methanol would. be
prohibitively expensive ($0.96 per gallon).
A few points are important concerning this particular option. First,
only a subsidized venture could achieve this type of leveraged financing in
the near future. There are significant risks in both the construction of such
a plant ac a western minemouth site and the marketability of such a large
quantity of methanol relative to traditional markets. Second, thee€ has been
a specific focus on the western region because this is a California study.
A coal-based methanol plant could probably be constructed more cheaply (as
much as 20-25X) in Texas or Illinois, which could lower the product cost
considerably (as much as 6-8 cents per gallon, even allowing for higher
delivered coal costs). Thus, from a national perspective, the options for
coal-to-methanol are somewhat different than from the California perspective.
4. Near-Term Production Summary
The basic conclusion of the near-term production cost analysis is
that the existing U.S. methanol production industry will most likely remain
quite viable, at least through 1990. A year ago this prospect seemed quite
remote. The key change is the moderation of expected residual oil prices to
which pipeline natural gas is expected to rise. At expected natural gas
prices, Gulf Coast producers can compete successfully with new foreign sources
once transport and the chemical methanol import duty are added. Some existing
or nearly completed foreign plants in Canada and Mexico will probably be able
to undercut domestic producers slightly if their natural gas feedstock cost is
significantly below pipeline gas, but this competition will not affect most of
the existing U.S. producers. A rapid run-up in oil prices in the mid 1980s
would, of course, significantly change this scenario. Natural gas prices
would tend to rise with oil prices (residual oil) and make foreign competition
much more vigorous.
An implication of the study baseline expectations is that the domestic
industry will tend to maintain its market for chemical applications. Even the
barge-mounted plant in Cook Inlet, which may be one of the lees expensive new
supply source cases, would have a production cost of $0.58 per gallon
delivered by tanker to the Gulf Coast. When one also considers that the
existing domestic producers have considerable marketing ties and, in some
cases, vertically integrated operations, the prospect of this scenario is
enhanced. Thus, if barge-mounted plants are to be introduced in Cook Inlet,
it will be to service the fuel industry on the West Coast. However, methanol
prices will tend to be at parity with Gulf Coast prices, less the added
transportation cost. Thus, existing natural gas plants using pipeline gas are
7The $0.78/gal price would then have to escalate at 8% annually over the
project lifetime (or 2% in real terms) to yield the assumed rate of return.
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the marginal production source and hence will, given expected demands,
establish the market price.
Even with SFC loan guarantees, western coal-to-methanol plants will
probably not be competitive with either existing producers, remote gas=to-
methanol from Cook Inlet, or methanol plants in Canada and Mexico, based Gn
non-pipeline gas in the 1980s. The premium for building such a capital-
intensive plant in areas without a fully developed infrastructure is just too
large when the other uncertainties are considered. Thus, it is more likely
that any U.S. coal -to-methanol plants started in the 1980s will be subsidized
and/or built in more developed areas than the western coal fields.
A point should also be made in this section on SFC's role in this
near term market. The situation in methanol production is quite different
than petroleum in that there is a potential fuels market and an existing
domestic chemical methanol market supplied mostly by domestic producers.
Unlike the petroleum market, however, where imports represent the marginal
producer, it is anticipated that the domestic producer operating on deregu-
lated "market" natural gas will be the marginal methanol producer. As a
result, whereas subsidized petroleum synfuels displace imports, subsidized
methanol production used in chemical manufacture would tend to displace
domestic production. Thus, any SFC support for coal-to-methanol production
must consider the market for the methanol product. Costs and benefits are
quite different if the methanol is used for fuel rather than chemical
applications. It is hard to develop a rationale for subsidizing large-scale
production that would displace domestic chemical producers, especially as
coal-based production would not compete on its own merits. As the focus is on
the California market and policy alternatives, this issue need not be analyzed
further, except to point out the problem and suggest that it be dealt with at
the national lev/sl.
B.	 HIGHEST VALUED NEAR-TERM MARKETS
As part of a transition strategy, an examination has been made of a
number of fuel submarkets that have been proposed as possible near-term
applications and could be helpful in expanding methanol use in California.
The potential applications that are particularly interesting for methanol
are	 repowering utility boilers, fuel for peaking turbines, dual fueling of
oil-fired boilers, octane enhancer for motor fuels, blending agent for volume
extention, neat methanol in retrofit car fleets, neat methanol in heavy-duty
vehicles, and methanol in industrial applications. In all of these submarkets,
the focus has been on the California.market and to a deeper level of examina-
tion than previous methanol market assessments. The discussion below on the
respective submarkets is organized into three major categories: stationary
applications, synthesis, and motor fuel applications.
1.	 Stationary Applications
The potential for methanol use in stationary applications includes
both utility and industrial uses of methanol as a boiler or peaking fuel. As
a mechanism for facilitating a methanol transition in California, the
F
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stationary applications can play an important role in bringing relatively
large quantities of methanol into the state. This would create a bulk storage
and distribution infrastructure. Obviously, direct substitution of methanol
for oil also has both environmental and fuel diversification value and is
important to the state. In this stationary applications analysis, the value
of methanol and its associated market potential was evaluated, taking into
account its fuel substitution value, changes in plant ratings, hardware
modifications, and environmental control savings. The primary tool for this
evaluation has been the SYSGEN Model, 8
 described in detail in the Technical
Report. It is important to recognize that the value analysis reported in this
section is not a "demand" projection for methanol, rather, it is a description
of the marginal value of using methanol in various types of generating units.
In general, one can interpret the quantities of methanol associated with the
derived marginal values as the market potential for methanol. The market
potential is the maximum amount of methanol use which would result if all
cost-effective uses were exploited as early as they become available. In the
marketplace, there will inevitably be events that slow the response of
potential adoptors and constrain the actual conversion to methanol to less
than the market potential. For example, in the model there is a methanol
price that makes repowering for a large class of oil-fired boilers "economic"
simultaneo.isly. In such a case, it would still be prudent for a utility to
incrementally make methanol conversions to verify experimental data and get
further operating experience before expanding too rapidly. The intent here is
that by exposing the opportunities and problems early with more lead time, the
actual market performance will move closer to exploiting the market potential,
although it cannot do this competely.
Even under the most optimistic assumption that methanol becomes cost
effective versus oil and natural gas in the very near term, there are
technical performance and operations uncertainties that must be resolved.
Thus, in order to capture a reasonable phase-in timeframe, a timetable has
been developed (Figure 2-1) that shows the most likely evolution from the time
methanol achieves cost-effectiveness.9
In this scenario, combustion turbines would be the first application
because of the relative ease of conversion and the small quantities of methanol
involved. The second step would bring in the Long Beach combined-cycle units
because the volumes of methanol are moderate, they are supplied by water, and
the capacity factors may be increased because they are now constrained by air
pollution limitations. A major third step, using the experience with handling
large methanol volumes and boiler firing at Long. Beach, would be the
conversion of the two large steam turbines suppliable by water: Ormond Beach
8The SYSGEN Model dispatches the generating units optimally and calculates
the system production costs of an electric generating system given detailed
characteristics (fuels, costs, heat rates, availability factors, etc.) of the
available generating units and the load that is to be supplied.
9In this context, cost-effectiveness is meant in the broad sense, including
direct fuel value, modifications to equipment, rating impact, and_environ-
mental control equipment value.
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Figure 2-1. UTILITY PHASE-IN SCHEDULE
and Mandalay. Only after a successful demonstration at Long Beach would the
conversion of the coolwater combined-cycle units begin, while conversion of
other large steam turbines would follow a period of successful operation at
Ormond Beach.
The result of expected lags in testing and implementation is that the
1987 utility potential is limited to approximately 3500 ton/day of methanol
demand. In reality, it is expected to be considerably smaller because
methanol will not be competitive in this timeframe under expected market
conditions, thus utilities would move slowly in a testing program. As shown
in Figure 2-2, methanol does not appear to be competitive by 1987 for
stationary sources. Furthermore, in the case where natural gas is available
to both utility and industrial customers, the margin is considerable. The
only potential is where utility plants or industry are so constrained by
environmental controls or regulations that they would be willingto pay a
significant premium for methanol. This premium would be over $2.00/10 Btu,
and therefore is not likely to be justified except in very unusual circum-
stances. As an experimental program, a demand of only a few hundred tons per
day might be expected if methanol is non-competitive.LO
10See Figures 9-11 and 9-12 of the Technical Report.
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2.	 Methanol Demand in Refining and Blending Submarkets
As discussed in Chapter 8 of the Technical Report, there are two
principal applications in refining and blending. One application is the use
of methanol as one of the feedstocks in the production of M'rBE, and the other
is use in gasoline blending for either octane or volume enhancement. There
are near-term barriers to the expansion of both these submarkets. In the case
of MTBE, for instance, there is no West Coast source of isobutylene, which is
&! essential for production. The existing capacity is located with the petro-
chemical industry near the Gulf Coast, and it is not likely that this situ-
ation could change significantly in the near term.
The blending market in the near term (up to 1Q87) is most economical for
the smaller (topping and hydro-skimming) refineries, where a price breakeven
would occur at about $1.05/gal of methanol. A co-solvent such as TBA would
have to be added in equal proportions to the methanol, and TBA is also not
currently available on the West Coast. If methanol were 12 to 15 cents per
gallon less expensive than on the Gulf Coast, it would compensate for TBA
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transport cost and m4ke some shipments of TBA available. Capturing this
smaller application, however,. would not have a significant impact on the
methanol market, as it represents only 4% of California's refinery capacity
and methanol would be used in only a 4.5% blend.
Thus, in the near term~ the availability of TBA is the key factor in
limiting blending. Other more expensive co-solvents such as propanols could
be used, but this would lower the economic attractiveness of methanol blends.
Larger refineries would have a lower value for methanol as an octane enhancer
because they would have a lower octane number cost. Even if all the TBA
currently produced in the United States were shipped to California, only about
70% of the gasoline produced in the state could be blended with methanol,
which would result in slightly over 3000 ton /day of methanol demand. In the
near term, it is anticipated that TBA limitation will hold this to only 300 to
300 ton/day of methanol demand in the mid-1980x.
3.	 Near-Term Light-Duty Fleet Vehicles
There now exists a very small methanol market in commercial fleet
vehicles, ,supported by several small companies performing vehicle conversions
to neat methanol. Even it quality methanol vehicles were available and the
price of methanol fuel was such that these vehicles would have an over-the-
road cost competitiveness with gasoline, the near-term potential market is
probably still limited to 4000-10,000 vehicle sales per year.
-
 This is due to
constraining factors such as uncertainty of resale value, reay availability
of methanol fuel, and customary maximum trip lengths for the vehicles. If
methanol vehicles were in fact sold at this volume, it would imply an increase
in methanol demand of between about 20 and 75 ton/day. Such a volume is quite
small in comparison to a remote natural gas methanol plant size of 2000-4000
ton/day.
C.	 NEAR-TERM SUMMARY
As shown in Figure 2-2, the most
very limited quantities of methanol bei
maximum competitive market size would b
blends of California gasoline were made
will be approximately 1000 ton/day, wit
markets, 100 ton/day to vehicle fleets,
utility experimentation. The only way
cantly affected would be for the West C
regulatory climate in California to be
higher allowed Reid Vapor Pressure.
likely outcome in the near term is for
ng consumed within the state. The
e approximately 4000 ton/day if 3-1/2%
A more likely outcome is that demand
h perhaps 800 ton/day to blending
and 100-200 ton/day utilized for
that this outcome could be signifi-
oast TBA capacity to be expanded or the
eased to facilitate blending with
On the supply side, the likely sources for methanol during this period
through 1987 would be from installation already under construction and based
on natural gas ,Feedstocks. The excess supply for chemical uses could total
nearly 109 gal/year by 1987. In spite of this large excess capacity,
however, a drop in price to below $0.60/gal delivered to California is not
anticipated because U.S. producers will have variable costs above this level,
which would imply shutting down at lower prices. Thus, marginal production
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costs will tend toward the U.S. marginal producer using market gar as
feedstocks. Prices are not likely to fall sufficiently to make methanol
competitive With natural gar for stationary applications or with diesel fuel
for trucks and buses.
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SECTION III	 OF POOR QUALITY
THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRON*,N'P
A.	 FUELS OVERVIEW
The following section describes in detail the present and projected
competitive environment fo, methanol in California, with emphasis on two key
issues:	 (1) the availability and price of natural gas and residual -)il to
California utilities and (2) the likely range of cost for motor fuels in
California.
The poor record of energv forecasters over the past decade clearly
illustrates the difficulty of making long-term projections in a rapidly
changing political and economic environment. In Figure 3-1, forecasts of
primary energy consumptions in the United States are sh.>wn for the period
1980-2000. These forecasts were made in S different years using a consistent
forecasting model.11
Figure 3-1. FORECASTS OF TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
"The Data Resources, Inc. forecasting model.
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The cumulative impact of the revisions in the year-2000 forecast are
substantial, dropping nearly 40% from 1974 to 1981. These changes are a
result of political factors (xran-Iraq War) as well as economic ones (larger
demand elasticities than expected), and as a result the level of understanding
of the forces that affect U.S. energy consumption is improving. It is still
very difficult, however, to accurately predict the quantities of different
energy sources consumed in the year 2000. The major value of large fore-
casting models is to show the impact of specific events or sensitivities in
relation tr,* some base case, not to forecast long-term magnitudes.
In California, the dependence on oil and gas will probably be higher
than for the nation as a whole. In electricity generation within California,
for instance, approximately 8% to 9% of utility fuel demand will be for oil
and 20% for natural gas, which is significantly above the national average.
In transportation also, California will exceed the national average in use of
motor fuels per capita, but here the difference from the average is less
extreme.
Fortunately, it is not critical for purposes of this report to make
precise forecasts of liquid fuel and natural gas consumption levels. Rather',
it is more important to define the expected climate for the fuel market in the
1987-1997 time period. At this general level, the findings are fairly clear
cut. For the United States as a whole, domesti.^ sources, including synthetic
liquid fuels, will be insufficient to supply exp Llcted demands, and thus oil
imports will probably represent 30% to 406 of the U.S. oil supply. The bulk
of this oil will be used for transportation, but there will still be some oil
burned in electricity generation (2% to 3% of utility fuel demand). Also, on
the national level it is expected that natural gas will represent. 5% to 6% of
utility fuel demand.
The key questions about the use of natural gas in California are: (1)
What price will it sell for af'tar decontrol? and (2) Will there be sufficient
quantities to supply low priority users in California? In the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, a complex pricing scheme was created which was designed to
bring the price of most new gas to a decontrolled market level by 1985. There
would, however, be price controls indefinitely on certain classes of flowing
gas. A problem arose with this policy almost immediately after it was enacted
because, of the major price increase of imported oil in 1979. Because new gas
was escalated at the inflation rate, gas prices lagged far behind the increase
in oil prices. There was much concern in the Federal Government that, accom-
panying decontrol in 1985, there would be a very rapid rise in decontrolled
gas. With the decline in the real price of oil in 1982, the "fly-up" problem
and concern over it has dissipated. There will still be a significant price.
increase in 1985, when about 65% of all natural gas supplies are decontrolled,
but it should be politically acceptable.
The market clearing price of natural gas in 1985 will clearly depend on
oil prices in that timeframe. Under the baseline scenario of virtually
constant real oil prices in the period 1982-1985, it is likely that natural
gas prices will tend toward parity with the price of residual oil to end users.
1.	 California Electric Utility Fuels
In California, where only low sulfur oil (0.25-0.50% sulfur) can be
used due to environmental constraints, natural gas should tend toward parity
with its value to the marginal user, which would be the price of 0.5% sulfur
oil in industrial boilers. In an unregulated market, therefore, electric
utilities (required to use 0.25% sulfur oil) might be able to Acquire gas at a
slight bargain over their alternative ,fuel price. It is possible, however,
that the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) will pass along the higher costs of
gas to these users up to the point of fuel switching, which is at parity with
0. 15% sulfur residual oil. The difference between these alternatives is not
that significant (approximately 5%) given the overall uncertainty in the
market forecast anyway. Thus, for the Southern California area, the price of
0.5% sulfur oil was used for electric utilities. For natural gas prices, the
premise was adopted that the market value will tend toward the price of ON,'!,
sulfur oil as the alteruative price of the marginal user. It should be noted,
however, that natural gas could have a value about 5% higher it PUC passes the
higher costs (up to parity with 0.25.% sulfur oil) along to the electric util-
ities. 'fable 3-1, derived from the Data Research, Inc. (DRI) Spring 1982
Energy Review, summarizes the utility fuels cost situation. Forecasts made by
DRI have been used throughout this zeport to provide a consistent frame of
reference. It should be noted that Table 3-1 represents the average
acquisition cost of gas to all utilities. It is expected that electric
utilities will pay a'higher price in 1982 to 1985 equal, to the cost of
residual oil at the point of use.
California's electric utilities pay higher fuel prices as a result of
requirements for lower sulfur fuels and longer transport distances. For
example, the U.3, price to all utilities for residual oil is forecasted by DRI
to be $5.95/10 6 tutu and $7.73/10 6
 Btu in 1990 and 2000, respectively. in
the base case forecast, shown in Table 3-1, there would be sufficient natural
gas for the market to supply about 2.0 quads to California, which is about the
quantity consumed in 1982, although less than what may be supplied in the
't'ab'le 3-1. BASS CASE CALIFORNIA UTILITY FUEL COSTS (1981$/10 6
 Btu)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990 1995 2000
COAL 1.89 1.96 2.04 2.18 2.21 2.76 307 3.74
NATURAL GAS a 3.93 4.10 4.89 4.83 5.01 6.37 7.44 8.06
RESIDUAL OIL
0.50% sulfur 5.80 5.44 5.42 5.41 5.49 6.68 7.58 8.18
0.25% sulfur 6.67 5.77 5.68 5.67 5.76 7.00 7.95 8.58
DIS'T'ILLATE OIL 7.17 6.15 5.90 5.95 6.12 7-.89 9.37 10.60
aNatural gas prices in this table are the acquisition prices for all
utilities.	 It is expected that electric utilities will pay prices
based on the cost of residual oil in their service area.
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1982 1983 1984 1985 1990 1995 2000
DRIa
Ca.s Available 2004 1972 2007 2096 2265 2078 1968
Non-Utility Gas Demand 1146 1161 1235 1300 1293 1254 1206
Electric Utility Demand
Gas 713 662 618 638 793 625 541
Oil 311 289 285 277 345 254 219
Percentage Available
Gas 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Gas and Oil 84 85 85 87 85 94 100
1982 California Gas Report 
Gas Available 2191 2202 2091 2013 2031 1964 1917
Non-Utility Gas Demand 1238 1242 1271 1296 1360 1449 1537
Electric Utility Gas Demand 762 619 512 499 435 457 435
Percentage Gas Available 85 94 95 87 83 71 51
aData Resources, Inc., Energy Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1982.
b1982 California Gas Report, prepared by Utility Industry Committee, 1982.
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intervening years. The implication of this forecast is that California
industry and electric utilities will probably benefit from the deregulation of
natural gad prices. Price inc.reaseis will increase conservation in residential
markets, while parity in price, with mid-sulfur residual oil prices will induce
some industrial consumers across the nation to use oil instead of gas. On the
production side, higher prices will induce some sources of supply which would
otherwise not be economic, although a major supply response is not expected.
In fact, by the year 2000, natural gas consumption is expected to decline from
approximately 20 quads per year in the period 1980 to 1990 to about 18.5 quads
in 2000. Over this period, lower 48 states production should decrease from
over 19 quads per year to below 14 quads per year. The remainder will be
supplied by supplemental, sources (Alaskan North Slope, Canadian imports,
Mexican imports, LNG and S'NG).
The issue of natural gas availability to California industry and elec-
tric utilities is more uncertain than its price relationship to oil. Two
current and pertinent sources were used for thi; subject: DRI's own projec-
tion on availability and the 1982 California Gas Report, prepared by the
Utility Industry Committee. The projections of each are shown in Table 3-2
for 1982 through 2000.
Table 3-2. NATURAL GAS AVAILABILITY (Trillion Btu)
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An examination of Table 3-1 allows that both sources are quite consis-
tent in their estimates of gas available to California markets; where they
differ is in the projected demand by residential gas customers. DRY predicts
greater conservation in this sector (in spite of a 1.4% annual growth in
housing units heated by gas) than does the 1982 Gas Report. As a result,
there is more gas remaining for the electric utility sector according to DRI.
Although it is likely that a large proportion of gas demand by electric
utilities can be satisfied through at least 1990, there is no basis in either
of these studies for concluding that 100% of both oil and gas needs can be
supplied by natural gas over this entire period. Thus, in the utility
analysis of methanol demand, both the gas-available case for all oil and gas
units and the no gas-available case for these same units were considered. It
is much more likely, of course, that actual experience will fall between these
two extremes, and there does appear t,> be a strong conviction that all the
demands of higher priority users (residential, commercial, industrial) can be
supplied over the forecast period. As the lowest priority market, therefore,
electric utilities must make contingency plans for a range of outcomes which
permit them to take advantage of available natural gas; this fuel should be in
sufficient supply to meet most if not all of these demands in the near term
(through 1990), but is more uncertain in the long term. Long-run residential
and industrial conservation as well as supplemental gas supplies will
ultimately affect availability.
Higher oil prices under some sustained disruption scenario would tend to
strengthen the conclusion that natural gas will be available to California
utilities at market clearing prices. In this case, the higher oil price
levels will lead to higher gas prices, which combine to induce further
conservation and reduction in real economic growth, thus leaving the
consumption of natural gas lower than the base case,
California has special problems with air pollution which make the use of
natural gas in utility and industrial applications important to achieving air
quality goals. Artificial constraints on gas use in these stationary
applications are, therefore, not in the state's interest. In the absence of
regulatory constraints that force a reduction in natural gas use, the
California utilities should be able to satisfy a substantial proportion of
their demands throughout the 1982-1995 time period.
2.	 Transportation Fuels
Liquid fuel use in California in the 1985-1990 timeframe and beyond
will be dominated by the transportation market, as shown in Table 3-3. In
1980, about 65% of the liquid fuel consumed in California was burned in cars,
trucks, trains and airplanes, and most of the remainder was burned in electric
t	 utilities. Of the liquid fuel consumed in transportation, almost 90% was usedr	
for vehicles.
i
A number of factors will determine future liquid fuel use for trans-
portation in California, including: the mandated improvements in fleet miles
per gallon of passenger cars, the economic health of business, the projections
being made that trucks will gradually increase their present share of the
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Table 3-3. MOTOR FUEL USE IN CALIFORNIA (106 gal/year)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
GASOLINE
	
11,108 9,840 8,800 8,640 8,400
DIESEL FUEL	 1,803 2,163 2,524 2,668 2,884
TOTAL	 12,911 12,003 11,384 11,308 110284
transportation liquid fuel market, and gradual displacement of gasoline-powered
cars by diesels. Several of these factors act in opposing directions. The
varied nature of these liquid fuel-use factors, coupled with the uncertain
future of the economy, makes it difficult to predict future fuel consumption
accurately. Of course, a major supply disruption could also affect the
picture.
It appears that there will be a decrease in consumption of gasoline by
cars between 1980 and 1990, but an increase in diesel, fuel consumption.
Liquid fuel consumption by trucks will probably rise: The net result may be a
modest decrease in liquid fuels consumption by the transportation sector.
The net effect of all these changes is a projection for a modest decrease
in consumptionjof motor fuels of less than 1% annually from 1980 to 2000.
Gasoline use falls off 25%, but is still about three-fourths of total motor
fuel use by the turn of the century. In the base came forecast, the projected
prices of motor fuels are summarized in Table 3-4 consistent with the user
demands in Table 3-3.
This motor fuel price forecast incorporates the assumption of weak
markets, where 1982 real prices hold through 1985 and then begin rising at
about 2% per year in real terms. The price of distillate fuel is also
predicted to rise relative to gasoline as an increasing proportion of diesel
vehicles and demand for diesel fuel drives up the relative price. 	 Table 3-3
was used as the baseline forecast for the analysis of methanol use in
vehicles, but higher and lower price scenarios were also considered for
purposes of sensitivity analysis.
{
s
Table 3-4. MOTOR FUEL PRICES (1981$/gal)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
GASOLINE
DIESEL FUEL
1.35
1.13
1.23
1.11
1.53
1.42
1.74
1.69
1.88
1.85 I
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B.	 NEED FOR SYNTHETIC LIQUIDS
Two types of benefits are potentially associated with significant syn-
thetics capacity. First, if the supply of synthetic fuel is significant, it
will affect the world price of oil, not only saving the producing country the
bill for the displaced oil, but also lowering the price of the remaining
imported oil. This effect of a synthetics program has been termed the
"market power" impact by the Energy Modeling Forum.12
The second benefit of synthetic fuel capacity in place when a disruption
occurs is the reduced economic impact that ensues resulting from less depend-
ence on foreign sources, called the security effect.
During the late 1970s, California produced only about one-third of the
petroleum that it consumed. This was part of a long-term pattern in which
annual consumption has outgrown annual discoveries and proven reserves have
declined. The knovm recoverable reserves amount to about 5 billion barrels,
and these are being drawn down at the rate of about 0.4 billion barrels per
year for a lifetime of about 13 years. Future discoveries (such as the recent
offshore discoveries), extensions, revisions, and improvements in extraction
will probably add another decade to this supply. Nevertheless, California's
capability to supply even one-third of its consumption is of limited.duration.
On the national scene, the petroleum outlook is far better than it was
2 years ago, but not encouraging to those who expect further disruptions in
imported oil. It is clear that domestic conventional supplies will continue
to decrease over the remainder of this century. Large increases in tertiary
recovery (to 1 MMBD13 by the year 2000) and small increases in the use of
heavy oil will help somewhat, but the total of these conventional sources,
including Alaska, will likely decrease with time, as shorn in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5. U.S. DOMESTIC OIL SOURCES (MMBD)
DOMESTIC SUPPLIES
1982 1985 1990 1995 2000
Conventional 6.3 5.8 5.5 5.1 4.7
Tertiary 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0
Heavy Oil 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Alaskan 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5
SUBTOTAL 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.0
SYNTHETICS
Coal Liquids 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.15
Shale 0.0 0.1 0.03 0.05 0.25
NET IMPORTS 4.4 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.6
TOTAL 13.0 13.6 13.5 13.3 14.0
12Energy Modeling Forum, World Oil, EMF Report 6, February 1982.
13Million barrels per day (MMBD).
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Synthetic oil from shale and coal is not expected to add significantly
to domestic production, totaling between a quarter- and a half-million barrels
per day by the year 2000. The synthetics industry is in a state of declining
expectations following the Cancellation of the p.oposed Colony projectl4
after construction cost estimates ros y from $3 billion to $5 billion. If one
assumes that imports are the marginal source of supply, it is clear that there
will still be a substantial quantity of imported petroleum by the year 2000.
A reasonable estimate at this point would be approximately 5 MMBD net imports
through the mid 1990s and then increasing to about 5.5 MMBD by 2000. The
precise numbers are really not crucial for this analysis because the levels of
imports are so large relative to synthetic fuels supply in that time period.
Imported petroleum prices define the marginal cost of oil and thus the target
for alternatives such as methanol.
In addition to the U.S. level of imports, another measure of our
vulnerability to oil disruption is the proportion of world oil supplied to the
market by the Middle East. This area's political instability is the source of
most of the concern over our import level, thus their influence is more criti-
cal as their share of the oil supply increases. In Table 3-6, the production
levels for OPEC are shown for the recent past and and projected to 1990.
Although OPEC is expected to .supply a decreasing proportion of world oil over
the remainder of this decade, they will remain a major force in international
oil markets. Thus, although the United States is importing less petroleum,
the world as a whole will remain dependent on OPEC for about 40% of world
supply. As a result, there is a strategic need for synthetics, although there
is certainly sufficient world oil to meet U.S. and California demands under
the base case and alternative price scenarios discussed in the following
section.
Table 3-6. WORLD OIL BALANCE
WORLD DEMAND
1980 1982 1985 1990
Western Industrialized 30.8 27.6 28.4 29.2
Other Developed 6.8 6.7 6.9 7.1
Non-OPEC LDCs 8.3 8.4 9.6 11.5
OPEC 2.7 .3.1 4.0 6.0
Communist Bloc 13.8 13.6 15.1 16.7
WORLD SUPPLY
Free World/Non-OPEC 21.3 25.4 24.9 26.6
Communist Bloc 14.2 14.4 14.9 15.8
OPEC 26.9 19.6 24.2 28.1
14A joint venture for the development of shale oil by Exxon and Tosco.
u
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The need for synthetic liquid fuels can be viewed from intermediate and
longer-term viewpoints. From an intermediate-term strategic point of view,
continued heavy dependence on foreign oil through the 19909 makes the United
States vulnerable politically and militarily. From a longer-term point of
view, it is clear that the United States is fighting a losing battle in trying
to maintain its present production rate of petroleum. As the twentieth
century winds down, the United States will have to produce synthetic liquid
fuels, import more oil, conserve more vigorously, or pursue some combination
of all three options. While it might be possible to get through the 1980s and
1990s without any substantial production of synthetic liquid fuels, the
following decade will require some synthetics. The only way to build a
synthetics market in the 2000s is to begin a transition in the 1990s.
C.	 ALTERNATIVE PRICE SCENARIOS
1.	 Base Case Scenario
Given the major uncertainties that exist in energy markets, it is
prudent to consider alternative oil and natural gas price paths as the basis
for methanol competition in the transition period. The major elements of the
base case scenario are contained in Sections 3.A.1 and 3.A.2, but there are
also reasonable sets of events which could make energy prices diverge signi-
ficantly from the base case. The base case assumptions are discussed in DRI's
Spring 1982 Energy Reviewl5
 and are not discussed in detail here. A set of
alternative assumptions has been established which are fed into their energy
forecasting model; these are referred to as the PESSIMCRUDE and OPTIMCRUDE
scenarios. The key features of these scenarios are shown in Table 3-7.
Probabilities are placed by DRI at no more than 10% in the pessimistic
case and 5% in the optimistic case. Clearly, these scenarios depend very
strongly on behavior in the Middle East and, although it can be expected that
disruptions will certainly occur, it is unlikely that they will be sustained
consistently over the forecast period. Deciding the appropriate weights to
place on the alternative scenarios is a subjective process. All three cases
were used in the study for evaluation of methanol and other synthetics simply
because there is so much uncertainty over the entire analysis period. As a
summary of the price forecast implications, the three energy price scenarios
are shown in Table 3-8.
A few features of these scenarios and their price implications are par-
ticularly interesting for this study. First, the range is quite wide in the
longer term. Whereas the base case for imported oil in 1985 is $32.50/bbl
with a range of from $23/bbl to $39/bbl, this range expands by the year 2000
from $31/bbl in the optimistic case to about $81/bbl in the pessimistic scen-
ario. Although one might take issue with these precise values and the proba-
bilities which DRI associates with them, it was concluded by this study that
the range is realistically wide in the long term. Through 1985, the risks are
somewhat reduced by the excess capacity in OPEC, which really implies that
only a threat to Saudi Arabia could significantly affect the world oil price.
15Data Resources, Inc., Energy Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1982.
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Table 3-7. ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SCENARIOS
ESSIMISTIC CASE
-	 Lower long-term elasticities than current best
estimates.
More pessimistic view of world oil resource base
than current best estimates.
-	 The Middle East moving from one moderate supply
disruption to the next with virtually no respite
for 1982 through 2000.
urTIMISTIC CASE
-	 Long-term elasticities of demand for oil turn out
to be higher than current best estimates.
-	 New discoveries of oil fields and gas resources
are higher than current best estimates.
-	 The Middle East experiences no net oil disruption
over the next 18 years. 	
.^
Data Resources, Inc., Energy Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 111-113,
Summer 1982.
After 1985 the increased demands within OPEC for oil and a presumed recovery
in the industrialized world will tend to reduce this excess capacity. Thus,
the possible threats increase for oil distruptions because in a tighter market
with Saudi Arabia operating nearer full capacity, even the loss of a
relatively small producer resulting from political turmoil could start prices
escalating. The pessimistic scenario to which DRI gives a 10% probability is
unlikely to occur because it requires sustained disruptions of medium scale
(e.g., such as those induced by the Iran-Iraq War) in combination with low
long-run demand elasticities and a low rate of oil field discovery. It must
be recalled, however, that these are not mutually exclusive scenarios. If any
one of the premises in Table 3-7 is valid for the pessimistic scenario, it
will drive prices higher than the base case. A price path in the range
between the base case and pessimistic scenario is quite possible, although
prices at the extreme-end pessimistic case level are unlikely.
.Since the DRI forecast in the spring of 1982, the prospects for the lower
or optimistic scenarioLave improved. More recent forecasts by DRI and others
(see Figure 3-2, p. 3-12) indicate that a scenario below the base case is
3-10
Table 3-8. ALTERNATIVE ENERGY PRICE SCENARIOS (1981$)
OPTIMISTIC
CASE BASE CASE
PESSIMISTIC
CASE
TOTAL ENERGY DEMAND 2000 (quad) 103 95 90
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF CRUDE AND 8.65 9.15 9.8
NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS 2000 (MMBD)
ENERGY PRICES
Imported Oil
1982 30.22 32.49 33.95
1985 22.84 32.58 39.26
1990 24.96 41.56 52.77
1995 28.31 49.59 68.07
2000 30.67 55.90 80.94
REFINER ACQUISITION OIL
COST($/bbl)
1985 22.11 31.54 38.00
1990 24.49 40.77 51.77
1995 27.89 48.85 67.05
2000 30.36 55.34 80.13
CALIFORNIA UTILITY NATURAL
GAS ($/106 Btu)a
1985 3.80 5.01 5.10
1990 4.16 6.37 6.73
1995 4.71 7.14 8.68
2000 5.11 8.06 10.32
CALIFORNIA UTILITY RESIDUAL
OIL ($/106 Btu)b
1985 3.34(3.50) 5.49(5.76) 5.74(6.02)
1990 3.65(3.83) 6.68(7.00) 7.72(8.09)
1995 4.14(4.34) 7.58(7.95) 9.96(10.44)
2000 4.49(4.71) 8.18(8.58) 11.84(12.42)
aNatural gas prices are for the general case and would be higher in
electric utility areas where 0.25% sulfur residual oil is required.
bFor residual oil prices, two values are , given for each case:	 the first
represents the price forecast for mid-sulfur residual oil (0.50% to 0.75%
sulfur), while the price in parentheses is for low--sulfur residual oil
(0.25% sulfur), which is appropriate for some parts of California.
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Figure 3-2. ALTERNATIVE FUEL PRICE FORECASTS (19810
increasingly likely. These scenarios show the impact of politics on the world
oil market. If the market could simply operate without the influence of
political turmoil., this case would seem a very real possibility. With
potential OPEC capacity of at least 30 MMBD and current output at only 19 MMBD
there would certainly be room for expansion to supply world demands, even with
economic growth in the industrial world. Thus, with all factors considered,
the base case scenario still appears realistic, but the existence of a
credible, wide range will discourage capital investments that would be
unprofitable if the optimistic case or even something below the base case
materializes.
A second factor which is interesting about the energy scenarios is that
natural gas prices are not likely to vary as widely as oil prices in the
extreme scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, for instance, lower oil prices
lead to somewhat stronger economic growth in the United States (approximately
0.4% difference, according to DRI). At the same time, the ;lower oil and gas
prices result in less production, as the profit incentive is lower than in the
base case. The impact of lower oil and gas prices leads to a stimulation of
demand in the residential and commercial sectors that is disproportionately
higher for gas due to less conservation and higher income effects. The lower
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priority users (industry and utilities) will face some reduced availability as
a result. In order to attract sufficient gas to meet demands by these lower
priority users, the price of gas will tend to rise versus oil. Whereas in the
base case the equilibrium price of gas is at the mid-sulfur (0.75X) level, it
will tend 'toward parity with low-sulfur oil (0.250 in the optimistic scenario
according to DRI.
In the pessimistic scenario the reverse impacts tend to occur. As oil
and gas prices rise, real growth is reduced, which induces greater gaa produc-
tion and reduced demand among high priority users (residential and commercial).
Low priority users (industry and utilities) will thus experience a relatively
higher availability of natural gas compared to oil, which drives down the
relative price. As :a result, in the pessimistic case, natural gas would tend
to achieve price equilibrium at the high-sulfur residual oil price.16
As a result of these considerations, the general conclusion is that
natural gas will achieve parity with the residual oil price after deregula-
tion, but that it will have less variance than oil prices under the alterna-
tive energy price scenarios. According to the DRI forecast, the range for oil
prices is from 55X of the base case for the optimistic scenario to 1452 of the
base case for the pessimistic scenario in the year 2000. For natural gas
prices, on the other hand, the range is from 63% to 128% of the base case
forecast for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, respectively. The
implications of this are that the impact of the alternative energy price
scenarios will be much more significant on transportation markets in Ca1 -
fornio than on utility markets, where natural gas is used. Furthermore, the
high price scenario reinforces the likelihood of natural gas being available
to low priority users so that if synthetic fuels are non-competitive at the
high price or pessimistic scenario, the prospects are further reinforced by
the increased availability of gas in this case.
2.	 Severe Oil Disruption
The prospect of a severe oil disruption caused, for instance, by
partial or total destruction of Saudi Arabian production capacity has been
cited as a reason for the need for synthetic fuels. The policy implications
of this issue are discussed in Section VII of this report, but the event is
briefly discussed here as a possible energy scenario. Perhaps the most
important point is that the role of synthetics in reducing the impact of a
severe oil disruption is a question of timing. Once a disruption begins it is
already too late to turn to synthetic fuel production as a solution. The lead
times on such projects are so long (8 years or more from start of planning to
commercial operation) that their impacts would be too delayed to help.
There are many potential benefits from reducing dependence on foreign
oil through the use of synthetic fuels (see Section VII for estimates of this
value), but the key is that the capacity must be in place or close to
16Data Resources, Inc., Energy Review, Vol.. 6 No. 2, pp. 125-128 9 Summer
1982.
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completion when the disruption occurs. It is doubtful a single severe
disruption would be a triggering mechanism for a methanol transition. Such a
transition must begin in anticipation of this type of event in order to pay
signficant dividends. A premium on imported oil has been discussed as a
possible policy mechanism to create incentives for an earlier movement to
synthetics, along with the existing program of loan and price guarantees
provided by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation.
In sutm4pTy, it is believed that the base case pessimistic price scenario
captures the pertinent aspects of a disruption scenario over the long term
from a market viewpoint. The social and policy .issues are discussed in
Section VII of this summary.
D.	 COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW
To summarize the competitive environment for methanol, alternative price
scenarios for crude oil are compiled into Figure 3-2 (see p. 3-12). The
figure illustrates how the increasing uncertainty further into the future
makes choices on capital-intensive pro,jecte very difficult. The baseline,
high price, and low price scenarios are all from DRI's Spring 1982 Energy
Review. In their Fall 1982 Energy Review, DRI lowered its baseline forecast.
The baseline forecasts from two other sources (DOE's Office of Policy Planning
and Analysis and Chevron) provide some perspective on how others view the
price forecasts. Although not shown in the figure, the high and low scenarios
for both Chevron and DOE are within the extremes of the DRI scenarios. Thus,
the range of forecasts from DRI that have been used within the study encompass
the projections of other knowledgeable energy market analysts.
A more comprehensive summary of the entire set of factors affecting the
competitive environment in California is provided in Table 3-9 for the
Pacific-2 region l7
 in DRI's forecasting system. This table shows demands
for energy, fuel prices expected, and the economic conditions that drive the
results for the base case forecast.
As was discussed above, the precise values of the forecast prices and
quantities are not as important as the general climate for synthetic fuels in
the transition period of 1982 throv4gh 2700. The key factors during this
period are:
(1) The United States and California will remain dependent on imported
oil.
(2) Natural gas after deregulation will tend toward parity with
residual oil. For electric utility purchases or natural gas,
parity pricing has already occurred.
17In DRI's system, Pacific-2 includes Hawaii as well as California; however,
in fuel markets, California dominates by such a substantial margin that this
does not significantly affect the conclusions made.
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Table 3-9. BASE CASE FUEL FORECAST SUMMARY FOR CALIFORNIA
(quad/year)
1950 1985 1990 1995 2000
VEHICLES
Gasoline 1.44 1.23 1.10 1.08 1.05
Distillate 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.37 0.40
SUBTOTAL 1.69 X1.53 1.45 1.47 1.45
ELECTRIC; UTILITIES
Natural Gas 0.52 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.45
Oil 0.48 0.36 0.49 0.37 0.13
SUBTOTAL 1.00 0.9:5 1.03 0.86 0.58
INDUSTRY
Natural Gas 0.54 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.37
Distillate Oil 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
Residual Oil 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
SUBTOTAL 0.63 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.43
PRICES (1981$/10 6 Btu)
Gasoline 10.66 9.85 12.42 14.31 15,97
Residual Oil (0.56 sulfur) 5.47 5.49 6,68 7.58 8,18
Distillate Oil 6.30 6.12 7.89 9.37 10.60
Natural Gas:	 VelX,ities 3.84 5.01 6.37 7.44 8.06
Natural Gas:	 Xn4ustrial 3.97 5.07 6.41 7.47 8.09
c
i
(3) The contribution of synthetic fuels nationally will probably be
less than 500,000 bbl per day by the year 2000.
(4) Although there is sufficient oil worldwide and unused capacity
in OPEC to supply anticipated demands in the transition period
at real escalation rates of 2% annually or less, political
disruptions could drive prices up much faster.
(5) There is a plausible wide range of oil price scenarios in the
19909 which work against those large-scale capital projects that
must rely on high price scenarios for viability.
(6) The real price decrease since the peak. 1981; oil price level has
severely impacted the enthusiasm for synthetic fuels and will
probably negatively impact such projects even if another sudden
price rise occurs (it is much more obvious now compared to 1981
that oil prices can fall rapidly in response to demand
reductions and OPEC's failure to cut output sufficiently to
defend target prices).
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SECTION IV
LONG-TERM METHANOL MARKET
A. INTRODUCTION
in order to sensibly evaluate alternative transition paths, it is
necessary to have some perspective of the long-term goals toward which the
transition is aimed. The intent of this section is to describe the long-run
methanol supply and end-use system after the early transition is complete and
methanol has established itself as a viable fuel. This derscription cuts across
the chapters in the Technical Report by summarizing the likely production tech-
nologies, competitive environment, transport mechanisms, end-use markets, util-
ization technologies,.and environmental consequences, Following a description
of this end-to-end methanol system, some conjectures are offered on the minimum
timeframe within which such a system could be established.
No implication is made here, however, that this long-run system is
inevitable or even desirable at this point in time. Too many intermediate
steps must be successfully completed before such a determination is made. The
input of technology advances in gasification, direct liquefaction, and shale
extraction and processing are impossible to judge accurately now, and it is
not known which energy price scenario will occur or how successful efficiency
improvements in vehicles will be in the long run. Consequently, to forecast
the ultimate role for methanol and when it will occur is unproductive. What
can be done is to describe what the long-run system would look like if the
intermediate steps are successful. Therefore, the goal of this section is to
discuss whether the long-run outcome provides potential worth to an attempt to
accelerate the transition period.
B. LONG-RUN PRODUCTION FEEDSTOCKS AND TECHNOLOGY
In the period 1997-2000, if the preconditions on methanol development
have been successfully achieved, there are really only two potential feedstock
sources for methanol: western coal and Alaskan North Slope natural gas. Both
of these feedstocks exist in sufficient quantities to supply an established
and growing methanol fuel demand, and have further strategic value as domestic
sources which are not subject to Middle Eastern political and social insta-
bility.
1.	 Coal to M6thanol
The case for western coal is fairly well established. There are
over two trillion tons of western coal, much of it subbituminous coal well
suited to methanol conversion. Within the Green River and Powder River coal
regions 18 there are nearly 1300 billion tons of Dotal reserves with approxi-
mately 275 billion tons under less than 2000 feet of overburden. The sulfur
18See Table 3-4 of the Technical Report.
4-1
content of these coals varies significantly from about 0.35% to over 5%, and
the Btu content varies from just under 8000 Btu/lb to over 12,000 Btu/1b.
Other fields which could become the center for western methanol supply are the
Black Mesa and San Juan coal regions. The point is that the feedstock
resource is not the constraining factor in the long-run methanol market.
Ample coax exists in western fields that could be ue-1-, without driving up
resource prices 1% per year beyond g_aeral i,nflatiot: ,:a .7s. In other words,
the coal supply is elastic enough to supply a significant quantity (e.g., 25X)
of U.S. fuel needs through coal-to-methanol conversion.
From an evolutionary sense, one of the interesting factora will be how
cost reduction takes place through (1) economies of scale in production, (2)
economies in transportation, and (3) risk reduction in technology and
markets. Table 4-1 shows how coal-to-methanol production costs potentially
could vary with alternative scale economies of production and transportation
and lower costs of capital associated with risk reduction. It must be
stressed that all these factors relate equally well to other synfuels such as
shale oil, direct liquefaction, and coal gasification. Thus, these long-term
potential improvements in methanol economics do not necessarily improve its
relative competitiveness to these fuels, but could help to make methanol more
competitive over conventional fuels such as gasoline, which already benefits
from some of these factors. The effect of production scaling on capital cost
is illustrated by the impact of a 0.85 scaling factor on increased plant size
in moving from 5000 ton/day to 21,000 ton/day in coal-to-methanol plants.
Capital cost on a per gallon basis would decrease from $0.73/gal to $0.63/gal
over this scale-up.
More significant than production economies, which are really highly
speculative at this point, are the transportation economies that arise from
moving to more efficient forms of transportation as minemouth volumes reach
the threshold level of production. In this example, early plants might be
located near the end-use site, where the coal transport costs would be
approximately $0.13/gal. Once plants are built at the mine mouth, but
assuming that pipelines are not yet built, the logical transport mechanism
would be unit train tank cars, where costs would be approximately $0.08/gal
from the Green River region to Barstow, California. Finally, the long-run
transport approach would be in high volume pipelines, where costs would be as
low as $0.04/gal.
As a final measure of how the long-run production industry might differ
from that in tAe near term, a calculation has been made of the effect of risk
reduction by assuming that, as technical and market risks are reduced, the
required return on invested capital falls from 25% in the near term to 20% in
the mid term and, finally, to 15% in the long run. As shown in Table 4-1, the
impact of these changes is substantial, lowering production cost on the study
baseline 5000-tan/day methanol plant from $1.36/gal at 25% return to $0.73/gal
at a 15% return. It is not inevitable, however, that this last step to 15%
return on equity after taxes proves to be an acceptable rate of return, as it
requires that the problems of risks and the general, availability of capital be
improved significantly from their current states. Rather, it is only
presented to show the limits to the highly capital-intensive coal-based system.
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Table 4-1. LONG-RUN WESTERN COAL-TO-METHANOL
PRODUCTION COST POTENTIAL (1981*/gal.)
NEAR TERM MID TERM LONG TERM
1982 - 1992 1992 - 1997 B4yand 2002
5000 ton day 100000 ton day 21,000 ton day
PRODUCTION SCALING
Capital Cost (/gal) 0.73 0.67 0.60
Methanol Cost W gal) a 1.00 0.90 0.82
California Unit Train Minemouth
Plant Site Tapk Cars Pipeline
TRANSPORTATION SCALING
1Transport Cost ($/gal) 0.13 0.08 0.04Methanol Cost (t/gal) b 1.13 1.08 1.04
Capital Return Capital Return Capital Return
to Equity 25% to Equity 20% to Equity 15%
RISK REDUCTION
Capital Cost ( $/gal) 1.09 0.73 0.46
Methanol Cost W gal) c 1.36 1.00 0.73
10,000-too/day 21,000-ton/day
5000-ton/day Minemouth Site Minemouth Site
California Site Unit 'Frain Pipeline
2$% Return 20% Return 15% Return
COMBINED EFFECTd
Delivered Methanol, Cost 1.50 0.98 0.60
($/gal)
aPlant gate costs with 20% returns.
b5000 ton/day plants with 20% returns.
c5000 ton/day plants.
dSuccessively higher plant scales, more efficient transportation, and lower
required return.
The combined effect of all three cost reduction mechanisms in Table 4-1
illustrates the lower limits to coal-bused methanol on a delivered basis to
California in the long term. Achieving all three types of economics (high
volume pipelines, economies of scale in production, and risk reduction) will
take an absolute minimum of 20 years. The point is that the technical and
market risks industry must take in the transition period and the effort needed
by government agencies to help facilitate the environment for methanol are
potentially worth the effort. Suggestions., however, that very inexpensive
(unsubsidized) coal-based methanol is possible in the 19809 or early 1990s are
grossly optimistic.
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2.	 North Slope Natural Gas
In the study evaluation of resources for methanol for California
(Technical Report, Chapter 3), the data indicates that there are sufficient
North Slope gas resources to support a production level of about 8 billion
gallons per year for over 30 years. This resource is, therefore, quite large
relative to California demands (approximately 60% vehicle-mile equivalent of
the projected California demand for gasoline in the year 2000). In the very
long-term, however, it is clear that it is not a substitute for ultimately
making methanol from coal. Even using all the North Slope gas for methanol
conversion would sustain only about 8% to 10% of the U.S. passenger cars on a
vehicle-mile basis. 19 From the perspective of this study, on the other
hand, North Slope gas-to-methanol is a long-run option because a commitment of
that scale implies that the methanol fuel option is accepted and over its
early transition hurdles.
The production cost analysis has not been worked out to the same level
of detail as the coal option because throughout much of this study the
prospects for the gas pipeline seemed fairly good, once the pipeline was
committed, the methanol option would cease to be meaningful. More recently,
the prospects have become more remote for the project to be initiated. The
mood at this point seems to be to wait for the economic situation in the
United States and the rest of the world to improve sufficiently to permit a
better financing package to be assembled. In terms of delivered cost to
California markets, thee cost would certainly be higher than some smaller
remote gas sites on the Pacific rim. First, conversion costs would be higher,
resulting from the added difficulty of towing the barges to the North Slope,
securing them on-shore, and operating them in a more difficult environment.
If the total cost of the installed plant were 25% higher than the Cook Inlet
plant and it were operated 310 days per year instead of 330 days because of
weather conditions, the production cost impact would be to raise methanol
plant gate costs to $0.63/gal compared with $0.53/gal for the Cook Inlet
case. In addition, there would be pipeline tariffs for slug flow through the
oil pipeline to Valdez of approximately $0.05/gal to $0,,07/gal, and finally,
the added cost of tanker transport to California ports. The total cost of the
operation would be $0.76/gal, as shown in Table 4-2, for gas brought to the
plant for $1.00/10 6 Btu.
Table 4-2. NORTH SLOPE GAS TO METHANOL (1981$/gal)
NATURAL GAS COST
at $1.00/106
 Btu at $1.50/106 Btu
RESOURCE COST 0.12 0.18
CONVERSION COST 0.51 0.51
PIPELINE TARIFF 0.07 0.07
TANKER TRANSPORT 0.05 0.05
TOTAL 0.75 0.81
19Assumes a long-run fuel factor of 1.6 gallons o
gasoline.
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Thus, methanol made from North Slope gas is less expensive than early
coal-based methanol plants, but does not have as low a long-runt potential
cost. For the next 10 years or so the most likely outcome is that the gas
owners will continue to put a gas pipeline project together where the methanol
gas can be co-mingled with less expensive gas. This approach has a very low
market risk for the pipeline backers and the resource owners. While the Cost
per million Btu of converting North Slope gas to methanol and delivering it to
California maybe higher at $11.70/10 6
 Btu than the delivered gas price.
(reportedly $9.00/10 Btu), the value of the respective products are quite
different. By the year 2000 the respective market value of wholesale gasoline
is projected to be over $13.00/10 6
 Btu in 1981 dollars in our baseline
scenario, whereas natural gas is forecast to be only $8.06/106
 Btu. The
real issue is the market rick involved in the two options. As long as the gas
can be rolled in, even if its delivered cost is above the otherwise market
clearing price, there is virtually no market risk to the venture. Methanol
conversion, on the other hand, poses significant risks because the quantities
involved are so large (8 billion gallons annually) that methanol must be a
viable fuel when the project is started. A reasonable forecast at this point
is that the delays necessary to ascertain if 8 billion gallons of methanol are
likely to be demanded in the fuel market would require too much time for North
Slope gas owners. The State of Alaska will not let them flare it and there is
likely to be a limit reaches: on reinjection. Thus, from the perspective of
those involved, the methanol option would appear to be a very distant second
choice.
C.	 END-USE MARKETS
The dominant long-run market for methanol as a fuel is in light-duty
passenger vehicles. That is not to say that there will not be other important
markets, but they will be much smaller in size. In this smaller but important
category methanol may be used in utilities in the period beyond 2000 for
limited peaking requirements, and by industry as a boiler fuel in environ-
mentally sensitive areas.
1.	 Vehicle Market
The real focus in the long-term is on neat methanol fueling of
passenger cars. This potential market in California is extremely large,
although the gasoline component of motor fuel consumption is expected to
slowly decrease through time as a result of more efficient vehicles and an
increased proportion of diesel cars. For the nation as a whole, annual motor
fuel (gasoline) consumption is expected to drop from 113.4 (97.5) billion
gallons in 1982 to 102.7 (71.4) by the year 2000. In California, gasoline
consumption is forecast to fall from 10.6 billion gallons in 1982 to 8.3
billion gallons by the year 2000, and for diesel fuel the increase is from 1.9
billion gallons in 1982 to 2.9 billion gallons in the year 2000. For
California, the relative changes in diesel and gasoline demands are illus-
trated in Figure 4-1.
The utilization technology for both gasoline- and methanol-fueled
vehicles is expected to improve significantly by the year 2000. For
conventional vehicles the improvement (approximately 30% over the 1982
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Figure 4-1. CALIFORNIA MOTOR FUEL DEMANDS (109 gal/year)
vehicle) will arise from aerodynamics, drive train and engine efficiency gains
from compression ratio increases, leaning, and other changes. In neat
methanol-fueled vehicles many of the above factors (e.g., aerodynamics and
weight reduction) affect efficiency gains in a comparable manner. Significant
differences occur, however, with respect to compression ratio, leaning,
vaporization, and exhaust heat recovery. The potential in the long run (i.e.,
2000) is for a net gain over the conventional baseline of about 10% without
dissociation and about 28% if it is included. 20 In terms of the fuel
factor, these two assumptions correspond to 1.86 and 1.60 a:espectively.21
Thus, in the long run, dissociation is an important technical improvement
necessary for methanol to maintain its fuel efficiency advantage (see Figure
4-2). Even if the conventional vehicle does not improve quite as dramatically
relative to the study's conventional baseline, the fuel factor limit should be
about 1.55 by the year 2000. Projections of fuel factors as low as 1.3 are in
comparison to 1980 conventional vehicles and are, therefore, inappropriate
measures of what can be accomplished relative to a realistic moving baseline.
20See Tables 8-10 and 8-11 in the Technical Report.
21See Table 8-11 in Technical Report.
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2.	 Long-Run Competitiveness of Methanol
Given the fuel efficiency projections in Figure 4-2, it is
necessary to combine these technical values with the study's fuel price
projections to achieve a measure of the over-the-road cost of methanol versus
gasoline vehicles. Four basic sources of petroleum products are compared with
methanol as a transportation fuel: conventional oil, shale oil, methanol-to-
gasoline (MTG), and Fischer-Tropsch gasoline. As shown in Figure 4-3, of the
wholesale costs of transportation fuel from these four sources, only methanol
is competitive with the base case oil cost. Both shale oil and methanol-to-
gasoline are competitive with the high oil price scenario, but Fischer Tropsch
liquids are uncompetitive under any of the scenarios. In addition, the high
price scenario must be interpreted with some caution becduse the projected
cost of the synthetic fuel plants has aot been adjusted for the feedback
effects of higher energy cost (Figure 4-3). Aside from feedstock cost
feedback, there are additional feedbacks through transportation costs and the
indirect costs of ramifications from higher oil prices as they filter through
the economy. The subject of consistency in the high price scenario is
detailed further in the Transition Analysis Section (Section V).
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Implicit in the results of Figure 4-3 is that the shale, MTG, and
Fischer-Tropsch plants are scaled at about the 50,000-ton/ day size, based on
reference case assumptions . 22 The methanol plant is sized at 10,000 ton/day
(less than half the size of the other plants) and assumes a vehicle fuel
factor of 1.6 gallons of methanol to drive a distance equivalent to gasoline.
Thus, it appears that methanol is conclusively more competitive than MTG23
and Fischer -Tropsch ga8oline , 24 but more difficult to compete with shale
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Figure 4-3. 1992 COMPARISON OF DELIVERED COSTS FOR
SYNTHETIC GASOLINE ALTERNATIVES (1981$)
22See Table 4-26 of the Technical Report.
23The factor with MTG versus neat methanol is that their costs are highly
correlated, having about 90% common processes.
24 In this case, the cost difference is so extreme that no potential is seen
for a reversal in these systems.
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oil. In this latter case, neat methanol appears more cost-effective today,
but much additional work remains before there is sufficient data to choose
between them. In fact, a more likely outcome is that both of these synthetic
fuels will be part of our fuel supply in the period beyond 2000 0 where the
respective quantities of each produced will be determined when their marginal,
production costs are equalized at the market clearing price.
3.	 Long-Run Stationary Application Markets
In the long run (year 2000 and beyond), oil and natural gas will be
used: significantly less in stationary applicatione than today. For the nation
as a whole, oil consumption in electric utilities will likely fall from over 2
quads to less than 1/2 quad over that period, while natural gas consumption is
expected to fall from 3.8 quads in 1982 to 2.4 in 2000. For industry, oil
demand is expected to drop from 4.8 to 3.9 quads and natural gas demand to
fall from 6.5 to 6.0 quads in the same timeframe. These forecasts and the
corresponding figures for California are summarized in Figure 4-4.
From the figure, it is clear that utility demands for oil will be small
in this time period in California (about 30 trillion Btu or 460 million
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gallons of methanol). Natural gads consumption, though larger (570 trillion
Btu), should be available for utility use at prices which are. too low for
methanol to be competitive ($8.08/10 6
 Btu in the baseline case for 2004).
In the high oil price scenario the study conclusions are reinforced: although
natural gas prices will rise to $10.31/10 6
 Btu, natural gas will be more
plentiful as a result of increased supply and reduced industrial demands. In
addition, the higher natural gas prices will have a feedback effect on remote
natural gas values, which will rise to market parity, less LNG conversion and
transport costs. Thus, the prospects for methanol in the long-run electric
utility market are very small unless regulation limits the access of utilities
to natural gas.
In the industrial markets a similar pattern is evident in that natural,
gas remains the dominant fuel for the remainder of the century. As in the case
of utilities, there is little prospect for methanol competing with natural gas
on a Btu basis and thus the market potential is limited. Methanol may still
be an important fuel for the growth of industry in metropolitan areas in Calif-
ornia because environmental restrictions may limit growth in the absence of
clean fuels. 25 Thus, although the quantity of fuel is quite small compared
to national fuel consumption, there may be an important role for methanol in
this period.
D.	 SYNTHETIC FUELS COMPETITION
In the long run, the marginal competition to neat methanol comes from
other synthetic fuels. For stationary applications, this competition is from
medium Btu gas, SNG, or synthetic fuel oil. For transportation fuels, as
shown in Figure 4-3, the relevant existing competition is from shale, MTG, and
Fischer-Tropsch gasoline. As the figure indicates, neat methanol does appear
to be in the competitive range for transportation fuels.
For stationary applications, the role of methanol versus other synthetics
is similarly clearcut, but with the opposite implications for methanol use.
The most relevant competition is medium Btu gas, SNG, LNG, and conventional
natural gas, as shown in Figure 4-5.
For delivering energy for repowering or for new combined-cycle plants,
methanol does not appear to be competitive with some of the other options.
This conclusion is more clearcut in the case of LNG and MBG because costs in
the former case are reasonably well understood, while in the latter case there
is significant process overlap with methanol derived from,coal. 26 Thus, even
f
25Although beyond the scope of this study, it is clear that Hawaii represents
an interesting potential synfuels market for utilities and industry because
it will remain dependent on liquid fuels and be relatively more vulnerable
to an oil disruption scenario.
26Plant specificatia^.w and cost estimates for the synthetic gas options are
from Table 4-26 of t3e Technical Report. The cost estimate for methanol is
from Table 4-25 of the Technical Report for a '21,000-ton/day plant with
reference case assumptions, except for 1997 start-up.
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with the considerable uncertainty in eatime-ing synfuel plant costs, there
seems very little chance that methanol can .ompete with MBG in the ions run or
LNG in the intermediate term in stationary applications. The only market
where methanol may have a significant advantage is where environmental
problems are very restrictive and methanol proves to have advantages over
natural gas in terms of NO x emissions at the end-use point.
E.	 LONG-TERM MARKET SUMMARY
As a n,eans to su mmarize the market potential for methanol in the 1991
timeframe, the relevant markets and sources are summarized in Figure 4-b. On
the supply side, both coal and natural gas options are represented. For
natural gas, the supply elasticity is such that quantities of 10,000 to 20,000
ton/day can probably be supplied before large supply cost increases take
place. Th n sP cost increases result from increasingly higher feedstock
quisition h	 collection costs, and also from coats associated with longer
4-11
On the demand aide, the highest value submarkets are for octane
blending, but these markets are very small, totaling no more titan 2000
ton/day. It is most interesting that light-duty vehicles should be in the
competitive range for both remote natural gas and coal-based methanol if
market and technical risks are reduced so that 15% after-tax returns become
acceptable in the long run. The results in Figure 4-6 also show that the
100	 1,000	 10,000	 100,000
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product transport times. As a result, these costs would increase until the
potential for North Slope gas could be exploited (around 10,000 ton/day). Of
course, if the gas pipeline to the North Slope is constructed, methanol will
cease to be a relevant option. For coal. -to-methanol, the figure shows how
quantity might lower production costs for a period while production and
transport economies are exploited. The lower bound of the coal-to-methanol
region is for a 15% after-tax IRR, which might be applicable in the longer
torm after risks (both market and technical) are reduced. If a 20% after-tax
IRR is required throughout the period 1982 to 1997, the upper bound of the
coal-to-methanol region defines the applicable production costs. Shifts in
product costs of quantitites at 10,000 and 20,000 ton/day correspond to
economies associated with larger plants (e.g., 10,000 ton/day) and pipeline
transport, which becomes feasible at 25,000 to 30,000 ton/day.
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prospects for methanol use in stationary applications are not very optimistic
in the case where natural gas is available. In fact, as strictly an energy
source, methanol is not likely to compete with LNG or MBG as a fuel source for
combined-cycle plants or for repowering oil-fired boilers. There may be a
small utility role for methanol in dual-fueling plants under strict control
for NOX dispatch.
SECTION V
THE TRANSITION PERIOD
A. INTRODUCTION
The transition period is the most interesting aspect of the evolution of
the methanol market because it is a timeframe in which production methods and
sources will change, end-use technology will improve, and the fuel market in
which it competes may also experience significant changes. The 10-year period
from 1987 to 1997 is defined for the purposes of this study as the transition
period in which major changes must occur if methanol is to be a significant
fuel by 2000. Obviously, planning, testing, experimentation and policy
changes might begin sooner, but the impact of these activities on the market
will be felt in the 1987-1997 timeframe.
Given the starting point illustrated previously in Figure 2-2 27 for
the bounds on the California fuel market for methanol in 1987, sim,lar
snapshots of utility, industrial, blends and neat transport fuel markets are
made in this section for 1992 and 1997. Once again the intent is not to make
a forecast, but rather to show the market potential in the various submarkets
and the methanol prices at which these California submarkets become competi-
tive. Highlighted in this section are; technological evolution in neat
methanol-fueled vehicles versus gasoline-fueled vehicles, the impact of
alternative fuel price scenarios on methanol viability, and changes in the
utility fuel demand market. Also, production of options are analyzed and a
comparison is made with other synfuel alternatives that might be competing
with methanol in this timeframe.
B. 1992 METHANOL MARKETS
By 1992, the most important factor in the status of the methanol fuel
market in California will be the competitive environment in which it must
compete. The pertinent submarkets are blends, fleets, private passenger cars,
industrial fuels, and utility fuels. All of these market potentials are shown
in Figure 5-1 in terms of both breakeven prices and market sizes. Some
significant changes are evident from the corresponding figure for 1987,27
especially in the scale of the potential stationary applications market and
the addition of a light-duty vehicle submarket.
1.	 Stationary Applications
a.	 Fuel Substitution. By 1992, the utility industry could have
completed its testing and experimentation program and thus be in a position to
use methanol widely if it is competitive with otheC fuels. Under the baseline
fuel price scenario, an extensive market of approximately 58,000 ton/day is
potentially viable at a methanol price delivered to California of $0.42/gal in
2 7See Figure 2-2, p. 2-9 of this report.
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1981 dollars. Some of this capacity (6000-ton/day methanol equivalent) is
natural gas-fired and would allow 1 methanol breakeven price of $0.54/ga'_ if
natural gas were unavailable and "istillate fuel was used as the substitute.
It seems likely, however, that natural gas will be available during this
period, thus making the $0.42/gal figure the appropriate target.
In the industrial market, the relevant competition is natural gay at
$6.68/10 6 Btu, residual oil at $7.03/10 6 Btu, 28 an,', distillate oil at
$8.55/10 6 Btu, which corresponds to methanol prices ranging from $0.42/gal
to $0.54/gal after ccrrecting for efficiency changes, conversion cost, and
local distribution. The bulk of this very large market (expected to be 88,000-
ton/day methanol eq(jivalent) is only cost-competitive at methanol prices of
$0.42/gal or less, while a smaller submarket corresponding to about 8000
ton/day hz,s a breakeven price of $0.54/gal, but only if natural gas is
unavailable and distillate fuel is substituted. With natural gas available,
which is the baseline assumption, the industrial market will all fall in the
narrow range of $0.42 to $0.44/gal of methanol delivered to a central
distribution point in 1981 dollars. At the plant gate, allowing $0.05/gal for
transportation and unloading, the required price for methanol production is
28Residual oil with 0.5% sulfur.
5-2
$0.37 to $0.39/gal, which is significantly below the baseline production ccst
estimates.
f
Thus, with unsubsidized private methanol production ventures, it is not
anticipated that methanol will compete in stationary applications on a fuel
basis alone. Production cost incentives and environmental values may also
lead to other bases for methanol use in stationary applications, and these
possibilities are discussed later in this section.
b.	 High Price Scenario. An important consideration is whether
the conclusion that methanol will not compete in stationary applications on a
Btu basis holds under the more pessimistic oil price scenario. A rather
surprising finding of this study is that the feedback effect of higher oil
prices to methanol production costs may in fact make methanol less competitive
in the high oil price scenario relative to utility fuels.
The baseline assumption is that utility gas would be $6.68/106
 Btu in
1992 (1981, 	 dollars) and rise to $7.45/106 Btu in the high oil price
scenario. 29
 The feedback effects come from four sources: feedstocks,
process energy, construction costs, and product transport; these sources
account for feedback effects on the delivered price of $0.04/gal, $0.01/gal,
$0.03/gal, and $0.01/ gal, respectively. Methanol production and delivery
costs for an additional plant constructed after the oil price rise would
therefore increase approximately $0.09/gal or $1.39/106 Btu.30 Thus, the
competitiveness of methanol versus market natural gas is not enhanced by
higher oil prices in utility markets.
C.	 Environmental Value of Methanol in Utilities. Those power
plants that are environmentally restricted from operating at full capacity
(e.g., Ormond Beach l and 2, Long Beach 8 and 9) have a potential premium that
may be added to the fuel value of methanol. The calculation performed (see
Chapter 9.D.9 in the Technical Report) was to estimate the value of operating
these plants at their, nameplate capacity on methanol versus their current
restricted output, and attribute the value of that added capacity to the value
of methanol. In 1981 dollars, the potential methanol premium for Ormond Beach
as an example ranged from a low of $0.7,5 1, 106 Btu to a high of nearly $4.00/
106 Btu, depending upon the assumed gain in heat rate, the efficiency of the
units displaced, and the value of adding capacity to the overall system.
Full-scale testing must be done on methanol overfiring.and on natural gas
overfiring to resolve the actual benefits. It is clear from the sensitivity
analysis done, however, that the issue of whether there is a heat rate gain
and its value is crucial to the viability of methanol overfiring. Without
this potential gain, methanol is very unlikely to overcome the $3.00/10' Btu
added cost expected over the likely oil and gas price in the mid
29For 1997, the increase is from $7.48/106 Btu to $9.30/10 6
 Btu in the
baseline and high price scenarios, respectively.
30By 1997, the feedback effect would be $0.14/gal or $2.16/10 6
 Btu.
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1980s. If this concept is validated in large-scale tests, the quantities
involved for 10% overfiring at Ormond Beach and Scattergood would involve
approximately 1500 tons per day of methanol, which is a significant quantity
relative to methanol fuel use, but a very small percentage of utility oil and
gas use.
Another environmental issue is the value that methanol would have
as an alternative in meeting NOx reduction requirements. The assumptions
and results of this analysis are summarized in Tables 9-28 and 9-29 of the
Technical Report. The approach was to identify three cases that would make it
difficult for Southern California Edison to achieve its NOx emission goals,
which are in compliance with regulatory requirements. For each of these cases
(no natural gas, no geothermal generation, San Onofre not available), different
emission reduction options were evaluated (methanol firing, dual-fueling,
repowering, selective catalytic reduction, low NOx burners, etc.) that would
bring the system back into NO x compliance. The premium values for methanol
beyond its Btu value as an environmental control option were then evaluated as
ranging from $1.90/10 6 Btu to $1.70/106 Btu for dual-fueling with methanol
versus selective catalytic reduction of oil-fired boilers. In the more likely
case, however, of comparing methanol dual-fueling with low NOx burners in
85% of the oil-fired boilers to replace geothermal capacity, the premium value
for methanol is only $0.25/10 6 Btu. It is important to note that all of
these NOx premiums are zero in the base case (that SCE's current program is
maintained and is successful). A few hypothetical cases wern examined to
determine the consequences of the incremental cost of NOx reduction in the
event that a major element of SCE's current program is not fully implemented.
d.	 Overview. The potential for methanol as a fuel in stationary
applications is very limited in the transition period because it cannot be
produced competitively with pipeline gas or even LNG. This situation is
actually strengthened in the high oil price scenario, where feedback effects
in methanol production costs will offset likely increases in pipeline gas.
Under the assumption that Natural gas remains available to utilities (which
appears highly likely), the margin for error between costs for natural gas and
methanol is estimated to be sufficiently wide that methanol cannot compete on
strictly an energy basis.
The only other rationale for using methanol for stationary applications
in this timeframe would be that it has environmental value beyond its energy
content. The problem with environmental premiums is that there are current
programs in place that rely primarily on rwclear capacity, out-of-state coal
generation, and renewables to achieve environmental compliance. Burning
methanol within the Los Angeles air basin is neither as cost-effective as
these options nor as environmentally benign with respect to NOx and sulfur
output in the basin. The one exception to the lack of environmental premiums
is the case where plants are currently operated well below capacity due to
NOx output limitations. These few plants are really the only transition
period methanol market in the utility sector.
In industrial markets the same basic conclusion holds. Methanol is not
competitive on an energy basis and thus will only be used where very severe
5-4
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environmental restrict,ons exist (but not so severe as to preclude methanol
burning). For example, requirements that new emission sources only be permit-
ted if they can demonstrate 10% reductions in net overall emissions may not
encourage methanol adoption unless an efficient pollution offset market
exists. In the latter case, firms in the Los Angeles air basin would have an
incentive to seek out the most efficient mechanisms for abatement and then
offer the emission deductions into the offset market. Thus, under the right
policy, industry could use methanol effectively because a premium would be
established for methanol use in the Los Angeles air basin.
2.	 Transportation Markets
The dominating potential use for methanol is as a fuel for the
millions of automobiles and trucks that will. be on the road in the year 2000.
Between the present time and the year 2000, transitional markets may develop
that can enable successful introduction of both methanol fuel and methanol-
fueled automobiles into the private marketplace. Therefore, in addition to
the examination of neat methanol as a fuel for private automobiles, several
other transportation submarkets have been examined. These markets include
methanol as an octane-blending agent for gasoline, the medium- and heavy-duty
truck and bus market, and in the near-term, the light-duty commercial and
public fleet vehicle market. The following sections present a short summary
of the contents of Chapter 8 of the Technical Report.
a.	 Methanol Demand in Refining and Blending Submarkets. There
exist two principal applications of methanol within the refining and blending
submarkets: the use of methanol as one of the feedstocks in the production of
MBTE, and its use with a co-solvent in gasoline blending. California demand
for methanol for use as a feedstock to MBTE production will be very small or
non-existent, due to the absence in California of high-concentration, high-
volume sources of isobutylene feedstocks. If a major petrochemical industry
develops in California comparable to that found along the Gulf Coast, this
situation could change.
i
There will exist a small market for methanol as a gasoline blending
agent by the smaller (topping and hydro-skimming) refineries. This market
appears to be presently existent at current methanol prices but is mainly
unfilled. However, the fraction of gasoline produced in California by such
refineries is quite small (approximately 4%). For some of these refineries,
octane number-of-barrel costs may be sufficiently high to justify the use of
high-price co-solvents such as propanols if low price tertiary butyl alcohol
(TBA) is not readily available. For the most part, however, it will be the
availability of relatively low price TBA on the West Coast that will determine
the magnitude of use of methanol as a blending agent in California. If all of
the TBA produced in the United States were shipped to the California markets,
approximately 70% of the gasoline produced in California could be blended with
methanol. If methanol could be marketed 12 to 15 cents cheaper in California
than Gulf Coast-supplied methanol, TBA use in California would be more likely
and the blends market would grow faster. The most likely application of
methanol TBA in California would be in the blending of higher octane unleaded
gasol.ines by the larger refineries or the upgrading of regular grade to
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premium grade by blenders or small refineries. Unless: the front-end vola-
tility of the gasoline into which it is blended is reduced, Reid Vapor Pres-
sure limits may be exceeded and/or driveability may suffer. Because the small
gasoline blender has little control over the front-end volatility of the
gasoline he receives, the potential market is reduced. For the larger
refineries, there is the potential to "back out" butane and reduce volatility;
however, it may not be an economic solution to providing octane if the
refinery's existing octane number-of-barrel cost is low. Compared to the
production of a remote natural gas-based methanol plant of approximately 3000
ton/day, the potential demand from the blending in the refinery sector in
California is rather small. For example, if 20X is assumed as a reasonable
estimate for the amount of gasoline that could potentially be blended with
methanol, the daily methanol demand is approximately 900 tons of methanol, or
a little less than one-third of a single plant's rapacity.
b. Methanol Fuel Demand from Private Passenger Vehicles. Meth-
anol-fueled vehicles appear to have attributes similar to those of gasoline-
fueled vehicles. Such vehicles could be built performance-equivalent, or
perhaps superior, to gasoline-fueled vehicles, and the composition of tailpipe
emissions from methanol-fueled vehicles could lead to improvements in urban
air quality (Section VI). Furthermore, the methanol-fueled vehicle appears to
have a thermal efficiency advantage over that of a gasoline-fueled vehicle.
The basic question appears to be Is the thermal efficiency advantage
sufficient to overcome the relatively high methanol prices? The answer to
such a question is dependent upon the petroleum price scenario that is chosen,
and the efficiencies of methanol versus gasoline vehicles. Therefore,
methanol-fueled vehicle viability is outlined below in terms of the three
scenarios used in this analysis.
As is discussed in the Technical Report, methanol-fueled vehicles would
be expected to have somewhat higher energy efficiency t7lan gasoline-fueled
Vehicles and test results have, for the most part, confirmed that
expectation. This efficiency advantage can be conceived as being derived from
three effects:
(1) A higher effective octane number than gasoline, permitting higher
and hence more efficient engine compression ratios.
(2) A leaner misfire limit, permitting leaner part-load operations than
gasoline.
(3) An effect related to the higher heat of vaporizaton of methanol
that reduces the heat transfer to the coolant and/or increases the
volumetric efficiency of the engine.
The actual efficiency advantage of a methanol-fueled vehicle cannot be exactly
specified because it is design-dependent. However, based upon published
results of engine and vehicle research and testing, a range for the efficiency
improvement can be estimated. A key factor in dvaluating methanol efficiency
gains, however, is that the conventional automobile will also improve its
efficiency over the transition period. Thus, net gains must be evaluated
against a moving baseline that may show significant improvements. These
improvements are summarized in Figure 5-2._
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Two different types of methanol technologies are potentially available
in the transition period: neat liquid methanol and dissociated methanol. In
the former case, the efficiency gain would be 15% to 21% in 1982 and attenuate
to approximately 10% by 1997 as conventional vehicles improve. This effi-
ciency gain corresponds to methanol fuel factors of approximately 1.7 and 1.85
in 1982 and 1997, respectively. With dissociated methanol, there would be an
additional efficiency gain, which improves the fuel factor to approximately
1.6 in the 1990s. The dissociated technology is in early stages of
development and thus will not likely be ready for widespread use in vehicles
(assuming successful development) until the late 1990s.
Thus, in the early 1990s, a reasonable estimate of methanol-fueled
vehicle fuel factor31 versus an improved gasoline baseline is in the range
of 1.75 to 1.85. These estimates are less optimistic than some recent
accounts in the technical literature, which do not appear to adequately
reflect likely improvements in gasoline-fueled vehicles.
31Fuel factor is defined as the gallons of methanol divided by gallons of
gasoline to drive a given distance.
{
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Under the low petroleum price scenario, liquid methanol-fueled vehicles
do not achieve over-the-road cost competitiveness with gasoline-fueled
vehicles in the foreseeable future. This is true for both remote natural
gas-based methanol and coal-based methanol: Dissociated methanol-fueled
vehicles become cost-competitive with gasoline in the early 19908 if the
source of the methanol is remote natural gas. However, even with dissociated
methanol technology improvements, coal-based methanol does not become
competitive in the foreseeable future.
Using the baseline petroleum price scenario, liquid methanol-fueled
vehicles become competitive with gasoline vehicles around 1990 if the methanol
is assumed to be derived from remote natural gas. The competitive advantage
in over-the-road costs after the early 19906 is not dramatic. (This implies a
relative modest growth rate in the methanol-fueled vehicle market.) Dissoci-
ated methanol technology would move the breakeven date forward by several
years, but more importantly, would significantly increase the cost advantage
of methanol relative to gasoline. Under this baseline petroleum price
scenario, coal-based methanol would not be competitive with gasoline in the
foreseeable future, even with dissociated methanol-fuoled vehicle technology.
Under the high petroleum price scenario, methanol-,fueled vehicles would	 #
become competitive with gasoline-fueled vehicles in the late 1980s and, after
this time, possess a significant cost advantage over gasoline. The high oil
price scenario combined with dissociated methanol technology would permit
coal-based methanol to be competitive with gasoline in the early 1990s. These
results are summarized in Figure 5-3.
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In summary, it appears that coal-based methanol is far too expensive to
become cost-competitive with gasoline before the year 2000. If the source of
methanol is remote natural gas, it appears that methanol-fueled vehicles could
be competitive with gasoline-fueled vehicles in the 1990s, but the size of the
cost advantage for the methanol-fueled vehicles versus gasoline-fueled vehicles
may not be significant enough to give a major impetus to large-scale produc-
tion of large quantities of methanol-fueled vehicles.
c.	 Methanol Vehicle Fleets. Fleet sales have been proposed as
one way to begin a transition to general sales of methanol-fueled vehicles.
Presumably, the first Gales will be to a subset of fleet buyers with the
following characteristics;
(1) Vehicles are commonly retained for a considerable period of time,
hence resale value is not of great concern.
(2) The vehicles are fueled on-site or are fueled from a single
contract source.
(3) Vehicles seldom, if ever, need more than a 200- to 300-mile range
between refuelings.
(4) Visibility/public relations, petroleum independence, or some other
attribute of a methanol fuel is of value to the fleet operator.
The growing methanol-fueled fleets will then, it is believed, generate a
growing retail distribution system, which will in turn increase sales of
methanol-fueled vehicles. However, such an approach depends only upon market
forces and may thus be ineffectual. There may exist enough fleet operators
who value the attributes of methanol to generate a demand for methanol-fueled
vehicles. The demand may be sufficient to interest a vehicle manufacturer in
the production of methanol-fueled vehicles. The resultant demand for methanol
fuel, however, may still be far too small to cause a fuel supplier to
establish retail capability in methanol.
A summary of the estimate of fleet market potential for the mid to late
1980s is shown in figure 5-4, where the market is:broken down into automobiles
and light trucks or vans. Each of these vehicle types is then broken down
into different types of users (police, government, utilities, etc.). Given
the fleet sale rates indicated in Figure 5-4, the methanol production needed
for fueling would be approximately 35 10 6 gal/year for automobiles and 98
106 gal./year for vans. Thus, the total methanol required is quite small
relative to near-term supplies or marginal supply sources.
d.	 Heavy-Duty Methanol-Fueled Vehicles. Heavy- and medium-duty
trucks and transit buses use approximately 0,30 quads of energy per year in
California (approximately 2.3 x 10 9 gal/year of diesel fuel). This
consumption is expected to approximately double by the year 2000. If this
energy use was methanol-based, it would imply roughly 40-50 10 3 ton/day of
methanol in 1980, and roughly 80-100 10 3 ton/day of methanol by the year
2000.
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For analysis of possible transitions to methanol, this submarket is
important not only because of its potential size but because the logistics of
the fuel supply are simpler than those for private automobiles. On-site
central refueling, combined with major interstate truck stops, can provide an
adequate supply infrastructure, as it does with diesel fuel today. Methanol-
fueled engines could penetrate this market more rapidly than private passenger
cars. With the possible exception of transit vehicles, Heavy-duty vehicle
purchasers have a greater ability to specify the engine transmission system
when purchasing new vehicles than do buyers of private passenger cars. While
most transit vehicles and medium- and heavy-duty trucks are longer-lived than
private cars, the engines are subject to replacement or major overhaul more
frequently. For example, transit buses are subject to major powerpack (engine
and transmission) overhaul or replacement ever; 150,000 to 200,000 miles. in
normal operations, this would occur every 2 to 4 years. 32
 Some heavy-duty
truck applications are subject to even more frequent overhaul; in principle,
conversion to a methanol-fueled engine could take place with any major
overhaul or engine replacement.
32Acurex Corporation, "Clean Coal Fuels: Alternative Fuel Strategies for
Stationary and Mobile Engines," Vol. VII: An Assessment of Methanol-Fueled
Heavy-Duty Engines, Apiil 198?.
For the heavy-duty, methanol-fueled vehicle market potential to be
realized, at least three requirements most be met:
(1) Methanol engines appropriate for medium- and heavy-duty truck and
transit applications must exist in the domestic marketplace and
sufficient "in-use" background must exist to ensure user confidence
in the technology.
(2) A limited fuel-methanol supply infrastructure must be in place.
(3) Total costs for the methanol engine operation must be equivalent,
or less, to those for the diesel engine.
There exist several methanol medium- and heavy-duty engines that are
close to being commercially available. Several of these engines have been
road tested, both in New Zealand and Germany. The UPS Texaco TCCS engine was
originally designed to run on conventional fuels, but has been demonstrated to
function satisfactorily on methanol.
Based upon the road test work to date, methanol-fueled vehicles do not
appear to have a significant efficiency advantage over diesel-fueled vehicles
in medium- and heavy-duty applications. (This implies that no significant
market would be expected to develop until methanol and diesel reach approxi-
mate parity in the price per Btu. Under the baseline petroleum price
scenario, Btu parity with distillate oils is not reached by low price remote
natural gas-based methanol until well after the year 2000.)
e. Overview. As shown in Figure 5-1, the transportation markets
are the submarkets where methanol can make a limited impact in the transition
period. Low level blends (4.5%) of methanol with gasoline should be competi-
tive at some level by 1992. Tho maximum methanol use would be about 3000
ton/day in California for this purpose, but actual use given TBA limitations
will probably be smaller, about 900 to 1000 ton/day. The fleet market is the
next increment in methanol demand which would be competitive at prices up to
about $0.90/gal, but it would imply a maximum methanol demand of 1200 ton/day
and a more likely demand of approximately 100 ton/day.
Ttge passenger car market would also achieve parity in the early 1990s
with 4..^Iv over-the-road costs of gasoline, although the margin would be
slight. A key factor in this analysis is that only remote natural gas
feedstocks yield methanol prices in the competitive range of fleets and
passenger car markets. Because this feedstock source is not highly elastic, a
very rapid penetration rate for methanol-fueled vehicles would lead to
methanol production cost increases. At rates of penetration consistent with
diesel vehicles in the period 1978-1982, remote natural gas is sufficient to
supply both fleets and passenger cars through the transition period.
Rapidly rising oil prices consistent with the high oil price scenario
induce feedbacks in methanol production costs that offset part of the apparent
gain in competitiveness. As a result, with either the base case or high price
scenario, methanol from coal does not appear viable through the transition
period. In the low oil price scenario, light-duty vehicles do not become
over-the-road competitive until beyond 2000, even for methanol from remote
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natural gas. For this optimistic case scenario, the only viable methanol
market is in blending for octane enhancement.
C.	 1997 METHANOL MARKETS
The evolution of the methanol market is not striking over the remainder
of the century, as shown in Figure 5-1. In the 1997 market, shown in Figure
5-5, the blends market is still a potential market for as much as 3000 ton/day
of methanol. The light-duty vehicle market could expand to approximately
12,000 ton/day if it were to grow as fast as the diesel market has grown in
recent years, 33 and after methanol achieves over-the-road competitiveness in
the early 1990s. The extremely large utility and industrial markets still do
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33gased on expansion of the diesel market share of new car fleets from 1978
to 1982.
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not appear to be viable compared with natural gas and only marginally competi-
tive even if natural gas is unavailable. But even if industrial and utility
markets become viable in small quantities, it could be expected that demands
above 40,000 ton/day would surely induce price increases that preclude larger
stationary application markets. The high volume region of the remote natural
gas production, shown in Figure 5-6, corresponds to Alaska's north slope,
which could satisfy stationary application demands, but only at prices near
:0.80/gal or above. The most optimistic scenario for methanol ft.m coal would
be that risks are reduced, resulting in 152 returns becoming acceptable. This
would require development of large (10,000-Con/day and up) minemouth plants
with pipeline transport. But even these unrealistically optimistic assump-
tions result in prices of about $10/10 6 Btu in 1981 dollars, which is at-ove
expected utility fuel costs. Thus, no market scenario is seen under which
large-scale stationary application methanol use (e.g., repowering) could oc-ur
on a cost-effective basis. The strategy that these oLservations imply is to
therefore focus on the transportation fuel market, where the high cost of
existing fuels and the gain in vehicle efficiency will help the transition.
Methanol use will grow Yluwly under this strategy, but it must grow slowly in
order to prevent prices for methanol production from remote natural gas
sources from being driven up too quickly.
Coal Co&I	 CoeI	 RNG Coal
	 Coal Wood	 Coke
Lural TPO	 TPU	 1C1 Winkler
	
TPO Lur`1	 Lurgt
2400 5000	 1000	 3000 5000	 22000 575	 2000
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
Capital
L^
0perrating Feedstock Product
Cost Cost Cost Tr anaport
Go 4t
Figure 5-6. 1992 COMPARISON OF DELIVERED METHANOL COSTS
FROM ALTERNATE FEEDSTOCKS (Ref. Case, 1981$)
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After detailed comparison of the methanol production costa from
both California feedstocks (bioenergy, petroleum coke, heavy oil in rock) and	 }
other out-of-state resources (western coal,, Alaskan coal and remote natural
Sao), it has been concluded that only two options would be important to Cali-
fornia's transition period remote natural gas, and SFC-supported coal-to -
methanol plants (see Section IV). The production cost and transportation cost
projections in Figure $-6 clearly illustrate the relative cost of the option&.
Feedstocks, conversion technology, and capacity in ton/day are noted along the
bottom of the figure for each system, with 'capital cost, operating cost,
feedstock cost, and product transport costdenoted on thevertical axis.
These systems are scaled to reflect system constraints, making the chosen
system (natural gas) optimal in an overall end-to-end delivery system
context. Based on a set of reference case assumptions (described in Chapter 4
of the Technical Report), remote natural gas has a clear delivered cost
advantage to California markets. This advantage is not surprising; the
capital cost requirements on an approximate basis for methanol conversion
are: $1.50/annual gallon for barge-mounted natural gas, $3.00/annual gallon
for coal, and $3.40/annual gallon for lignites. Obviously, coal-to-methanol
can only be considered if the relative feedstock costs are significantly lower	 i
foil coal or lignites than other options, While there will be a major
feedstock costdifferential after n4 g^,^ral gas deregulation is complete that 	 j
will preclude the construction, of Pia	 +h p.1 plai=ts based on "pipeline" gas,
there "is still sufficient raU,mpt 	 gad with oj,portunity costs below the
market 'rate to satisfy tx l ,nisl-an period demands. If natural gas in remote
areas can be purchased, collected, and transported to barSe-mounted conversion
k. 0/ 06	 k1 50/106 BC	 Y	 411 b	 0.4, 4.4plants for l.O 1	 Btu to	 u, t ^ere_wx	 a no comps	 ive
incentive for the construction of coal-to-methanol plants.
}
A key factor in the conclusion that remote natural gas is the most
important source for methanol in the transition period is the expectation that
the markets will evolve slowly. Methanol from remote: natural gas .is not
likely to be extremely elastic in supply. At large levels offuel demand,
production costs from this source would begin to rise for two reasons: longer
`
	
	
transport distances to California, and higher collection costs in less
developed remote sites. Although there is not sufficient data for a thorough
r
analysis of this elasticity of supply issue, it is prudent to assume that,
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Daring the transition period in the late 1980s and early 1990x, the
potential exists for new capacity to be. constructed. As discussed 'in Section
II, there. are already capacity additions planned through 1987 based on natural
gas feedstocks that may add as much as, one billion gallons of excess capacity
relative to ,projected chemical demands: Thus, there is an ample supp ly of
methanol for early utility experiments, fleet use, and octane blending in the
next few years. The discussion in this section will focus beyond 1987, when
additional capacity will be needed. The options for incremental capacity
expansions are examined, other synfuel alternatives are compared, the impact
of the high oil price scenario on methanol production coot is evaluated, and
the likely course for methanol capacity expansion is described.
1,.	 Methanol Production Options
il
,.i
beyond 10,000- to 12,000-ton/day capacity from remote gas sources, some cost
increases would occur (e.g., higher tranaport cost from Indonesia versus Cook
Inlet alone coule- account for 0.05/gal to $0.09/gal).
California feedstocks are not crucial to the transition period because
they are either too expensive or too small to make a significant impact as a
EueL. In the case of petroleum coke and heavy oil in rock, the problem is the
f .,Ostock cost. At $1.80/10 6 Btu and a plant that is simila r to a coal-to-
^M,,,,sno1 plant, petroleum coke would be uncompetitive with remote natural. gas
3tU . ^.es., Heavy oil in rock would be even more expensive; at a minimum of
Ba tt/1,r, 6 Stu, it would be too expensive to even consider as a methanol feed
,t^aV",c, The only indigenous source that may compete on a cost basis is bio-
energy. There are some new gasifiers being developed specifically for wood
feedstocks which will be manufactured and simply unloaded at the conversion
sites that promise to reduce costs below the estimate in Figure 5-6. The
problem is that these feedstock sources are not large enough or concentrated
enough. to be a major portion of California's fuel supply. Thus, although.
there may be some cost-effective methanol from bioenergy, it is not a critical
part of the supply picture.
Aside from remote. natural gas, the only other major source for Cali-
fornia methanol in the transition is SFC-supported coal-to-methanol plants.
The effect of loan guarantees and price supports would be sufficient to bring
the minimum selling price from an Alaskan coal plant down to approximately
$0.81/gal delivered to California. At such a price the product would have
some difficulty finding a market for a 4000- to 5000-ton/day output: Even
with premiums for environmental operation, utilities could not justify such a
high methanol price. Only the blends market might be willing to pay this high
a price, but they could probably get other sources at lower prices as long as
imports for blends are not subject to import duties.
	
2.	 Synfuel Alternatives
There are other synthetic fuel options that are potentially avail-
able to compete with methanol in either utility or transportation markets.
Those which could be commercial in the next 15 years are shale oil, Fischer-
Tropsch indirect liquefaction, methanol-to-gasoline as transport .fuels, and
SNG or medium-Btu gas in utility markets. These options have been evaluated
in a consistent manner with a common set of assumptions (Section 4.C, Figure
4.3). These results have some definitive implications: (1) methanol-to-
gasoline is considerably more expensive than neat methanol on a per mile
basis; (2) Fischer-Tropsch gasoline is so much more expensive than any of
the other options that it is not viable as a synthetic option for California.
Although there is significant uncertainty in projecting synthetic fuel costs,
the high correlation between methanol and methanol-to--gasoline costs indicates
that these conclusions would be valid under most reasonable sensitivity assump-
tions. Similarly, the wide differences between Fischer-Tropsch liquids and
neat methanol improve confidence in neat methanol as a_superior fuel. From a
production cost viewpoint, the edge of methanol over gasoline from shale oil
is less significant. The processes are not closely related, nor is the margin
so great that one dominates the other. A'conclusion has been drawn that when
environmental issues, however, are added to the cost evaluation, the edge is
f
	
5-15	 ^1
1f	
a
^'	 :.1,. _ `_.,. ,. _,,., 	 -.^: ,^_ ^uxa .-^ ,-...... -	 _	 =.-^.ww,eb„Y'^ -. ...:...__:_.°-e,"=7xm ^^	 ^	 ..^ rcxrts^c=^--^.^!...:ca-:;-..usea^ ...............•:^...^,..
.I
sl
clearly to neat methanol from California's perspective. As a national stra-
tegy, on the other hand, these and other synthetic fuels should be examined
further.
3.	 High Oil Price Scenario Feedback
One area that is often overlooked in evaluations of new technol-
ogies is that the sensitivity of the ,:ompetitivene8s of new systems to higher
energy prices also has a feedback to the product:.on cost as cell. In the case
of methanol production, the high price oi. scenario may be expected to affect
production costs in three distinct ways. First, rising oil prices caused by
continued political distruptions in the Middle Er.st will tend to raise the
feedstock cost of methanol production. Second, large-scale energy projects
are themselves energy-intensive in terms of moving men and equipment to remote
sites, supporting them, and in indirect energy usage dur: to the manufactured
equipment and subsystems needed for the processing plant. '.hird, the opera-
tion of these plants over their lifetime would cost more for process energy
valued at the opportunity cost of the higher price scenario. Thus, it is riot
necessarily true that higher prices and hence other energy costs greatly
accelerate the competitiveness of synfuels. There are offsetting effects
that partially mitigate the direct impacts.
In the case of methanol from remote natural gas, the mechanism by which
feedstock costs rise is that remote gas can be converted to LNG and substi-
tuted for pipeline gas at end-use centers. A high oil price scenario leads
to increases in market gas prices because these fuels are close substitutes
in utility and industrial markets. In 1992, for instance, the increases in
refinery acquisition oil and gas prices from the base case to a high oil price
scenario are $6.68/10 6 Btu to $7.45/10 6 Btu for natural gas and from $7.54/
10 6
 Btu to $9.90/10 6 Btu for oi.. These energy price increases could induce
an overall increase in remote natural gas-to-methanol production cost. from
$0.58/gal to $0.66/gal. First, as pipeline gas rises in value, the remote
resource may rise in value as well. An estimate of this increase waa made by
backing out the LNC conversion cost and transport cost from the pipeline gas
price in the high oil scenario. The net difference indicated an increase of
$0.50/10 6 Btu in the value of the remote gas resource, which in turn increases
methanol production cost by $0.05/gal. Second, there would also be a small
increase in the cost of barge-mounted plants which, of course, utilize process
energy (mostly oil if made in Japan) that would cost more after the price
increase. The potential feedback effects are hypothetical because a detailed
analysis of the capital cost feedback effect is beyond the scope of this study,
and even the remote gas cost would depend on the costs and aiternative options
in each specific gas field.
In coal-to-methanol plants, the source of the feedback comes more
strongly from capital costs rather than feedstocks. Using the Texaco Coal
Gasification Process 5000-ton/day plant as an example, the total feedback in
1992 would be an increase of $0.11/gal and $0.13/gal in 1997 based on a recent
study. These feedback effects could offset much of the gain in apparent
competitiveness resulting from high oil prices. This type of feedback may be
a partial explanation for why shale oil prices seem to stay always slightly
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above oil prices, ever: after large price jumps occur. The effect applies to
all synfuels, and methanol is no exception.
Thus, although the specific values of the feedback impacts above are
only rough estimates of the actual feedback that might occur, the more general
caution that high oil prices would be partially offset by increases in
methanol production costs seems quite sound.
4.	 Overview
The major findings in the production cost analysis ere that:
(1) Methanol is most efficiently produced from remote natural gas
in the transition period.
(2) Production costs from remote noturai gas vary from the
reference case of $0.53/gal in 1992 up to $0.66/gal at a 25%
return and down to $0.42 /gal at a 15% return.
(3) The quantities of remote natural gas available on the Pacific
rim at $1.50/10 6 Btu or less appear sufficient to support
Calif -nix's transition period demands.
(4) Rapid expansion of methanol supeiy from remote gas resources
will induce price increases as longer tra ►► sport and higher
collection costs are incurred.
(5) California resources are not cri-ical to a methanol fuel
transition.
(6) Methanol does appear to be in the competitive range with shale
oil an' to be significantly cheaper than methanol-to-gasoline
or Fischer-Tropsch liquids.
(7) A hip,n oil price scenario will induce some methanol production
cc.3t increases, which offsets some of the gains in viability.
(8) There does not appear to be a case in which unsubsidizec, jal-
to-methanol plants become commercial before the year 2000.
As a result of these findings, some general conclusions can be formed.
California needs to encourage the creation of an infrastructure to import and
unload methanol within the state with emphasis on port facilities in the near
term and pipelines in the long term. Attempts to favor the use of in-slate
feedstocks will only slow the methanol transition by raising methanol produc-
tion costs. Similarly, attemrts to stimulate rapid methanol use will induce
increases in methanol pLu.;uction costs. It will take at least until the turn
of the century for a fully commercial coal-to-methanol industry to become
viable. Thus, in the interim transition period, remote natural gas must
satisfy fuel demands. There is enough remote natural gas on the Pacific Rim
at acgvisition prices that will range from $1.00/10 6 Btu to $1.50/10 6 Btu
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to supply likely fuel demands on the West Coast for fleets and octane
enhancement. Artificial demand created by regulations to induce greatly
increased methanol use (i.e., 50,000-ton/day) will lead to rising methanol
supply costs as longer transport and higher remote gas collection costs are
incurred. Thus, from the production side of the market, a relativel y slow
transition period is implied. A critical factor in tying together the supply
and demand analyses is that coal-to-methanol production costs are a very
important issue in the mid-term period, even though there are less costly
near-term production options. The incentive to begin the investments in
production and utilization equipment necessary to have a major commitment to
neat methanol vehicles requires that coal-to-methanol production costs look
attractive in the ^ime horizon of 10 to 15 years. The analysis done in this
study indicates that the actual time horizon at this point in time looks much
longer. Thus, although "here are less costly sources of methanol (remote
natural gas, petroleum coke), the potential quantities at low prices are too
limited to induce any significant transition.
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SECTION VI
AIR-QUALITY IMPACTS OF METHANOL
A. INTRODUCTION
In this section, a screening analysis of likely impacts of methanol fuel
on the air quality of the South Coast Air Basin is described. The Basin
includes all of the populated areas within the counties of Los Angeles,
Orange, Riverside, and San Be-nardino. Some 11 million people, about one-half
of the population of California, live within this area. The region has
persistent and severe problems of air pollution due to a combination of
factors:	 large amounts of p4,1:ucants are released into the atmosphere over a
relatively small area; the mountains to the north of the Basin act as a
barrier to the horizontal dispersion of pollutants; and for many days of the
ye..r, the existence of a temperature inversion layer confines the pollutants
within a layer of air whose thickness is typically between 1000 and 2500
feet. The smog-forming reactions are initiated by sunlight and promoted by
warm temperatures. Thus, smog is most severe during the long, hot days of
summer.
There were several reasons for selecting the South Coast Air Basin as
the case for assessing the impact of methanol fuel on air quality. In
addition to the heavy population that suffers from the effects of pollution in
this area, the availability of extensive compilations of emissions and
meteorological information enabled the application of rigorous analytical
procedures. For example, past and future estimates of pollutant emissions are
summarized in the Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP), 1982 Revision, issued by
the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD). However, the
scientific basis for the analysif of air quality and the conclusions .o be
drawn from that analysis are quite general.
B. AIR-QUALITY MODELING CALCULATIONS FOR OZONE ANn FORMALDEHYDE
Over the last 20 years, researchers at the California Institute of
Technology have made efforts to understand the chemical. and physical processes
that lead to the formation of photochemical smog. Some of the information
obtained from that work has been applied to the development of models that
simulate air quality in the Basin. One such model was developed at Caltech by
McRae and Seinfeld. The air quality model calculates the amounts of secondary
atmospheric pollutants such as ozone and peroxyacyl nitrates (PAN), given the
emissions of reactive organic compounds (ROC) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx)
that enter the atmosphere from various sources such as automobiles, stationary
power plants, solvents, and petroleum production, marketing, and refining
operations. Ozone is widely accepted as a good index of all the complex
reactions that take place among reactive hydrocarbons and NO x in the
polluted atmosphere. The ROC are divided into six classes, according to
reactivity. For this an&, ,i., the model was further adapted in order to
treat methanol as a spec : oullutant. The methanol chemitrry was included
in the model for completP,,,3s even though, as is shown later, methanol
contributed relatively little co the formation of ozone. Thuu, the model was
able to distinguish seven classes of reactive organic compounds: alkanes,
1
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ethylene, other olefins, formaldehyde, other aldehydes, aromatics, and
methanol. The vari ,)us ROC have different rates of reaction with NO x and
with the oxygenated species that pro..ote the formation of photochemical smog.
The model is described in detail in technical papers written by its
authors. 34 It uses a Langrangian form for the representation of the
equations of motion that describe the diffusion and convection of chemical
species withir, the modeling region. It calculates the concentrations of
chemical species along a given trajectory of an air parcel traversing the
South Ceast ..ir Basir. This computational method is generally faster than the
alternative method of calculating those concentrations for every position
within the Basin. In order for the model to give the concentrations of
chemically reactive species, three major input components are required: (1) a
meteorological description, such as wind speed and trajectories and vertical
temperature variation; (1) a source description of the temporal and spatial
distribution of emissions for all significant pollutant sources; and (3) a
kinetic mechanism describing rates of atmospheric chemical reactions as a
function of concentrations of various species present.
The meteorological description must account for the interactions among
the various components. For example, r on,perature variations affect the 	 R
inversion height, which in turn influences the transport of chemical species
in the atmosphere. The emissions data must be accurate and detailed arid
specify emissions from diverse sources. The data must also be well structured
so that emissions from one source can be varied without altering the remainder
of the emissions. The model has previously been validated by comparing its
predictions with observed atmospheric data and with the results of smog-
chamber experiments. Out of 15 species of pollutants predicted by the model,
NO2 and 03 were used to provide the most rigid test of the model's
accuracy. The pred i ctions were consistent with observed data.
After the model had been modified to include the chemistry of methanol,
no additional validation runs were made because, as methanol had never been a
component of the atmosphere of the Basin, there were no past atmospheric
pollution data with methanol as a major pollutant. In addition, no suitable
smog-chamber data were available for comparison with the predictions of the
modified model. In the only ppublished smog-chamber experiments with gas
mixtures containing methanol , 34 not enough information was provided to
enable a simulation of the experiments using the modified McRae-Seinfeld
model. Nevertheless, the study is confident that the equations upon which the
model is based correctly represent the chemistry of methanol and that the
modified model is correct.
All calculations were based on the projected emissions of pollutants for
the year 2000. At that future date, the potential benefits of existing
pollution-abatement regulations would have been realized. At the same time,
it is a feasible date by which, if methanol were to become an important fuel
in California, air quality effects from this change would be felt. Calcula-
tions were performed to indicate the likely effect on air quality of using
methano l. as a substitute for gasoline. No estimates vere made on the use of
34See Reference Section, Chapter 6 of the Technical Report.
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methanol for stationary power plants or diesel vehicles, because the economic
analysis, described elsewhere in this report, has indicated i t is unlikely
methanol would be used in stationary plants and diesel vehicles because the
projected pric y
 of methanol in the year 7000 would not be competitive with the
established fuels for these applications. The two main environmental effects
of using methanol as a fuel for stationary poker plants would be to reduce
emissions of NOX and SOX . It was assumed that NO X
 emissions from
stationary sources would be kept within the limits imposed by existing
regulations using any available economical means, including the use of
methanol. 35
 Ccnsideration was given, however, to the effects on ambient
concentrations of sulfates from the use of methanol in power plants and in
industrial Lnd commercial boilers.
1.	 Emission Inventories
Input data of emissions were prepared for two base cases and for
four methanol cases. The two base case inventories were as follows. The
first set of figures were taken from the projections made by the South Coast
Air Quality Management District and published in their Air Quality Mangement
Pian. The second base case inventory was obtained using Caltech CMAP calcula-
tions of emissions for highway motor vehicles and the SCAQMD p-ojectionr fo--
all other sources. The purpose of the CMAP inventory was simply to provide a
means of checking the SCAQMD figures.
In developing the methanol case inventories, the substitution of
methanol for petroleum-derived fuels was considered under four sets of
assumptions, which were designated as Cases A through D. Those cases were
defined as follows:
Case A. Substitution of methanol-fueled vehiclec for all gasoline-
fueled vehicles on the assumption that total, lifetime-average exhaust
emissions for methanol-fueled vehicles and gasoline-fueled vehicles are
equal. Calculation based on SCAQMD-projected emission inventory for the
year 2000.
Case B. Substitution of methanol-fueled vehicles for gasoline-fueled
vehicles on the assumption that total, lifetime-average exhaust
emissions of reactive organic gases for methanol-fueled vehicles and
gasoline-fueled vehicles are equal, but that the methanol-fueled
vehicles have lowe r en..ssions of NOX than the gasoline-fueled
vehicles. Calculation based on SCAQMD-projected emission inventory for
the year 2000.
35Utilities in the South Coast Air ?iasin and in the Ventura County Air
Pollution Control District are required to reduce their NO X
 emissions by
60% by the year 1990. Use of methanol in some units could be included as
part of an overall strategy to satisfy this requirement and could lead to
payment of a premium for methanol.
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tTable 6-1. TOTAL EMISSIONS BY REACTIVITY CLASS FOR DIFFERENT
BASE CASES AND METHANOL CASES (ton/day)
BASE GASES	 ME T	 L CASES
SC Ac	 D INVENTORY CMAP INVENTORY
CASE A CASE B CASE C CASE DCOMPOUNDS SCAQMD CMAP
Formaldehyde 16.6 17.3 74.7 74.7 32.8 64.0
Other Aldehydes 36.4 37.2 36.4 36.4 36.4 37.2
Aromatics 208.7 251.1 113.2 113.2 113.2 118.4
Ethylene 41.9 53.2 22.3 22.3 22.3 25.6
Olefins 80.0 101.6 41.9 41.9 4).9 49.8
Alkanes 704.8 797.1 576.9 576.9 568.5 618.4
Methanol 0 0 225.7 225.7 137.5 346.6
Oxides of Nitrogen 920 990 892 768 768 999
Case C. Substitution of methanol-fueled vehicles for all gasoline-
fueled vehicles on the assumption that total, lifetimt--average exhaust
emissions of NOx
 and of reactive organic gases for methanol-fueled
vehicles are 50% lower than Corresponding emissions from gasoline-
fueled vehicles. Calculation based on SCAQMD-projected emission
inventory for the year 2000.
Case D. Substitution of methanol-fueled vehicles for all gasoline-
fueled vehicles on the a:sumption that total, litetime-average exhaust
emissions for methanol-fueled vehicles and gasoline-fueled vehicles are
equal. Calculation based on CMA1'-projected emission inventory for the
year 2000.
The calculated emissions data for each of the above methanol cases and the
base cases are shown in Table 6-1.
In Case A, the assumption of equal emissions for methanol-fueled
vehicles and gasoline-fueled vehicles was very conservative. It was made in
order to establish a "worst-case" scenario for methanol, because emissions
from future commercial methanol-fueled vehicles could not be accurately
predicted.
The assumption of lower life-time emissions of No for methanol-fueled
vehicles (Case B) is based on the reported fact that methanol-fueled vehicles
can produce much lower NO x emissions. In generel, a reduction in NOx
emissions is achieved at the expense of fuel efficiency. These calculations
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were made in order to show what could happen and not necessarily what would
happen in practice.
Among hydrocarbons, the methanol and formaldehyde emitted by methanol-
fueled vehicles are more easily oxidized by exhaust catalysts than are the
hydrocarbons in gasoline exhaust, such as aromaticu and alkanes. In addition,
there is good reason to expect that (1) the catalyst used for methanol exhaust
woul(' have a longer life than the catalyst used with gasoline-fueled engine
exhaust, and (2) the exhaust from methanol combustion has a lower exhaust-gas
temperature and a lower heat of reaction in the catalyst bed, thus reducing
the likelihood of damage to the catalyst through overheating. More
significantly, there are indications that engines utilizing emerging
technology that is based on the catalytic dissociation of methanol would
produce significantly lower emissions of both hydrocarbons and of NO x
 than
present-day metharol-fueled vehicles.
Several important additional variational calculations were also made,
all based on the Case A inventory. The first was an investigation of the
sensitivity of the model results to possible errors in the projected mass of
highway-vehicle emissions for the year 2000. Runs were made using Case B
inventory data in which those emissions were 25% and 50% higher than the
figures projected by the SCAQMD. The results are shown in Figure 6-1.
The second variational calculation was intended to establish the maximum
reduction in peak ozone concentration that could be achieved by any strategy
to limit emissions from gasoline-fueled vehicles in the year 2000. An
emission inventory was used (based on Case A) in which those emissions were
set to zero.
The last variational calculation was made in order to obtain an estimate
of the effective reactivity of methanol in the atmosphere. In this
calculation, the mass of methanol in the Case A inventory was set equal to
zero and the peak ozone concentration was compared with that obtained for the
methanol Case A calculation.
All the modeling calculations were made for the trajectory of an air
parcel traversing the Basin and passing through the City of Upland at 4:00
p.m. The meteorological conditions were those which existed on June 28,
1914. On that day, air quality was particularly bad, with a peak ozone
concentration of 0.38 parts per million (ppm) at 3:00 p.m: at Azusa. The
trajectory was chosen because it passed through Azusa, which had the highest
Basin-wide concentration of ozone on that day, and tecause the ozone concer.-
tration along the trajectory was relatively insensitive to initial concen-
trations of pollutants. Estimation of those initial concentrations is
generally subject to some uncertainty. Concentrations of the following
pollutants were noted: ozone, formaldehyde, and peroxyacyl nitrates.
2.	 Results of Modeling Calculations
a.	 Ozone Concentrations. Figure 6-2 shows the peak ozone
concentrations for four different cases. The results indicate that substi-
tution of methanol for gasoline as a fuel for highway vehicles would result in
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substantial reductions in levels of ozone and peroxyacyl nitrates. The four
peaks, shown in Figure 6-3 (see p. 6-9), are as follows:
Peak 1. The daily maximum ozone concentration for the base case in
which gasoline .s used as the fuel for all the conv,ntional, spark-
ignited-engine vehicles in the South Coast Air Basin in the year 20
The vehicle emissions for the year 2000 were estimated by the South
Coast Air Quality Management District and published the Air Quality
Mnnage_ment Plan. The peak level of ozone was 0.333 ppm and the pea
level of PAN was 0.033 ppm.
Peak 2. The ozone concentration for the Case A methanol inventory
which there is complete substitution of methanol for gasoline in th
year 2000, with total emissions of reactive organic compounds and o
oxides of nitrogen from methanol-fueled vehicles being equal to the
corresponding emissions for gasoline-fueled vehicles. Please note
this assumption is very conservative. Projections by SCAQMD for
gasoline-fueled-vehicle emissions in the year 2000 were used in thi
modeling calculation. The peak ozone concentration was 0.285 ppm,
i
W	
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is 14.4% lower than the corresponding peak for the gasoline case shown
in Peak 1. In addition, the peak concentration of PAN was reduced by
21.51.
Peak 3. Ozone conec-.tration for the basic Case B methanol inventory,
assuming complete substitution of methanol for gasoline for all
conventional, spark-igniter-engine vehicles in the year 2000, with total
exhaust emissions of reactive organic compounds equal to the
corresponding emissions for gasoline-fueled vehicles but emissions of
NOx 50% lower than for gasoline-fueled vehicles. Projections by
SC:AQMU for gasoline-fueled-vehicle emissions in the year 2000 were used
in thin modeling calculation. The peax ozone concentration was 0.275
ppm, 17.4% lower than the base case represented by Peak 1. The
difference between Peak 2 and Peak 3 is a measure of the sensitivity of
peak ozone concentration to total emissions of NO x . Peak 3, which
allowed for 50% lower emissions of NO x for methanol-fueled vehicles,
represented a decrease of 8.5% in total NO x emissions compared with
Peak 2. The corresponding difference in peak ozones between Peak 2 and
Peak 'f was equal to 3.5% of the peak value. for Peak 2.
In the Case B methanol inventory, calculations were also made for 20%,
50%, and 100% substitution of methanol for gasoline. The relationship
between peak ozone concentration and percentage of fuel substitution is
shown in Figure 6-4. The reduction in peak ozone concentration relative
to the base case was 6.6% for 20% methanol substitution and 9.9% for 502
methanol substitution.
Peak 4. Obtained for the methanol inventory ease C, which is com;lete
substitution of methanol for gasoline, assuming that total exhaust
emissions of both NO x and reactive organic compounds are 50% lower
r'ian the corresponding emissions for gasoline-fueled vehicles.
Projections by SCAQMU for gasoline-fueled-vehicle emissions in the year
2000 were used in this modeling calculation. The peak level of ozone
was 19.6% lower than the base level of Peak 1.
Figure 6-1 (see p. 6-5) shows results of calculations to investigate the
possible effect on peak ozone level of possible errors in the estimation of
motor-vehicle emissions for the year 2000. Note that, while the absolute
values of peak ozone concentrations do change, the percentage reduction in
peak ozone as a result of methanol substitution is not particularly sensitive
to changes in the mass of highway emissions.
When the mass of methanol emissions in Case A are set equal to zero, the
resulting peak ozone concentration is 16.4% lower than that of the AQMP base
case. By comparison, the peak ozone concentration corresponding to the Case A
inventory was 14.4% lower than that for the AQMP base case. Thus, as was
expected, it was found that the reactivity of methanol was relatively low.
Obviously, the assumption of complete substitution of methanol for
gasoline is quite unrealistic and was made only for convenience, in order to
establish limits. Calculations for more realistic percentages of substitution
of methanol for gasoline, as shown in Figure 6-3, indicate that the peak ozone
concentration decreased approximately linearly with percentage of substitution.
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Also investigated was the effect of methanol-vehicle NO x emissions on
ozone concentration. The results are shown in Figure 6-4, where the percent
reduction in peak ozone concentration is plotted against the assumed average
mass of NOx emisaions from methanol-ft:eled vehicles, expressed as a fraction
of the projected gasoline-vehicle emissions.
Finally, all exhaust and evaporative emissions from gasoline-fueled
vehicles were set equal to zero in order to establish the maximum reduction in
peak ozone concentration that could be achieved by any strategy to limit
emissions from gasoline-fueled vehicles in the year 2000. By comparison with
the base case, th( reduction in peak ozone concentration was found to be 25%.
1).	 Fort..aldehyde Concentrations. The air-quality model was used
to predict hourly average concentrations of formaldehyde along the
trajectory. The peak hourly concentration of formaldehyde !or a typical
stcoggy day was 0.0355 ppm for the base case- and 0.0535 ppm for the methanol
case. These concentrations are not high enough to justify general concern.
C.	 ESTIMATION OF IMPACT ON SULFUR COMPOUNDS AND PARTICULATES
The likely changes in the ambien
a result of methanol substitution were
of the very high level of uncertainty
for total suspended particulates, that
any calculations.
t concentraLions of sulfur compounds as
estimated for the year 2000. Because
in the projected inventory of emissions
projected inventory was not used for
The suspended particulates include sand, dust, non-volatile carbon
(soot), sulfates, inorganic nitrates, organic nitrates, and condensible
organic substances. Thus the term total suspended particulates (TSP) is a
blanket description for a variety of chemical species in a range of particle
sizes, and reveals little about the impacts that those different kinds of
particulates would have on the environment. For this reason, emission
inventories for TSP were not used in Assessing the possible impact of
methanol. Instead, a qualitative evaluation was made based on some published
work.
According :-, Cass, Boone, and Macias, 36 on-road and off-road diesel
engines accounted for 61.0% of all fine .:,)n-volatile carbon emissions in the
South Coast Air Basin in 1980, while gasoline-fueled vehicles accounted for
10.2%. Methanol-fueled engines, on the other hand, produce very little
particulate matter. The Southern California Edison Company performed
combustion tests using methanol in boilers and turbines, from which they
confirmed that methanol was an extremely clean-burning fuel. Pefley and his
associates at the University of Santa Clara have made similar observations
36See Reference 46, Chapter 6 of the Technical Report.
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from their work with methanol-fueled, spark-ignited engines. Thus, if
methanol were to be substituted for gasoline, there would be a reduction in
total emissions of non-volatile carbon. A much larger reduction in such
emissions would occur if methanol were to be substituted for diesel fuel as
well as gasoline.
The expected ambient concentration] of SO X
 and sulfates were estimated
relative to their ambient concentrations for 1979 using the "linear roll-back"
approximation. Thal approximation assumes that the change in ambient concen-
trations between 1979 and the year 2000 is directly proportional to the change
in the total emissions of the corresponding primary pollutants over the sarre
period. No more sophisticated methods of calculation are available for the
sulfur compounds.
Emissions of sulfur oxides were projected for the year 2000 for three
cases, two of which were described earlier in this section:
( I) SCAr1MD Base Case.
(2) Methanol Case A.
(3) Methanol Case E.
The methanol Case E was similar to Case A except that for Case E all utility
boilers and industrial and other boilers were also assumed to be converted to
mt thanol fuel.
D.	 FINDINGS
The conclusions drawn from the air-qualitv modeling calculations and
from the semi-quantitative analysis applied to projected emissions of sulfur
are summarized below. The comments apply to the complete substitution of
methanol for gasoline in the South Coast Air Basin, based on projected emis-
sions for the year 2000. Fven though this is not a feasible scenario for
methanol use, the intent was to bound the air-quality implications of substi-
tuting methanol for gasoline and tc calculate a limiting case. Therefore:
(1) The complete substitution of methanol-fueled vehicles for gasoline-
fueled vehicles would lead to a reduction of 14.4% to 20.0% in the
peak hourly-average concentration of ozone.
(2) The peak ozone concentration decreases approximately linearly with
methanol substitution.
(3) Even with a very optimistic rate of neat methanol vehicle adoption,
the maximum impact by the year 2000 would be only a 3% to 4%
reduction in the peak hourly average concentration of ozone.
(4) The photochemical reactivity of methanol is relatively low. Thus
when the mass of emissions of methanol in Case A was arbitrarily
set to zero, the peak ozone concentrat_on was reduced by unly 2.3%.
(5) With the use of methanol fuel, the peak ozone concentration is
reduced as emissions of NO X are reduced. The ozone concentra-
6- 1 1
tion, however, is a lot less sensitive to emissions of NO x than
to reactive organic emissions.
(6) The maximum reduction in ozone concentration achievable by
elimination of gasoline-fueled-vehicle emidsi.ons is 25%.
(7) With methanol substitution, the ambient concentration of
formaldehyde would not increase significantly.
(8) The concentration of sulfur-derived pollutants would not be
significantly affected by methanol substitution. If methanol ^.Cre
to be used in utility boilers and in industrial and commercial
boilers, there would be a large reduction in the concentration of
sulfur-derived pollutants.
(9) Total suspended particulates in general would not be greatly
affected by methanol substitution. The concc riCration of fine,
non-volatile carbonaceous particulates, however, would he reduced 	 iR
slightly if methanol were substituted for gasoline. If methano:
was also to be substituted for diesel fuel, the reduction in the
concentration of non-volatile carbonaceous particulates would be
much larger.
The approximate linear relationship, Conclusion (2), between the degree
of methanol substitution and the peak concentration of ozone implies that the
atmospheric reactions of methanol and those of the reactive components and
byproducts of gasoline are not significantly coupled. That observation is
entirely consistent with the fact, indicated in Conclusion (3), that methanol
is significantly less reactive than the other reactive compounds in the
atmosphere.
Conclusion 4 appears, superficially, to be at variance with the results
of a recent study made by System Applications, Inc. (SAI) of San Rafael, Calif-
ornia, on behalf of the Western Oil and Gas Association NOW. Actually, the
SAI/WOGA study was based on different premises than those used in the calcula-
tions described in this section. The results 37 refer to the case where
methanol was substituted for gasoline, which was not one of the cases con-
sidered by the SAI/WOGA study. The SAI/WOGA study used a different emission
inventory than that used in this study; they used a projected 1987 inventory
and applied to it the emission reductions expected from implementaton of some
provisions of the Air Quality Management Plan for the South Coast Air Basin.
There may also be other differences in the data used in the modeling
calculations. Therefore, Conclusion (4) does not necessarily contradict the
results of the SAI/WOGA study.
Table 6-2 summarizes the expected physical effects upon the atmosphere
of a large-scale substitution of methanol for gasoline. The table is only
qualitative, and is intended to give a very general overview of the effects of
37See Figure 6-6 of the Technical Report. 	
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Table 6-2. CHANGES IN AIR QUALITY DUE TO USE OF METHANOL IN SPARK-IGNITED
MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN IN THE YEAR 2000
POLLUTANT CHANGE PHYSICAL IMPACTS
OZONE Reduction -Reduced acute respiratory 	 illness
-Reduced damage to paints, 	 elastomers,
rubber
-Reduced damage to crops
SULFATE Small	 reduction -Reduced mortality
-Reduced acidity of rain
-Improved visibility
FOkMALDEHYDE Small increase -Possible odor
-Eye	 irritation if	 local concn.	 high
-No known health effects at 	 low concn.
NITROGEN DIOXIDE Small reduction -Reduced acidity of rain
-Possible reduction in respiratory
illness
ORGANIC NITRATES Significant -Reduced eye irritation
reduction
TOTAL SUSPENDED Reduction -Improved visibility
PARTICULATES
different air pollutants. The sources of information about the physical
effects of the pollutants are listed in Table 6-22 of the Technical Report.
E.	 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The work described in this section is only an initial investigation.
The accuracy of the data used in the modeling calculations could possibly be
improved. However, the overall conclusions are believed to be substantially
correct. Generally, very conservative assumptions were used in the analysis.
The emerging technology for the catalytic dissociation of methanol using
exhaust heat from the vehicle's engine has the potential for significant
reductions in motor vehicle emissions. Hard data of emissions from dissoci-
atcd methanol vehicles must be obtained so that the likely impact of such
vehicles on the environment may be evaluated.
The study results clearly indicate that the impact of methanol on the
South Coast Air Basin atmosphere would be beneficial. For some pollutants,
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the potential improvements are significant. The most significant impact would
be in reducing the peak level of ozone, but only if a major portion if
vehicles in use were methanol-fueled. Even a small reduction in peak level
would cause larger reductions in the number of days on which smog episodes
occur, and thareby cause an improvement in the air quality for the residents
of the Basin. Obviously, the use of methanol is no panacea for the problems
of air pollution. Other pollution-abatement measures would still be needed.
if neat methanol-fueled passenger cars were to become over-the-road competi-
tive with gasoline vehicles in 1990, and from that point achieve a rate of
sales consistent with the rate of adoption for diesel-fueled vehicles since
1978, the vehicle stock would be about 12% neat methanol-fueled vehicles by
the year 2000. With 12% of the vehicles fueled with neat methanol the impact
on peak ozone would be to reduce it approximately 3.7% from the base case.
Obviously, neat methanol-fueled vehicles could be adopted either more rapidly
or more slowly than diesels, which would change this year-2000 impact, but ft
is unlikely that the change could be too ,arge given that neat methanol will
not be competitive over the road for at least 8 years, and creating a distri-
bution system widespread enough to attract a broad-based market will take a
good deal of time. From both the perspectives of over-the-road cost-effective-
ness and depth of distribution outlets, methanol will not compare favorably
with diesels before their rise in percentage of new vehicle fleet sales.
Thus, although the analogy with diesels is weak, neat methanol has more
barriers to overcome, which will make its rate of adoption tend to be less, if
anything, than the diesel experience since 1978. As a result, the 3.7% impact
on peak uzone by 2000 for neat methanol vehicles is prob,.bly optimistic and,
in any case, only a modest factor in that timeframe.
In this report, there has been no attempt to quantify the economic value
of the likely air-quality benefits of methanol as a fuel in the South Coast
Air Basin. It was simply assumed that the use of methanol will be determined
by the free market, depending on the price and the utilization of efficiency
of the fuel. There is a brief discussion in the Summary Report (page 7-9) of
possible mechanisms by which the use of cleaner fuels could be encouraged.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that the use of methanol in
motor vehicles could form part of an effective long-term strategy to reduce
air pollution in the South Coast Air Basin.
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SECTION VII
ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
A.	 INTRODUCTION
From California's perspective, there are two overriding motivations for
examining methanol as an alternative fuel in stationary and transportation
applications:	 security of supply and environmental improvement. However,
both these factors may not be sufficient to induce methanol implementation if
they are not deemed to be of sufficient value to make methanol viable in
specific applications. The intent is to see if there is justification for
government intervention in the private marketplace to either facilitate or
accelerate methanol production and use. In other words, given that the
description in Section V is a reasonable projection of what the mid-term
consequences would be of letting the market determine methanol introduction
and evolution, the goal here is to determine, based on the data developed in
the study and other sources, whether a government role is justified and, if
so, what the likely impact of government policy would be on the methanol fuel
market. In other words, the intent is to take the transition period case as
discussed in Section V, and determine if justifiable State policy can signifi-
cantly change the outlook for methanol in the next fifteen years. The impact
of State policy is then shown at the end of this section as the "derived
likely roles" which methanol can have in California if the state implements
policies to eliminate externalities and other impediments to methanol use.
Thus, by definition the difference between the "business as usual" case in
Section V and the "derived likely roles" for methanol is State policy. The
policies considered in the section are only those which deal with imperfections
in the market process and are justified in terms of net benefits to the State
of California. There are, of course, more aggressive policies which heavily
subsidize methanol production or use and could possibly result in faster
market penetration, but a compelling rationale for policies of this type has
not been found in this analysis or other studies.
In areas where there is simply too much uncertainty to formulate a
policy for methanol use in the state, the objective is to evaluate whether the
pre-conditions exist in terms of efficient markets and other institutional
mechanisms for the expansion of methanol fuel use if it meets the market
test. Emphasis is placed on examining mechanisms that help the market reflect
the cost and benefits of methanol as they become known and that efficiently
transmit them to both potential producers and consumers.
H.	 TRANSPORTATION FUEL SECURITY
The rapid changes in events and trends in the last decade are an
indication that our understanding is quite limited of how energy markets in
general and international oil markets in particular will evolve. During the
last 8 years since 1974, the forecasts of energy demand have changed
dramatically in response to a better understanding of supply and demand
elasticities, Middle East politics, and our own evolving policy. It has been
previously shown how the forecasts from one consistent source have changed
with time (see Figure 3-1).
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The most recent forecast, available .n the summer of 1982, 38 continues
this downward trend, but at a smaller rate of change. In the recent forecast,
a year-2000 energy forecast is for 95 quad 	 compared to a 101-quad forecast
in early 1981. The main point is that we at, a nation are still learning what
the impact on energy use can he in response to both institutional, technical
and international political changes.
1.	 OPEC in the 19808
In the months following OPEC's meeting in March 1982, the trend in
the international oil market changed significantly from disunity to Saudi
Arabia re-establishing its leadership through OPEC policy. The formulation of
a production allocation policy was important because it was the first time
that OPEC had imposed production quotas since their rise in the 19708 to world
prominence. In addition, it is in the setting and enforcing of production
quotas that cartels have often disintegrated in the past. During the 3 months
following their special session, the oil markets signaled that their policy
was basically successful. Spot prices of crudes rose enough to offset most of
the declines in early 1982, restoring them to near the official level. The
apparent success of this policy was more psychological than real in the sense
that it demonstrated that OPEC (or more accurately Saudi Arabia) still would
set the world price of oil. Market conditions would tend to erode the
official price over time in real terms, but expectations of a collapse were
greatly reduced.
More recently, OPEC's meeting in late June ended on a much less con-
clus:_ve note. Saudi Arabia did not attend on the basis of observing religious
holidays and in its absence the :artel failed to reach agreement on produc-
tion quotas. Iran, in particular, is in no mood to be cooperative after their
victory over Iraq. The support which Saudi Arabia and others gave to Iraq,
and the production quota given to Iran of slightly over 1 million barrels per
day (MMBD) is viewed by Iran as perhaps a factor of three too low. The
ultimate result of this situation is obviously highly uncertain. Saudi Arabia
could voluntarily absorb greater production cutbacks itself, or call another
special meeting and achieve another compromise victory on OPEC pricing/produc-
tion. Although these recent events are interesting as a guide to OPEC's
evolving role in world oil markets, the interest for this study is in the
longer term, when methanol could have a significant impact on transportation
fuel markets in California.
Events since 1979 in world oil markets and prospects for the future
indicate that OPEC cannot set prices at arbitrarily high levels. The price
increa.;e in 1979, on top of 1974 increases, was too high to be sustained when
long-run adjustments in demand materialized. The demand and supply of oil in
the short run is quite inela^,tic. More efficient utilization technology turns
over every 10-12 years for automobiles, 20 years for home heating systems,
40-50 years for residential and commercial buildings, and 25-30 years for
38Data Resources, Inc., Energy Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1982.
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utility and industrial boilers. 39 Obviously, with such a long turnover
period, the ability for quick response simply does not exist. On the
production side of the fuel market, new projects in oil, gas, sy ►► iu..!s,
pipelines, etc., all take 8 years or longer to impact the market. Thus,
although short-term elasticities are extremely low, the long-term response on
the demand side can be substantial. The significance of these market realities
is probably quite evident to Saudi Arabia; the country will continue to be a
moderating force (for its own self interest in the long run) on OPEC pricing
behavior. Real prices should conLinue below 1981 levels until at least 1985,
barring any political disruption in oil flow, and then start to grow in real
terms in response to economic growth and the end of the worldwide recession.
An orderly world market would not pose as great a difficulty for enecgy
planners, even with some real price increases and numerous polit i cal inter-
ruptions. Although industry can deal with evolving changes in supply/ demand
balance, the prospect of political disruption is a public concern as well.
2.	 Supply Disruptions
Although the recent reductions in oil prices compared to 1981
levels are a welcome relief from escalating real oil prices, the potential for
another sudden price increase has not vanished. If one looks for significant
factors in OPEC policy, two stand out:
(1) Politically caused disruptions have allowed OPEC to raise prices.
(2) Saudi Arabia has moderated extreme market conditions through its
production decisons.
Looking at the future in terms of disruption potential, it is clear that
things have improved since 1979 in the sense that OPEC has significant excess
production capacity. rhis change is important if a moderate-scale political
disruption should occur: other OPEC members will be tempted to pick up the
slack. For example, in 1982, capacity utilization should average about 61%,
down from 82% in 1980, and even with economic recovery it should only grow to
76% by 1990. A result of excess capacity is that a moderate producer (e.g.,
Iraq, Libya) could totally cease export as a result of some political problem
and the world market could absorb the loss without a major price increase.
Thus, the causes of a potential disruption that could lead to major price
increases in the 19809 have been narrowed. Where the loss of any significant
producer would have sent oil prices escalating in a period of little excess
capacity, now it would require a major producer to be lost (Saudi Arabia or
two or more of the lesser producers). Thus, the possible set of events which
could set off rapid price increases has been narrowed.
In spite of this relative improvement in our position in world oil
markets (both the import reduction to tinder 5 MMBD arid the excess production
capacity in OPEC), the United States and the countries forming the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are still extremely vunerable
3y
^-`- Resources Inc., Energy Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 2, Summer 1982.
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to a large disruption. In addition, three sets of events currently evolving
make the threat of a very large disruption as likely as at any time in the
last few yeers. First, Iran's victory over Iraq to reclaim its own territory
may only be a stepping stone to broader scale adventurism in the Middle East.
An invasion into Iraq, or an attack on Kuwait or Saudi oil installations is
possible as retribution for support of Iraq during the recent war. The second
factor that is potentially destabilizing is the softness of world oil markets
and the potential for OPEC losing control of setting world oil prices. It is
a case of too fast a fall in world oil prices (to perhaps $25/bbl) putting
tremendous pressure on the development plans of some OPEC members. Some would
even face severe internal turmoil without large oil revenues. Under such
circumstances, the destabilizing forces could create internal OPEC conflicts
that could result in lost oil production capacity. Finally, the current
situation in Lebanon, although not directly affecting oil producers at this
time, certainly has the potential for involving other Middle Fast nations.
Thus, although the set of threats that could trigger another precipitous world
oil price increase have narrowed, a few specific ones have intensified.
3.	 Import Premiums
There are two general cusses of policies that can be used to
prepare for import disruptions. One has to do with defining procedures for
whether market forces or allocation programs will be used, or whether reserves
will be established and how large they should be for dealing with actual dis-
ruptions. Such issues, although important, are not directly pertinent to
methanol's role as a synfuel that could provide diversity and security in case
a severe oil disruption should occur.
A concept which is useful in this context is: What is the value of the
import premium40 for assessing the value of alternative import reduction
programs? A report has been recently published on this subject by the Energy
Modeling Forum (EMF) at Stanford University that gives a thoughtful evaluation
of this concept. 41 The basis for calculating a premium for reductions in
oil imports is that programs established to reduce impacts in advance pay off
in a number of ways:
(1) Market power component: a reduction in imports would tend to
reduce the price for all oil imported.
(2) Security component: import reductions may create excess capacity
in OPEC producers that will moderate disruption effects and also
reduce the quantity of oil exposed to escalation and hence its
economic ramifications on the economy.
40Defined as the economic benefits of oil import reduction on a per barrel
basis.
41 Energy Modeling Forum, World Oil, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.,
EMF Report 6, February 1982.
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The Energy Modeling Forum acknowledges the difficulty of making these
estimates and has used ten world oil market models in an attempt to represent
a diverse set of assumptions and approaches. Even so, none of the existing
models deal comprehensively with such problems as inventory-holding policies
of consumers, utilization of exce g e capacity by OPEC producers, and feedback
of oil price increases into general economic activity. Thus, no claim is made
that the estimates are precise, but rather they are given as a rough guide to
the range of estimates that are reasonable under different assumptions. The
import premium estimates from the EMF repart are summarized in Table 7-1 for
both the United States alone and the OECD as a group.
The key assumptions that. drive these results are that the probability of
a disruption occuring in a given year is 5% for a 10-MMBD, 1-year duration
interruption. Increases in the probability of a disruption occurinp o r the
length of its effects would increase the security component of the import
premium. In general, the results indicate that world oil prices can be
reduced from $0.90 to $2.40 per barrel for each MMBD import reduction, in 1981
dollars. Thus, a simple approximation to the market power component for the
United States is derived by multiplying the price reduction times the quantity
of oil still imported. For example, a reduction in imports from 5 MMBD to 4.5
MMBD would have a market power component of between $4.05 and $10.80 per
barrel. 42 The security component estimates range from $1 to $5 per barrel
for the United States and from $4 to $17 per barrel for the OECD.
Table 7-1. EMF IMPORT PREMIUM ESTIMATES
(1981$/barrel)
U.S. PREMIUM	 OECD PREMIUM
	
MARKET I	 MARKET
MODEL	 POWER	 SECURITY TOTAL	 POWER	 SECURITY	 TOTAL
Gately	 10	 -	 10+	 35	 -	 35+
IEES-OMS	 9	 1	 10	 31	 4	 35
IPE	 8	 -	 8+	 23	 -	 23+
Salant-ICF	 8	 0	 8	 27	 0	 27
ETA-MACRO	 13	 5	 18	 45	 17	 62
WOIL	 7	 4	 11	 24	 14	 37
Kennedy-Nehring	 8	 2	 10	 30	 6	 35
OILTANK	 8	 2	 10	 28	 8	 36
OILMAR	 15	 3	 18	 50	 11	 61
t I►.
42Derived by: 4.5 MMBD x $0.90/bbl/MMBD and 4.5 MMBD x $2.40/bbl/MMBD.
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It is important to clarify the meaning of these results to policy makers
in the context of this study. First, given the assumptions in the EMF study:
(1) Policies that reduce imports at torts less than $8 bbl in 1981
dollars are probably economically beneficial to the United States.
(2) Policies that reduce imports at a cost of greater than $20/bbl in
1981 dollars above the world oil price will probably cause a net
economic loss to the United States, while those in between cannot
be evaluated given current data.
(3) Some import reduction policies that go beyond free market import
levels appear to be economically justified.
(4) The import premiums discussed above do not necessarily justify any
policy that cuts imports less than $8/bbl; it is still important to
search for the most efficient solutions and implementation
mechanisms.	
.R
In addition to the above conclusions, this study offers a few of its own
on the relevance of the import premium concept to the California Methanol
Assessment:
(1) The size of the economic entity (i.e., OECD, United States,
California) has a profound impact on the value of the import
premium to its residents.
(2) Behavior of other importers has a very significant impact on the
value of an import reduction program in the state or country
implementing a specific program or policy. As its import reduction/
substitution has an increasing marginal cost, it would be less
efficient to implement a given target reduction on a relatively
smaller set of users (California) than on a national set of users
(United States) or, even better, on an international user community
(OECD).
(3) The key to implementing a policy of this nature is that it needs to
be neutral among technologies and other options to be truely
effective. Thus, implementing an iiuvort premium, such as a
tariff on oil imports, is more r:fficient than subsidizing any
particular synfuel option becaAse it does not bias the selection
process.
It is easy enough to calculate the implied value of the premium on the
supply price of gasoline and thus to see if it makes a significant difference
on the timetable of methanol competitiveness. Based on a recent study, the
implied prices of gasoline at the pump are shown in Table 7-2 for the bounding
import premium cases of $8/bbl and $20/bbl for the United States.
For this first-order comparison, the implication is that if methanol as
a transport fuel were competitive with gasoline at $1.74 in 1990, there would
be reason to believe that a national policy of imposing an import premium (for
instance through a tariff) would induce a methanol market. If methanol re-
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Table 7-2. GASOLINE PRICES WITH THE U.S. IMPORT PREMIUM
BASELINE GASOLINE WITH
GASOLINE IMPORT PREMIUM
YEAR	 MAkKET PRICK: $E/bbl	 2O—Fbb1
1990	 P1.55 1.74	 2.03
1995	 1.80 1.99	 2.28
quired a gasoline price above $2.03 per gallon in 1990 (in 1981 dollars) to be
competitive, it would be less likely to be justified on these grounds. The
study Analysis indicates that an increase in gasoline prices of $0.19 /gallon
(in 1981 dollars) does significantly accelerate the period at which methanol
becomes a viable transport fuel (by about 4 years).
The conclusions of this study on the iosue of national security are
that: (1) there is a significant value (at least $8/bbl) above the free
market oil price to oil import reduction in the United Stated, (2) any attempt
to implement such a policy should be done at the national level, where the
costs are spread among all beneficiaries, (3) an oil import premium should be
implemented in a neutral manner (e.g., oil import ta ,:-itf) to allow the nairket
to select the best alternatives, (4) an import premium of $8/bbl would raise
the retail price of gasoline about $0.19 /gal, which would accelerate the
over-the-road competitiveness of methanol and other synfuels 4 to 5 years if
the premium were believed to be of a stable duration, and (5) from a fuel
aecuiity viewpoint, methanol is not significantly different from other
synfuels that substitute for imported oil.
Within California, the value which can be justified for an oil import
premium is smaller because the market power component (impact of substitution
on lowering the world oil price) is reduced considerably compared to the
nation as a whole, as most of the benefits would accrue to others. The
secur i ty component	 estimated by the EMF had a median value of $2/bb143
for the United States with a disruption probability of 5% in a given year.
Acting on its own, however, California would only capture a small portion of
the synfuel benefits if a disruption would actually occur. Although it would
require a detailed modeling analysis of California's economy in a disruption
hoth with and without a premium (established well in advance) to measure the
value of such a program, a crude estimate is provided by California's share of
U.S. oil consumption. As California consumes approximately 5% of U.S. oil,
the corresponding value of a premium for California only would be very small,
on the order of $0.50/bbl. Even if this crude estimate is low by a factor of
four (e.g., the California security premium equaled that of the United States
as a whole), the conclusion is still that the premium that California could
43$1 to $5 per barrel range for the United States.
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justify for encouraging oil substitution is very low on a cost/benefit basis.
For example, a premium in the range of $0.50 to =2.00/bbl on imported crude
oil would add only approximd,ely $0.01 to :0.03/gal to the value of methanol
used in neat methanol-fueled vehicles.
The security value of methanol must sine be considered from the pro-
duction side of the market. In the near term (i.e., through 1992), the most
likely source of methanol for California is remote natural gas from the
Pacific rim, Canada, and Mexico. These sources, although involving imports,
are not subject to the same level of risk of disruption as is oil from the
Middle East. The key issue is freedom from the likelihood of interruption of
supplies from individual sources, rather than whether the source is imported
or domestic. In this case, a diversified supply of methanol from Canada,
Mexico, Indonesia, etc., would not place California in a particulaty vulnerable
position. This conclusion is especially true for the limited guarantees of
methanol (relative to transportation fuel consumption) that would he obtained
from these sources. It would be difficult, for instance, to justify any
security premium for methanol made from Middle Eastern gas because the
instability of the region would pose the same threats to methanol imports as
it does to oil imports.
In the long run, the use of coal as a feedstock for methanol would make
it as secure as any source of fuel supply available to California. Other
possible sources for methanol (biomass and petroleum coke feedstocks) are also
domestic sources and hence secure supplies for California. Thus, from a
security viewpoint, there does not seem to be a major problem in any of the
sources that might evolve in the remainder of this decade. One possible
problem for California would be in the event that Europe does become a najor
consumer of Middle Fast methanol from remote natural gas. Even in the event
that California obtained its methanol from Pacific rim sources, competition
for methanol if there were a Middle East disruption would dri %re up prices much
the same as it would for oil. Thus, remote natural gad must be considered as
an intermediate step in methanol use as a transportation fuel, which in modest
quantities can help the state transition to coal-based methanol use. Its
security value in this transition period, however, would tend to diminish as
worldwide methanol fuel demand expands and the Middle Fast increases its
relative share of the worldwide supply.
C.	 ENVIRONW NTAL VALUE OF METHANOL
Another nationwide concern with special significance for California is
the air quality problem in its urban centers. In this regard, methanol does
have unique properties compared to other transportation synfuels, such as shale
oil, Fischer-Tropsch liquids, and products of direct coal liquefaction, as well
as conventional gasoline and diesel fuel. It is also clear that substitution
of methanol for oil in utility applications can lead to some benefits as a
result of reductions in MOX , SOX , and particulate emissions. The value
of these benefits to the utilities, however, iL not as clear.
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1. Policies and Regulations
Utilities in the South Coast Air basin ( Los Angeles and vicinity)
and in the Ventura Country Air Pollution Control District ( particularly SCE
and LADWP) are required to reduce their NO X emissions by 60% by the year
1990. Use of methanol in some units could be included as part of an overall
strategy to satisfy this requirement. This could lead to payment of a premium
for methanol.
A similar requirement is under consideration to limit SOX emissions in
the South Coast Air Basin, and there may be requirements to reduce particu-
late emissions; but the value of methanol use as an emission control strategy
cannot be determined until these regulations are finalised.
Methanol may also provide benefits in regard to the "offsets" and
"bubble" policies currently being developed by federal, state, and local air
pollution control agencies. Methanol use could provide offsets to be used for
expansion of other facilities or for sale to other companies. Under the
buW - policy, burning methanol in one boiler could allow less expensive
hij^nar-su ? fur oil to be burned in another boiler. A recently completed study
done at Caltech44 indicates that if a market were created for tradable
emission licenses for sulfur oxides, the value of a license to emit one ton
per day of sulfur oxides for a year in Los Angeles would be worth $400,000 to
$1.5 million, depending on whether natural gas were available. These types of
policies are in their infancy, and there is no precedent that can be used to
predict the outcome of the.r application here. Thus, methanol would have a
premium value as part of overall strategies for NO X and SOX reduction, but
the level of that premium depends on the level of desired en-irenmental goals
and the least expensive options for obtaining these goals.
2. Value of Environmental Benefits
An part of this study, an evaluation has been made of the environ-
mental control technology in utilities. The results, which are specific to
the Los Angeles basin, are highly dependent upon the regulations that might
exist, the level of abatement desired, and she abatement alternatives avail-
able for utilities, industry, and automobii, manufacturers to meet these
regulations. 45 The two basic strategies evaluated for NO X redaction are:
44Cass, Hahn, and Noll, _Implementing Tradable Emissions Permits for Sulfur.
Oxides Emissions in the South Coast Air Basin, Environmental Quality
Laboratory, California In&titute of Technology, June 30, 1982.
45Using specific control technologies would tend to overstate the cost of
abatement compared to an airsEc i tradable-emission permit program in the
South Coast Air Basin, which would encourage each polluter to search for the
least costly abatement options. An attempt has been made, however, to
examine abatement alternatives and to pick the most efficient option (least
costly) that meets the desired abatement target. In the long run, a
tradable license p rogram may be established which would permit the us- of
market-determined premiums for clean fuels.
I
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(1) selective catalytic reduction for Gil -fired boilers, or (2) A cotabination
of selective catalytic reduction in a limited number of plants and low NOx
burners in others. These abatement technologies were compared with the costs
of different ways to use methanol for emissions reduction, including: (1)
complete methanol substitution for other fuels, (2) 301 dual-fueling, (3) 151
dual-feeling, and (4) repowering. The results, shown in Table 7-3, show the
value of methanol in NO x reduction compared to the least costly alternative
examined for three levels of decrement in required NO x output.
As indicated in Table 7-3, the base case premium is zero, which means
that there is currently a plan for complying with NO x reduction requirements
in the South Coast Air Basin. Basically, the plan calls for using natural
gas, expanding San Onofre, and adding geothermal capacity to avoid using oil
in existing boilers within the Basin. If any of these elements of the plan
are not met and oil does need to be used in these boilers, som e form of
emission control equi pment (e.g., selective catalytic reduction or low NOx
burners) would have to be added to the oil-fired units to meet the NOx
standards. Using this approach, the premiums derived for the case where no 	 .R
natural gas is available are highest for using 151 methanol in an overfiring
mode with residual oil. The premium is $0.30/10 6 Btu in this type of
Application. The potential premiums are largest if a more severe change in
the plan occurs (i.e., San Onofre is not available for use) that imposes the
Table 7-3. PREMIUM VALUE OF METHANOL IN NOx
REDUCTION IN UTILITIES ($/10 6 Btu)
DEVIATIONS FROM BASE CASE
GEOIHERMAL
BASE	 NO GAS	 GENERATION	 SAN ONOFRE
METHANOL OPTIONS a	CASEb	 AVAILABLE NOT AVAILABLE: NOT AVAILABLE.
Methanol Fueling	 0	 0.10	 0.10	 0.50
30% Dual-Methanol Fueling	 0	 0.20	 0.20	 1.10
15% Dual-Methanol Fueling	 0	 0.30	 0.25	 0
Repowering	 0	 0.10	 0.10	 0.60
aA more detailed discussion of methanol options for reducing NO x can be
found on pages 9-52 to 9-57 of the Technical Report.
bSCE currently has an approved plan for complying with NO x restrictions;
thus, if the plan is fully implemented, there is no prem i um justified for
further reductions. Three deviations from the plan were considered: that
no natural gas is available, that geothermal capacity is not constructed,
and that San Onofre is not available for use.
7-10
-in
Y.
need to operate the oil-fired capacity much more intensively. In this case,
the premium is still highest for overfiring with methanol, but with a value of
$1.10/10 6
 Btu over the cost of natural gas. It is important to stress,
however, that the base case premium is zero and the most likely deviations
from the plan (no gas available orggeothermal capacity not completed) lead to
premiums of $0.25 to $0.30/106 Btu. 46 There may be less expensive and
thus more efficient ways to reduce NO X output, either by utilities or other
sources of NO X , which could be induced by a market-oriented incentive
program (e.g., tradable licenses). This issue needs to be studied further so
that the incentives or premiums for clean-burning fuels like methanol can be
determined by the least costly mechanisms to achieve any target emission
level. A reasonable bound on the premium value of methanol in NOx
reduction, however, is from zero to $0.30/10 6 for the NOX standards and
contro' opti)ns expected in the near future. Furthermore, if the no-gas-
available case were to arise, the quantity of methanol involved would be
approximately 3000 ton/day, which would receive. the $0.30/10 6 Btu premium
over natural gas or 0.25% sulfur oil.
An estimate has also been made of a possible value of methanol as a
strategy for SOX reduction. If a policy for reduction of 60% of SOX were
enacted in the South Coast Air Basin, one strategy would be to burn natural
gas in the oil-fired utility units in the Basin. If this requirement were
enacted and natural gas were not available, another strategy would be to burn
0.1% sulfur oil instead of the 0.25% sulfur oil now used. If this strategy
were implemented in all the oil-burning planto in the Basin, the cost premium
for this low-sulfur oil would translate into a value of $0.65/10 6 Btu fcr
methanol as an alternative. In other words, if methanol were less than
$0.65/10 6 Btu more expensive than 0.25% sulfur oil, it would become the most
efficient abatement option.
The premiums for the values for methanol as a pollution abatement
strategy would be an additive for NO X and SOX . Thus, the potential
premium value is approximately $0.65 to $0.90/10 6 Btu, or about $0.05/gal of
methanol. This size premium is not likely Lo induce use of methanol in many
plants. The cost difference that has been calculated between methanol and
conventional utility fuels is muc.. larger than this value. Nevertheless, in
the longer run it would be highly desirable if a market system were established
to create a stable mechanism for determining the value of the premium which
methanol or other clean fuels should have as part o, an efficient environ-
mental program.
D.	 GOVERNMENT PRODUCTION INCENTIVES
With the highly capital-intensive nature of coal-to-methanol plants, a
reduction in the required cost of capital has a major impact on production
cost. As a way to illustrate this relationship, the production costs from the
46There are a few special cases where plants are capacity-constrained by
NOX restrictions. In these instances, the premium for methanol could be
higher if the value of the increase in capacity factor were credited to
methanol.
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reference case, 47 coal-to-methanol plants, have been plotted against
alternative required rates-of-return (Figure 7-1).
As shown in Figure 7-1, the minimum acceptable selling rice per gallon
rises from 50.56/gal to =1.36/gal at required rates-of-return^ 8 of 11% and
25%, respectively. The reference case assumption is for a 202 return
consistent with hur('le rates in the petroleum ind •,atry, 49 which yieldo a
minimum acceptable selling price of 51.00/gal. The types of guaranteed loans
and price guarantees provided by the Synthetic Fuel Corporation have the
effect of lowering the overall required return from 20% to approximately 13.5%
1.5
0.5
0.2
5	 10	 15	 20	 25
Requ Ired Rzate of Return
Figure 7-1. SENSITIVITI OF COAL-TO-METHANOL PRODUCTION
COSTS TO REQUIRED RAPES-OF-RETURN (19815/gal)
47
'rhese cost estimates are based on a 5000-ton/day Texaco gasification plant,
located at a western minemouth on-line in 1992 	 Other assumptions are
shown in Tables 4-6 and 4-25 of the Technical Report.
48Rates-of-return are all ex pressed in nominal, after-tax terms.
49
n	 In d18CUS810nS with sponsors of this study, a 20% nominal after-tax return 	 (	 j
was determined to be the appropriate threshold for :oal-to-methanol plants, 	 IJ
I;
although rates as high as 25% were also suggested by some companies.
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for some vcntures (e.g., a 302 equity share with a 30% return and 70% debt at
13% yields a 13.55% overall return with a 50% tax rate). Thus, SFC has the
capability (through its impact on the cost of capital) to lower the minimum
acceptable selling price at the plant Kate to $0.65 to $0.70/gas in 1981
dollars.	 It is also possible to further subsidize these plants by granting
price supports to further reduce the minimum acceptable selling price.
Nowe%er, it is felt here that further subsidy may not be necessary for
me ► nanol to compete in the octane enhancement market nationally. Thus, SFC
could minimize its contribution to coal-to-methanol projects by limiting .ts
participation to loan guarantees. If methanol is to compete as a utility
fuel, however, substantial price subsidies appear necessary. A plant gate
price of only $0.35/gal would be necessary to compete with natural gas or
residual oil in 1992, which means that a price subsid y (on top of loan
guarantees) of $0.30/gal or more would be necessary to make methanol viable in
this market. An operating subsid of approximately $1.50 million per year
would thus be necessary for a 5000-ton/year plant, or approximately $3 billi,
over its 20-year lifetime. It is doubtful this level of support would occur
when the technology demonstration and production experience can be gained by
selling into higher value markets with much lower costs to SFC.
As far as the State of California is concerned, there is little to be
gained from subsidizing production of methanol because the Federal Government
has already assumed that role. It is in California's interest, however, to
have a western coal-to-methanol project among those awarded assistance by
SFC. The state can improve the likelihood of this type of project by helping
prospective project sponsors and supplying data on California markets for
methanol. There does not appear to be a justification, however, for any
state-.sponsored production subsidy to either augment or duplicate SFC's
program.
The one area where the State, througa its Public Utility Commissions,
can make a contribution to lowering the cost of methanol production is in
further development and the eventual demonstration of the once-through
methanol, coal-gasification, combiiied-cycle concept. Potential efficiency
gains in the once-through process imply that a cost. saving of about 20% (aside
from utility financing impacts) may be possible from such a system, compared
to a dedicated methanol plaat. 50 Proposed experimental programs by Cali-
fornia utilities for development of this process should be given careful
consideration by PUC.
E.	 NEAR-TERM PROGRAMS
One area %there the State of California might be able to improve the
acceptance of methanol as a fuel is in removing institutional barriers arising
from regulations and restrictions not conceived with methanol in mind. The
California Energy Commission (CEC) has been active in searching for such
50Economic Evaluation of the Coproduction of Methanol and Electricity
with Texaco Gasification - Combined- Cycle Systems, Electrical Research
Institute, EPRI-AP 2212, pp. 7-15 - 7 -16, January 1982.
a
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unintended barriers and has been successful in eliminating the most important
obstacles. For example, the state gasoline tax will be levied on methanol on
a Btu basis equivalent to gasoline rather than on a gallon basis. Taxing
methanol on a gallon basis would have penalized methanol relative to gasoline.
The state ha y; also sponsored tax credits for converting vehicles to neat
methanol use, which have been responsible for initiating fleet conversions
within California. In general, CEC has been very diligent in encouraging
alcohol fuel use through barrier elimination, developing test information
through its alcohol fleet test program, and providing incentives for vehicle
conversion. Th y intent of this section is to examine what further steps are
warranted in view of the findings of this study concerning the comparative
viability of methanol as a fuel in the neat to mid term.
The focal point of the State's plan currently is the $5 million pro-
gram to purchase and support appro,cimately 1000 fleet vehicles, to establish
50-100 commercial refueling stations in California, and to test methanol-
fueled CHP pursuit. vehicles. These activities are intended to help develop
market-pull, which will eventually lean to a self-sustaining methanol fuel
market. Related efforts are also underwa; to demonstrate methanol in
heavy-duty diesel engines and in stationary applications (repowering and
co-firing). These other programs for different types of applications are
important to CF.C's strategy of developing methanol uses that displace the
majority of refined products from crude oil. The Co ►mnissions's rationale for
this strategy is that an alternative fuel which only displaces gasoline, for
example, could have adverse effects on the existing petroleum product slate,
necessitating refinery modifications and/or relative price changes in refined
products. The stated goal of these programs is to accelerate the "take-off"
point for self-sustained commercial market growth.51
Given the abrupt reduction in the expectation for conventional fuel
prices that has occurred in the past 2 years, and the significant rise in
projected cost of synfuels, it is important to assess what government programs
can realistically accomplish in this environment. First, it is clear that the
viability of synthetic fuel projects 'ias deteriorated significantly in this
2-year period, as evidenced by the car.cellation or postponement of numerous
synfuel projects. Second, the excess capacity in OPEC oil production makes a
near-term oil disruption less likely than it was a few years ago. The net
effect of these factors is that the market viability of the long-term neat
methanol-fueled vehicle market supplied by • western coal has been pushed back
until after the year 2000 in the most likely scenarios. The major fuel
producers have little incentive, in the view of this study, to move
aggressively toward creating the supply and distribution network needed for
the use of neat methanol as a large-scale tr p.nsportation fuel in the
foreseeable future. There are, however, other selected markets where methanol
will be used successfully during this period: octane enhancement, some
captive fleets, and limited use by utilities. Programs that are oriented
51 Smith, et al., Alcohol Fuels for California; Establishing the Market,
Synthetic Fuels Office, California Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Commission, 1982.
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toward these type of goals can be successful in the period before 1990, but
not if they are expected to lead to a private passenger car market.
The California 1000-vehicle fleet program can be very effective in
demonstrating the use of neat methanol-fueled vehicles in captive fleets.
With over- the-road competitiveness, it is estimated that an annual sales
volume of 4000 to 10,000 vehicles per year is potentially achievable within.
California. In order for California's program to be successful in stimulating
both other California purchases and fleet activity in other states,52
credible information must be generated and disseminated to potential users.
In reviewing of the description of the program, there did not appear to be
sufficient resources devoted to collecting that information and diffusing it
to potential fleet users. It is recommended, therefore, that resources be
included to provide these functions so the program can stimulate better
producer and consumer decisions in the longer term. Ideally, the way to
implement such a process would be to go to the fleet purchasers/operators and
determine the type and quality of data they need to make well informed
decisions on neat methanol-fueled fleet vehicles, and then structure the data-
collection effort to answer these questions. Given this study's analysis of
the fleet market, the following types of data would appear to be important to
these potential areas:
(1) Long-term maintenance record (engine wear).
(2) In-use fuel economy record by duty cycle.
(3) Long-term emissions performance.
(4) Driveability performance by area within the state and season of the
year.
(5) Resale experience.53
As this information is assembled, there needs to be a careful plan for
dissemination to potential fleet users both in California and the rest of the
nation. A start to developing this data was begun with the Alcohol Fleet Test
Program, 54 in which much useful information was assembled and will be
published as the testing of each fleet is completed. As useful as this data
will be, however, it will be based on a limited number of methanol-fueled
vehi,:les (19 and 40 neat methanol-fueled vehicles in Fleets II and II,
respectively), which does not permit the needed segmentation of end-use
52The benefit to California of stimulating sales in other states is the
potential reduction in vehicle production costs through increasing volume
and greater manufacturer competition.
53Fjr an experimental program the State may want to take responsibility for
the resale F-ogram directly to avoid problems that may arise with a
developmental technology.
54See Chapter 8 of the Technical Report for a description.
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experiments or a large measure of data reliability. Thus, this study urges
the addition of a long-term testing program structured to the 1000-vehicle
fleet purchase.
In stationary ap p lications, the potential market with the greatest
promise for being economically viable is overfiring with a small percentage
(10-15X) of methanol. As discussed in Chapter 9 of the Technical Report, this
concept, if successful, can lead to a justifiable premium for methanol suffi-
cient to overcome its added cost if the capacity factors of plants constrained
by NOx emission restrictions are expanded. In effect, the value of this
added operational capacity added to the value of methanol fuel can be substan-
tial, but it is limited to those plants that are NOx-constrained. This
study strongly supports the conducting of tests to confirm the potential
performance of methanol in the overfiring mode. To be of greatest value,
however, it is important for overfiring with methanol to be tested against
overfiring with natural gas. A significant proportion of the benefits of
overfiring may be achievable at lower cost with natural gas overfiring, which
would reduce the justifiable premium for methanol. This submarket of utility
operations is relatively small (1750 ton/day of methanol) 55 compared to
utility fuel, but quite significant relative to current use of methanol as a
fuel. Thus, although a major use of methanol is not anticipated as a fuel
substitute for residual oil or natural gas in utilities, it may be benefically
used in highly selective applications (e.g., overfiring in environmentally
restricted plants).
One possible method for achieving greater use of methanol within Cali-
fornia is for government policy to be used to promote (perhaps even require)
utility applications as a means to provide a base fur expanding fuel use into
transportation markets. For a number of reasons, it is felt that this policy
would not be a desirable means to transition to large-scale use of methanol as
a transportation fuel. First, the value of methanol in transportation markets
(particularly octane enhancement) is considerably higher (i.e., at least
double) its value as a utility fuel. 56 As a result, methanol will be used
first in these higher value markets and only be applied to lower value uses as
°ae[hanol competition increases production and lowers price. Second, the cost
of producing methanol in large quantities will be too high to compete with
conventional utility fuels (with the exceptions in the footnote below). Thus,
utility customers would have to pay a large premium ($3/10 6 Btu fur methanol
from remote natural gas) over current utility fuels, which cannot be justified
by any realistic assessment of the benefits. Third, the experience gained in
transporting, handling, purchasing, storing, and using methanol would be based
on utility use, which would not carry over to transportation fuel companies.
Fourth, although the quantities cf fuels used by utilities are sufficiently
large to utilize the output of a coal-to-methanol plant (once thought to lower
55 10% methanol overfiring at Ormond Beach, Scattergood, and Long Beach
powerplants (see pages 9-49 to 9-52 of the Technical Report).
56Excluding specialty uses such as overfiring and perhaps remote peaking
units. The reference here is to the value of octane enhancement per gallon
compared to residual oil or natural gas.
7-16
cost through volume production), the cost of methanol would be considerably
higher than from much smaller plants based on remote natural gas. Thus, the
etrategy of inducing utilities to use methanol through public policy as a
means to transition to more widespread use in other applications is nut very
attractive. This conclusion is not intended to imply that public support of
programs to test methanol use in potentially viable utility applications is
inappropriate, but rather that they should be justified based on their own
merits as to their ability to benefit utilities and their customers.57
F.	 SUMMARY OF THE ROLE FOR STATE POLICY
The first step in determining the appropriate policies for the public
sector in the evolution of methanol as a fuel in California is to examine to
what degree the private market is not providing proper incentives for methanol.
Rationales for justifying a public role were examined for an oil import premium
and an environmental premium on fuel emissions. Although quantitative esti-
mates on these types of premiums are admittedly imprecise, they do provide
some rough guidelines on whether the social benefits of methanol are sufficient
to justify its cost.
With regard to oil import premiums, a recent analysis 58 places the
range of the premium for the country at $8 to $18 per barrel, with a medium
value of $10 per barrel. As discussed in Section VII.A, however, the justi-
fiable premium for a unilateral California policy would be considerably
smaller because the state uses only approximately 5% of the U.S, oil. Based
oil 	 data, the range for a justifiable unilateral California oil import
premium would be very small: from $0.50 to $1.00 per barrel. In terms of
methanol, this would correspond to from $0.09 to $0.17 per million Btu, which
is insignificant given the uncertainties of this crude estimate.
In the environmental area, premiums for methanol may be justified by the
avoidance of alternat"'Ne costs of reducing emissions of SO X and NOX
associated with using conventional fuels. The premiums for environmental
value were estimated in Chapter 9 of tht Technical Report to have a range from
zero to $0.20/10 6 Btu for added NOX reduction and from $0.15 to $0.65/
10 6 Btu for SO reduction. Thus, summarizing the premium value for
methanol use io n representative stationary application would yield the range
of values in Table 7-4.59
57 Including environmental benefits that were discussed in Section VII.B of
this Summary Report.
58Energy Modeling Forum, World Oil, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
EMF Report 6, February 1982.
59The potential premium for methanol use in overfiring is not considered
because the application would appear to be potentially viable in only very
limited applications.
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Table 7-4. POTENTIAL PREMIUM VALUE FOR METHANOL IN
STATIONARY APPLICATIONS (1981 $/10 6 Btu)
PREMIUM SOURCE	 VALUE RANGE
Oil Import Premium	 $0.09	 - $0.17
NO Reduction	 0.00	 -	 0.20
x
So	 Reduction
	 0.15	 03 65
— —
TOTAL	 $0.24	 51.^.1
The more likely values of the premium are in the lower eid of the range
for the rest of the 1980s because (1) the likelihood of a major disruption is
low in the near term owing to the excess capacity in OPEC, (2) there is an
accepted NOX reduction plan bEing implemented that makes the incremental
value of further reductions zero, and (3) natural gas availability has
improved considerably, which greatly reduces the cost of SO X
 reduction.
Thus, the state can impose policies that effectively correct for these
externalities by raising the value of methanol by $0.25/10 6
 Btu or even
double that amount to allow for reasonable estimation errors. The key point,
however, is that the cost of methanol relative to conventional fuels is so
much greater than this justifiable premium that it would have virtually no
impact on methanol use. For example, if policies were enacted within
California to internalize the premium values shown in Table 7-4, the value of
methanol versus residual fuel oil would be approximately $6.87 to $7.65/106
Btu, whereas its value relative to natural gas would be $6.49 to $6.69/106
Btu. The delivered cost of methanol from remote natural gas or coal would be
approximately $9.25 and $16.00/10 6 Btu, respectively. Thus, the impact of
these types of premiums would be ineffective in influencing actual purchase
decisions. Obviously, policies could be devised to force methanol use in
spite of these major additional costs, but there is no justifiable basis for
policies of this nature. Thus, in the case of stationary applica^ions, the
impact of government policies to internalize oil security and environmental
premiums would not affect the private-sector decision process.
The premium value of methanol as a transportation fuel is even more
difficult to assess than stationary application fuel because the incremental
abatement costs are not well documented. Obviously, the import premium
component would apply to transportation fuels that are compared with methanol.
In the environmental arena, there would be no SO X
 reduction value for
methanol because gasoline does not yield this type of emission, but there
presumably would be a value for reductions in NO X , reactive hydrocarbons,
and particulates. As part of this study, an evaluation was made of the
potential impact of neat methanol-fueled vehicles upon long-term (year-2000
and beyond) ozone formation. The results 60 indicated that methanol-fueled
60Reported in detail in Chapter 6 of the Technical Report and summarized in
Section VI of the Summary Report.
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vehicles can have a beneficial impact in reducing ozone after the year 2000,
given that in the interim the emission inventory changes as described in
Section VI. By the year 2000, however, the potential improvement is minimal
from neat methanol-fueled vehicles because the number of vehicles that could
be in the automobile fleet is quite small and the contribution of automobiles
to the emission inventory will have been reduced substantially from current
levels by current and ongoing technology improvements. The combination of
these two factors limits the impact of neat methanol on peak ozone formation
to approximately a 2.5X-potential reductiin in the year 2000. This impact is
probably too small to be significant given the uncertainties in the projected
inventories and modeling process. The results do indicate that in the much
longer term (beyond 2000) the potential impact could grow to be an important
part of an overall air-quality strategy. An appropriate role for public
policy in stimulating use of alternative transportation fuels would be to
internalize differences in air-quality implications from alternative fuels.
Although it would require an effort that extends well beyond the scope of this
study, it is urged that a policy be thoroughly examined to institute differ-
ential state registration fees and transportation fuel taxes based on environ-
mental implications of the alternative fuels. The type of policy that needs
investigation is not a subsidy program for alternative fuels, but rather
differential taxes that reflect the differential impacts on air quality of
alternative fuels. '
For any pollution abatement program to be efficient (least costly) for a
given target air-quality goal, the marginal costs of abatement should be
roughly equal among all emission sources. Thus, one goal of such a program
would be to achieve a balance in incentives at the margin to abate NOx,
reactive hydrocarbons, and particulates between stationary and mobile sources.
The air-quality impact of a vehicle depends on the vehicle technology, the
fuel used, and the amount it is driven; thus, a differential tax program would
probably have to utilize both registration fee differentials and fuel tax
differentials to proparly reflect these differences. Both producers and
buyers of vehicles would have incentives to modify their behavior. Pro-
ducers would have incentives to have their vehicles in lower registration fee
classes (because that would improve their saleability) and would invest in
cost-effective measures to lower emissions. Abatement measures that are too
high relative to the tax (incorporated in the registration fee) would not be
pursued because they would add more to the vehicle cost than the savings in
registration fees. Consumers would take into account both the registration
fee and the fuel price (incorporating differential taxes) differential in
making their vehicle selection. Those users who drive relatively more annual
miles would presumably be more influenced by the differential fuel taxes than
those who drive less frequently and so make their vehicle purchases accord-
ingly. The theory behind this type of program is not new. What is needed,
therefore, is a practical assessment of whether the data and analysis tech-
niques exist to evaluate the implications of such a program sufficiently to
justify its implementation. Practical decisions would need to be made on
which fuel categories would be differentially taxed (e.g., leaded gasoline,
unleaded gasoline, methanol, ethanol, diesel, etc.). Similar decisions would
be needed on vehicle emissions and on how many vehicle categories would have
to be identified. Also, (1) the level of differential fees and taxes would
have to be examined in relation to marginal abatement costs in stationary
applications, (2) policy alternatives where either seasonality or regionality
I
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would need tr be examined, and (3) administrative costs would have to be
examined as a function of implementation alternatives and their distributional
effects assessed. It is quite possible that the type of scheme described
above is simply unworkable if the administrative costs were greater than the
abatement cost savings or if the air-quality consequences of alternative
policies cannot be estimated, but it is worth very serious consideration.
;n the absence of a policy to provide carefully justified incentives for
alternative fuel adoption, there may be attempts by proponents to impose more
extreme measures. For example, requirements or mandates for use of specific
proportions of alcohol vehicles in California would be one example of an
extreme measure that does not lead to efficient pollution abatement or oil
security solutions. Thus, if new fuels are to be properly encouraged in a
very uncertain future environment, it makes sense to do so in a flexible way
that will be applicable under a wide range of circumstances.
G.	 DEALING WITH "THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG" PROBLEM
One often-discussed obstacle to implementing widespread use of methanol
in transportation is that the retail distribution system must expand rapidly
in anticipation of automobile manufacturers producing and selling neat
methanol-fueled vehicles to the general public. Obviously, it would be very
expensive and risky for fuel producers/distributors to create the neat
methanol distribution system when volume is extremely low based solely on
anticipation that sa.es
 will expand. Cive.n that ower-the-road competitiveness
is not anticipated for neat methanol-fueled passenger cart until the early
1990s, there does exiut a mechanism ,hat could reduce this distribution cost
and risk considerably by using the normal replacement cycle of pumps and
storage tanks in the distribution system.
The problem with distributing methanol is that part of the existing
gasoline distribution system (seals, hoses, patches in tanks, etc.) would not
be compatible with methanol use. Compouiding the problem is the fact that the
most recent cycle of replacements at retail outlets has been done with fiber-
glass tanks instead of steel, which makes the existing system even less com-
patible with methanol. Creating a parallel system for methanol by replacing
functional equipment for gasoline presents a major cost and hence an obstacle
to methanol. The lead time that exists, however, before methanol can compete
as a private passenger car fuel provides time to create a threshold distribu-
tion system much more efficiently. Currently in California, there are
approximately 18,000 retail gas stations supplying transportaticn fuels to the
public. As a general rule, the tanks and pipes in these stations have an
expected life of 20 years, which, with a uniform replacement rate, 61 would
imply about 900 replacements per year. A policy that California may consider
is starting a tax incentive in 1986 which could be created to subsidize the
added cost of methanol-compatible tanks and pipes (over the replacement cost
which would be incurred anyway) in a small percentage of the replaced
61 Actually, the replacement rate is not uniform because stations were
installed in waves, which leads to heavy replacement periods.
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equipment. For example, if 20% of the regularly scheduled replacements
(tanks, pipes, pumps) were made methanol-comp4tible each year, that would
imply approximately 150-180 conversions per year. Thus, if this program were
started in 1986, by 1992 about 1000 svrtems would be in place that could be
used to distribute methanol. Some cleaning of the system would have to be
done whe;. the con:,ersion actually took place, but that would not impose a
major problem. The cost of methanol-compatible systems versus what would be
installed without this policy is a crucial factor in its usefulness. As
discussed in Chapter 8 of the Technical Report, the cost for replacing a tank,
piping, and two pumps at a typical service station is approximately $50,000 in
1981 dollars for a fiberglass system and slightly less for a steel system.
The latter, although less expen.,4ive, has a lifetime which can be considerably
smaller, depending on the climatic conditions to which it is exposed. In
addition to the costs of more frequent replacements with a steel system, there
are additional costs arising from station disruption and the risk of damage
caused by undetected leaks. With the rela^ively dry climate in muc'i of
California, the added cost for methanol-compatible systems should not be great
or a major impediment to methanol use. It is recommended, therefore, that the
state examine the tradeoffs in implementing such a program in the 1986-88
period. The benefits from this type of policy would be that the state would
have in-place a means to diversify rapidly in the case that neat methanol
becomes suddenly more viable in the early 1990s (resulting from rapid oil
price escalation, technological improvements in neat methanol-fueled vehicles,
or less costly production. techniques). The costs of such a program would
appear to be fairly modest. If the needed subsidy were $5000 per installa-
tion, then 150 stations per year would cost $750.000 in lost tax revenues to
the state. Some form of repayment might be even negotiated from the distribu-
tors to the state at the time of actual conversion to cuver some of this
cost. Although this is not a trivial sum of money, the cost over 6 years is
$4.5 million to create a threshold distribution system of 900 retail outlets.
If instituted in this type of incremental fashion rising the normal replacement
cycle, the retail distribution barrier need not be a massive obstacle to
widespread methanol use.
H.	 DERIVED LIKELY ROLES FOR METHANOL
In the previous sections, the rationale for a government role in
influencing the methanol market has been discussed from the perspective of the
State of California. The intent of this section is to summarize whether the
implementation of those policies to credit methanol for its potential value in
pollution abatement or in reducing the impact of an oil disruption would signi-
ficantly accele ate the use of methanol within the State. As shown in Section
F, the total of the unpriced benefits which appear justified are probably in
the range of $0.25 to $1.00/10 6 Btu for methanol. The estimate for the oil
import premium within the state is extremely crude, but it would require a
major effort to refine the value further. Rased on the best information
available now, therefore, the premium would be quite small because the
security component has been estimated nationally at approximately $2.00/bbl,
which would have to be reduced for California alone. As an example, if this
$1.00/10 6 Btu premium (see Table 7-4) were added to the value of methanol in
stationary uses, for security improvement, NO X abatement and SOX abatement
the impact on the viability of methanol in these markets would be inconse-
19
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quential. The problem is siirply that th ,: lower bound on delivered methanol
costs in the latter part of the 1980s (in 1981$) is approximately $0.60/gal or
approximately $9.25/106 Btu. With the price of utility fuels currently
under $5/106 Btu and most forecasts placing them at $6 to $7/10 6 Btu by
1990 (in 1981$), there is little rationale for concluding that government
policy, which is justified in terms of net benefits, would affect the market
at all through the mld 1990s. A combination of unlikely events could,
however, lead to some viable markets in the stationary applications market by
the early 1990s. If the high-price fuel scenario were to occur, natural gas
were unavailable to electric utilities and methanol were obtainable at prices
near $9/10 6
 Btu, then some use of methanol in these applications would be
viable. At this point in time, however, this combination of events appears
unlikely and thus, although further testing and experimentaton appears
warranted, implementation of methanol use in the stationary application sector
is not. Obviously, it is possible to subsidize methanol so that its cost is
It-so than its value to users and get greater implementatoin within the state,
but presumably the goal is to only consider policies which benefit
Californians.
In the transporation markets, the potential value of methanol premiums
are much more difficult to estimate as noted earlier. For California acting
alone, the security value would be quite small reflecting the fact that a
single state, even one the size of California, cannot insulate itself from an
o:l disruption if the rest of the country has not also reduced its vuner-
ability. Thus, for California acting alone, the justifiable premium would
have to be lower than the national premium for oil import security estimated
at approximately $2/bbl. 62 Even if this full premium were attributed to
methanol in transportation uses, the impact would be very small. For example,
$2/bbl oil import premium would be equivalent to less than $0.03/gal of
:methanol used in neat methanol vehiclec. Once again, given the cost of
methanol relative to gasoline or diesel fuel, this premium would nut impact
the methanol market in any sivnificant way. As a means to summarize these
effects visually, Figure 7-2 shows the impact of adding justifiable methanol
prem?ums to the market value of methanol shown earlier in Figure 5-1 for 1992.
As indicated in Figure 7-2, the implementatioe of State policy to add
premiums for oil import security and pollution abatement does little to the
methanol market scenario for 1992. In transportation markets the octane
enhancement market and light-duty vehicle market are potentially slightly
improved over the "business as usual" case. The stationary applications
market would still remain nor.-viable as long as gas were available to the
industrial sector. For utilities, even in the case where gas is unavailable,
the addition of the premium would not change the conclusion that methanol is
uncompetitive as a fuel.
620il import premiums have been estimated as ranging from $8 to $18/bbl with
a median of $10/bbl, but of this total the major portion is associated with
the market power component ($8/bbl) and only $2 for the security component.
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Figure 7-2. DERIVED LIKELY ROLES FOR METHANOL IN CALIFORNIA IN 1992
The conclusion is that the "derived likely roles" for methanol which
result from government policies 63 are not any different from the "busine,s
as usual" case where no policies are implemented. Although premiums may be
warranted, the values which appear reasonable, based on studies currently
available, cannot overcome the very large extra cost cf methanol over
conventional fuels. Much more work can be done in this arena in terms of
refining the premium value of clean domestic fuels in California. Based on
the data and analysis available at the time of this study, however, there does
not appear to be a case Mat state policies to correct market failures would
significantly affect the use of methanol in California.
Interpreted here to mean policies where specific benefits arise because of
externalities which currently undervalue clean-burning domestic fuels. No
rationale has been found for stimulating methanol for other reasons.
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SECTION VIII
CONCLUSIONS
A.	 OVERVIEW
A successful strategy for making a transition to widespread use of
methanol as a fuel must be consistent with the realities of the fuel market in
which it must compete. In this study an attempt has been made to assess the
available information to determine the salient features of how this market
might evolve in California. The strategy that emerges fruu. this approach is
to establish the necessary preconditions for methanol to be used as a fuel in
both transportation and stationary-application markets by creating mechanisms
to reward externalities which are unpriced in the marketplace and by modifying
undesirable institutional barriers which might slow methanol production and
use.
1.	 Competitive Environment
It is clear tha t in the last year and a half, the climate for
introduction of synthetic fuels has changed dramatically. In 1981, oil prices
in constant dollars reached a peak from which they Have since fallen nearly
15%, but even more important is the change in expectations for the future. In
early 1981, many knowledgeable forecasters were predicting real price
increases for oil of 3% annually for 20 years, but by the end of 1982 there
was much evidence to the contrary. Although opinions still differ widely
ctver.ing the spectrum of the three energy scenarios described earlier in this
Summary Report, the consensus of expectations for oil prices has clearly
fallen. This major change in expectations is partly a result of information
that was simply unavailable 2 years ago, or so speculative that it was not
credible. The response of energy users (demand elasticity) has exceeded
expectations by a wide margin. Because oil is extremely price-inelastic in
the short run, analysts were not well equipped to predict if or when reactions
to the 1914 price increase would occur. The response took 5 to 6 years to
occur and coincides' with an economi,; show-down that has made oil prices
extremely soft. It is widely believed that real oil prices will remain
constant through 1985 and only rise to 1981 levels by the end of the decade.
All the demand adjustments in creating a more energy-efficient capital stock,
which will result from the 1919 price run-ups, have not occurred as yet. As a
result of the demand adjustme-.*-s to oil price run-ups, oil price deregulation,
and the worldwide economic recession, OPEC is operating at only 19 million
barrels per day, although existing capacity is over 30 million barrels per
day. Consequently, when Iran and Iraq began attacki.ig each other's oil
facilities, there was no significant price impact, either from real supply
areas or from consumer country panic buying. The suppl , response, on the
other hand, has not been too significant as yet, but the time lags necessary
co find, develop, and commence commercial activity are 8 to 10 years, which
wil •. mean that only in the mid to late eighties will the full impact of the
price rises be reflected in supplies.
This change in attitude toward synfttels and the change in expectations
concerning future fuel prices is clearly evident in the number of cancelled
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plans in the synthetic fuel industry. When lowered oil price expectations are
coupled with highly escalated shale development costs, the viability of these
projects is diminished dramatically. To some degree, the maas i v%s shale cost
escalation is a result of feedback effects from the 1979 oil price run-up, a
very large infrastructure development, and low productivity in :emote
environments. Although each type of synthetic fuel would have unique
characteristics with regard to these cost factors, they would all be affected
to some degree. Large coal-based syntheti, :uel plants to be built in
relatively undeveloped western coal fields or in Alaska would certainly be
impacted similarly. obviously, methanol from coal is not immune to these
factors and this is a significant reason why cost estimates made prior to the
oil price rein-up in 1979 are typically unrealistically low. Thus, for very
good reasons, the climate for synfuels has cooled considerably in the last few
years.	 It is in this environment that methanol must establish itself if it is
to move ahead in the nearer term.
2.	 Methanol Supply and Demand
As has been stressed in the transition-period discussion (1987-
1992, see Section V), the sources of methanol in the near term will be
dominated by natural gas as the feedstock. After deregulation of pipeline
gas, no new plants are likely to be built based on pipeline gas, although it
is anticipated that most will continue to operate for the rest of the 1980s
and early 1990s. The plants throughout the world already under construction
or in planning stages using remote natural gas will be sufficient to satisfy
modest fuel demands through 1987. The projected excess methanol production
capacity, relative to chemical market demands in this period, could exceed one
billion gallons per year. In addition, the worldwide excess capacity could be
even larger if SFC should support a methanol project. Of course, relative to
fuel demands, one billion gallons per year is a rather small quantity and
could be utilized as an octane enhancer in a small proportion of U.S. unleaded
gasoline.
Beyond this planned capacity, the incremental source of methanol becomes
other remote gas projects, including barge-mounted methanol p'.ants around the
Pacific rim. There is sufficient remote gas to supply California demands for
the next 15 years at prices which would undercut any unsubsidized coal-to-
methanol project. Even with SFC support other than direct price subsidies,
methanol from coal cannot be profitably produced and delivered to California
for less than $0.80/gallon in 1981 dollars, which is higher than methanol from
Cook Inlet or Indonesia for remote gas prices up to $2.50/10 6 Btu.
The market picture in the transition is that, at expected production
prices, the stationary applications market will be small. If the overfiring
concept can be demonstrated to work effectively and plants currently limited
in operation by NO x regulations can be operated at rated capacity using 10%
Co 30% methanol, the implied premium world be sufficient to make methanol
competitive in these plants. The maximum market in this case, however, is
approximately 1500 ton/day, and the overfiring technology which is yet to be
fully demonstrated must prove successful. Thus, the scale of the utility
market is small at best and years away from reaching that potential. There is
virtually no chance that methanol can be used economically as a fuel for
8-2
ORIQWAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
re powerinS boilers, even with credit for eliminating the need for
environmental control •cchnology.
Only two realistic interim markets exist for methanol in the transi-
tion period: blends and neat methanol-fueled vehicle fleets. These markets,
oecause of the high cost of transportation fuels and additives, are potentially
competitive for methanol. The blends market in California has a maximum demand
of 4000 ton/day of methanol, but it is limited by the availability of tertiary
butyl alcohol. Normal market forces will induce industry to exploit this mar-
ket in a timely fashion. The state could aid the process by facilitating
methanol transport by tanker and pipeline. For neat methanol-fueled passen;er
vehicles, the rate of growth will be slow because neat vehicles based on rem(,te
gas will not achieve a slim over-the-road cost advantage until shortly after
1990, although this advantage will increase through time. This advantage will
not be as large as it has been the last few years for diesels over gasoline
vehicles. Thus, with a narrower cost advantage and a thinner distribution
network, neat methanol should tend to grow mere slowly than diesels. But
even if it grows at the diesel rate from 1978 to 1982, the proportion of neat
methanol-fteeled vehicles in the California fleet by 2000 would be about 12%,
which would consume about 12,000 ton/year (120 10 6 /gal) of methanol. This
level of demand is ,,onsistent with supplies of methanol frora remote natural
gas around the Pacific Rim.
Furthermore, given these penetration rates, the potential impact of neat
methanol-fueled vehicles by 2000 is quite modest. If 12% of the vehicles were
fueled by neat methanol, the projected impact on peak ozone in the South Coast
Air Basin would be to reduce it less than 4%, which is a small part of the
problem. In the longer term, the impact could be larger as tiie methanol fleet
grows.
In the view of this study, methanol is a potentially superior synthetic
fuel for California based on the data available today. It is in the same cost
range (probably less expensive) than gasoline from shale, but also has end-use
environmental properties that are superior to shale and other transport fuels
from coal. The problem is that none of the synthetics are competitive on a
large scale at this point in time, thus, building a foundation for growth is
the most fruitful role for the State of California and the potential producers.
A key qualifier in the above statement is "competitive on a large scale,"
because methanol can be competitive in selected applications which will yield
the needed experience and test data to make decisions on larger markets.
The limits to large-scale methanol use are real and attempts to overly
encourage the methanol market will be self-defeating. Methanol from coal is
not economic and will not be viable (unsubsidized) for quite some time. The
interim feedstock is remote natural gas, which will not be elastic in supply
for huge fuel demands. Thus, modest growth in fleets and passenger cars can
be supplied without driving up prices significantly, but rapid growth in
vehicle sales or utility demand could not be supplied at a competitive price.
Although coal-to-methanol is not the least costly source of methanol,
currently it is an important factor in the evolution of the methanol market.
Based on the interactions with the fuel producing companies, it seems unlikely
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that any transition to neat methanol passenger care can begin (other than
centrally fueled fleets) until coal-to-methanol shows promise of being a
competitive fuel with gasoline. As of this point in time, that expectation
for competitiveness is simply too far in the future (beyond 2000). Thus,
although there are less costly sources of limited quantities of methanol, in
the nearer term the real thr_-hold still is determined by the viability of
coal-to-methanol.
3.	 Recommended Strategy
It has been demonstrated that the neat methanol market is not
really "the chicken or the egg" problem it has often been called. It is true
that automobile makers and fuel producers must simultaneously provide vehicles,
Biel, and a distribution system, but the scales of these systems are not so
large as to preclude a workable solution. Reasonably efficient production
runs of neat methanol-fueled vehicles could be made at 30,000 vehicles per
year for a given producer, production from remote natural gas shipped by
tanker can be made efficiently at scales of 200 million gallons per year, and
distribution requirements for a regional introduction of one station in ten
are well within the fuel industty's resources. If the climate of 1980 in
terms of fuel price escalation had persisted until today, an agreement between
an auto manufacturer and fuel producer might quite likely already have been
made. In today's environment it is a more difficult decision, but the long-
run wisdom of pursuing methanol as a serious co.,tender for a long-tern.
transportation fuel is still sound. Clearly, the trend in California (and,
in the long run, the rest of the country) is that conventional transport fuels
will become more expensive and higher levels of environmental improvement will
become increasingly more difficult (and more expensive) to attain. Both
trends favor methanol use in the long run.
When this study was organized, it was hoped that it would be possible
to help the State of California devise an implementation strategy for transi-
tioning to large-scale methanol use. During the course of the study, it has
become clear that such a goal is simply not consistent with the market real-
ities of methanol versus conventional fuels. The next step for methanol use
in California must be considerably more modest, involving further experimen-
tation, testing, and demonsrration. There are some small, but high-valued
potential uses for methanol in the next 10 years which can help in keeping
the cost of the needed experimentation relatively low.
The strategy that California should pursue is to exploit the small
cost-effective markets in the near term (octane enhancement, fleets, capacity-
limited power plants), eliminate the barriers to expensive transport and hand-
ling of methanol, and convince industry that California is the regional market
for neat methanol introduction. Three key actions are needed: obtain credible
test data from the California fleet program, establish criteria for port facil-
ities for unloading and storing methanol, and continue the State's aggressive
policy on eliminating regulatory uncertainties (gasoline taxes, RPV limits,
emission requirements). The automobile manufacturers can accelerate the
market significantly if the advanced automotive technology (e.g., methanol
dissociation) can be perfected and incorporated in neat methanol-fueled
vehicles by the mid 199Cs. This technical advance would reduce the required
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fuel factor from 1.7 to 1.8 in 1992 to about 1.6, which would significantly
improve the over-the-road cost-effectiveness of neat methanol-fueled vehicles
and probably lower their emissions as well. On the producer side, there are
potential technology improvements that Lan lower long-run production costs.
Some of the most interesting concepts involve co-producing methanol and
electricity from coal; further development is needed. Most of our oil
producers view themselves as energy companies, which is the broad perspective
ne eded to adjust to long-term changes in markets and condition3. Within the
next decade, it seems likely that one such company will make this necessary
commitment for what will be a long-term transition.
B.	 DETAILED CONCLUSIONS
1.	 Resources
(1) Substantial quantities of western coals are potentially avail-
able for methanol conversion for use in California. In
particular, the subbituminous coals of Black Mesa, San Juan,
Yampa, and Powder River appear to be promising long-run
sources with combined potential resources of about 1600
billion tons, with 500 billion tons having less than 2000 feet
of overburden.
(2) There are significant (relative to likely demands) remote
natural gas resources in the Pacific Rim that could be used to
support methanol fuel demands through 1995. 3ased just on
current rates of reinjection and flaring, the remote gas in
the Pacific Rim could support over 8 billion gallons per year
of methanol production -- ignoring Alaska's North Slope.
Although it is not anticipated that anywhere near this amount
will actually be used for methanol production, the point is
that gas resources are not the binding constraint on methanol
production in the next 15 years.
(3) Indigenous California resources are either too limited in
supply (bioenergy, petroleum coke) or too expensive O ►eavy oil
in rock) to support a major transition to methanol fuel within
the state. Small selective markets, howev-r, will probably be
served by those in-state resources.
2.	 Production Costs
(1) Methanol production costs iiom alternative resources are
heavily influenced by capital cost differences which vary
significantly by type of feedstock. Approximate estimates in
unescalated, 1981 dollars per annual gallon of capacity are:
natural gas (industrial site), $1.00/annual gallon; natural
gas (barge-mounted plant), $1.50/an,,tial gallon; coal, $3.00/
annual gallon; and lignite, $3.40/annual gallon. With this
approximate relationship of capital requirements, very
significant cost advantages in feedstocks for coal and
lignites are necessary to overcome the capital disadvantage.
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(2) Although market gas in the United States and throughout much
of the world will have a value comparable to oil products
(residual U.S. oil), there are significant quantities of
remote natural gas with oppo.tunity costs that are consider-
dbly less than oil. As a result, methanol production in the
near term is dominated by remote natural gas for California
markets. It has been concluded that sufficient remote gas
deposits exist on the Pacific Rim with values of $1.50/106
Btu or less to satisfy California methanol fuel demands
through 1997.
(.l) Methanol production costs per 10 6
 Btu from coal should be
17% to 19% less expensive than M-Ras, resulting from a 10%
increase in capital costs and an 8% efficiency loss in further
processing. This extra production cost is compounded in an
end-use efficiency loss of at least 15% in the fuel factor
required for neat methanol-fueled vehicles versus gasoline,
making the overall extra cost per mile traveled at least 30%
and probably more. Thus, M-gas production is not an important	 rip
near-term or long-term factor in the methanol transition
because M-gas cannot compete in the near-term gasoline market
and is much less economic than neat methanol in the long run.
(4) Given the significant cost advantage of remote natural gas
over coal and petroleum coke, these resources are not
important to the near-term transition. Other resources from
bioenergy may compete in specialized applications (c.g.,
non-grid-connected peaking units), especially considering a
potential $0.20/gal incentive in neat methanol uses and up to
$0.40/gal in 10:1 gasoline blends. Bioenergy, however, is not
economic in large-scale uses, even for such applications as
dual fueling a large boiler. Thus, both indigenous feedstocks
+nd transporting feedstocks into California for processing are
not crucial to a successful methanol transition.
(5) The key feedstocks for synthetic fuels for California are
remote natural gas in the short run and coal or shale oil in
the long run. In all these cases, processing will be done
much more efficiently near the resource site. Thus,
California needs to do all it can to facilitate entry points
for products into the state. In the near-term, port
facilities at Long Beach and San Francisco Bay, and at coastal
power plants are important. In the long run, pipelines from
western coal fields will be crucial links in efficient
systems. It is clearly in California's interest to promote
transportation competition between railroads and pipelines by
supporting legislation that increase the state's energy
transport options.
(6) There are a number of methanol production facilities under
construction throughout the world which will come on-line in
the early to mid-1980s. 7.1 spite of this added capacity, the
market price of chemical methanol in tie next 5 years will
probably remain over $0.70/gal, in 1981 dollars. The
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deregulation of natural gas and the termination of "old" gas
contracts by 1985 will leave virtually all the existing
industry on market gas by 1985. The variable costs of
production by such producers will be over $0.64/ga?. by 1985 if
natural gas is $4.50/10 6
 Btu or more. Thus, any produce
who cannot earn his variable costs will shut down. Although
there will be some infra-marginal producers earning larger
returns (e.g., Canadian suppliers with below-market gas), the
marginal U.S. producers will not sell below $0.64/gal, keeping
sales in chemical markets at this level or higher when
transport and some return is added. Some foreign producers
may sell to West Coast fuel markets for a minimum of
$0.53/gal. At prices lower than this, they can absorb the
transport cost and import duty and compete for the chemical
market at the Gulf. As a result, expectations of very
inexpensive methanol (i.e., below $0.53/gal) resulting from
excess capacity are unwarranted.
(7) The moderation in the expectation of natural gas prices for
1985, given lower oil price forecasts, has made the existing
production capacity viable in the mid term. Using market gas
at $4.50/10 6
 Btu to $4.75/10 6
 Btu in 1985 to 1987 (in
1981$), existing producers will be able to compete in chemical
markets with marginal production costs of $0.67/gal to
$0.70/gal at the plant gate. Although remote gas from foreign
sites will be less expensive at the plant gate, the
combination of an 18% duty and transport costs of $0.10/gal
from Pacific Rim producers will keep most foreign competition
out of the market. The U.S. industry will rely on its sunk
capital to compete, as new plants would not be viable based on
market gas.
(8) One of the implications of the Synthetic Fuel Corporation's
potential support for coal-to-methanol plants may be to
displace part of the existing U.S. chemical methanol
production industry. Study estimates indicate that a
coal-to-methanol plant, in Alaska's Cook Inlet for example,
with SFC support could deliver methanol to California for
about $0.81/val by 1987, in 1981 dollars. The additional cost
of transport from California to the chemical markets located
primarily in the Gulf Coast would add enough by either train
or tanker to bring the delivered cost to around $0.90/gal. An
estimate of the variable costs alone of producing methanol
from market gas in existing plants is $0.67/gal, ignoring
capital amortization. This margin is probably sufficient for
these producers to continue to make debt repayment and
interest charges on non-fully-amortized plants compared to the
Alaskan coal case. However, other coal-to-methanol projects
nearer to chemical markets and those with other incentives
(relating to biomass feedstocks) may be able to undersell
existing producers sufficiently to force them to sell at below
full-cost recovery. Thus, SFC should carefully examine
applications for coal-to-methanol projects for this potential
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impact on U.S. industry. The intent of the synthetic fuels
program is to make the United States less dependent on foreign
oil, not to subsidize some U.S. producers into driving other
U.S. producers out of business.
(9) If remote natural gas is the preferred feedstock for methanol
in California, a concern is whether the resource would be used
for LNG conversion instead of methanol. There is no doubt
that strictly as an energy carrier in large gas deposits
(i.e., over 300 million SCFD), LNG is less expensive to
produce and ship under 5000 miles. At longer distances, the
cost of transportation in cryogenic tankers becomes more of a
factor. Some have suggested that even at distances 5000 to
•	 10,000 miles, the added shipping cost of LNG does not offset
its significant production advantage. The key point that is
often missed in these comparisons is that 10 6 Btu of
methanol and LNG are not of equal value in either stationary
or transportation applications. In transportation, on a Btu
basis, methanol will be more valuable than gasoline. Thus,
when value is considered, methanol will successfully compete
for use of some remote natural gas with LNG, especially in
smaller gas fields. In other words, methanol producers will
be able to offer some remote gas owners a small premium over
potential LNG producers in some locations and still have a
viable product in many circumstances.
3.	 Methanol Transport
(1) Where large volumes or distances are required, there is a
clear economic advantage to transporting methanol by means of
tankers or pipelines compared to rail or truck. In 1981
dollars, the average cost to transport crude oil relative to
tanker cost 0.0 by definition) was pipeline 1.8, barge 3.0,
rail 10.8, and truck 18.4. For new transport options (e.g.,
building new pipelines or tankers), the relative costs would
change somewhat, but the basic pattern of tanker and pipeline
superiority for long distances at high volumes would be
sustained. Thus, in the long term, a widespread methanol fuel
industry would rely on tankers for overseas methanol shipments
from remote natural gas and pipeline transport of methanol
from western coal sites.
(2) In the near-term and transition periods, the likely quantities
of methanol demanded could not justify a methanol pipeline
from western coal fields. Such projects would have to utilize
either rail transport of coal for conversion to methanol near
the end-use center or rail transport of methanol from a
minemouth plant. Early plants based on remote natural gas,
however, could bring methanol directly to California end-use
centers, thus creating a significant advantage for remote
natural gas feedstocks over coal in the near term. Truck
transport would only be used for local distribution to fueling
stations for fleets or private passenger cars.
if[
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re will exist a small market for methanol as a gasoline
nding agent by the smaller (topping and hydro-skimming)
refineries. This market appears to be presently existent at
current methanol prices but mainly unsatified. However, the
fraction of gasoline produced in California by such refineries
is quite small (approximately 4%). For some of these
refineries, octane number-of-barrel costs may be sufficiently
high to justify the use of high-price co-solvents such as
propanols if lour-price tertiary butyl alcohol is not readll•
available. For the most part, however, it will be the avail-
ability of relatively low-price tertiary butyl alcohol on the
West Coast that will determine the magnitude of use of
methanol as a blending agent in California. If all of the TBA
produced in the United States were shipped to the California
markets, approximately 70% of the gasoline produced in
California could be blended with methanol. The most likely
application of methanol TBA in California would be in the
blending of higher octane unleaded gasolines by the larger
refineries or by blenders or small refineries to upgrade
regular grade to premium grade. Unless the front-end
volatility of the gasoline into which it is blended is
reduced, Reid Vapor Pressure limits may be exceeded and/or
driveability may suffer. Because the small gasoline blender
has little control over the front-end volatility of the
gasoline he receives, this reduces the potential market. For
the larger refineries, there is the potential to "back out"
butane and reduce volatility; however, it may not be an
economic solution to providing octane if the refinery's
existing octane number-of-barrel cost is low. Compared to the
production of a remote natural gas-based methanol plant of
approximately 3000 ton/day, the potential demand from the
blending in the refinery sector in California is rather
sm l . For example, if it is assumed that 20% is a reasonable
estimate for the amount of gasoline that could potentially be
blended with methanol, the daily methanol demand is
approximately 900 tons of methanol, or a little less than than
one-third of a single plant's capacity.
(2) There now exists a very small methanol market in commercial
fleet vehicles supported by several small companies performing
vehicle conversions to neat methanol. Even if quality
methanol-fueled vehicles were available and the price of
methanol fuel was such that these vehicles would have an
over-the-road cost competitiveness with gasoline, the
near-term potential market is probably still limited to
between 4000 and 10,000 vehicle sales per year. This is due
to constraining factors such as uncertainty on resale value,
ready availability of methanol fuel, and customary maximum
trip lengths for the vehicles. If methanol vehicles were, in
fact, sold at this volume, it would imply an increase in
methanol demand of about 20 to 75 ton/day. Such a volume is
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quite small in comparison to a remote natural g,is methanol
plant size of between 2000-4000 ton/day.
(3) There exist several methanol medium- and heavy-duty engines
that are close to being commercially available. Several of
these engines have been road-tested, both in New Zealand and
Germany. The UPS Texaco TCCS engine was originally designed
to run on conventional fuels, but has been demonstrated to
function satisfactorily on methanol. Based upon the road test
work to date, there does not appear to be a significant
efficiency advantage of methanol vehicles over diesel vehicles
in medium- and heavy-duty applications. 'rhis implies that no
significant market would be expected to develop until methanol
and diesel reach approximate parity in the price per Btu.
Under the baseline petroleum price scenario, Btu parity with
distillate oils is not reached by low-price remote natural
gas-based methanol until well after the year 2000.	
R
(4) An important factor in neat methanol viability as a
transportation fuel is the efficiency gain expected compared
to a moving conventional baseline vehicle. The analysis shows
that there will be gains in neat methanol-fueled vehicles from
higher compression ratios, leaner fuel mixture and heat of
vaporization that are potentially 1.7 in 1982 and slowly
attenuvte over time as the baseline improves. If dissociated
methanol technology is assumed, the fuel factor is from 1.53
to 1.63. It appears, however, that with likely improvements
in conventional gasoline vehicles, projected fuel factors as
low as 1.3 for neat methanol-fueled vehicles are unrealistic
in the long term.
(5) Using the baseline petroleum price scenario, liquid methanol-
fueled vehicles become competitive with gasoline-fueled
vehicles in the early 1990s if the methanol is assumed to be
derived from remote natural gas. The competitive advantage in
over-the-road costs after the early 1990s is not dramatic.
This implies a relative modest growth rate in the methanol-
fueled vehicle. market. Dissociated methanol technology would
move the breakeven date forward by several years, but more
importantly, it would significantly increase the cost
advantage of methanol relative to gasoline. Under this
baseline petroleum price scenario, coal-based methanol would
not be competitive with gasoline in the foreseeable future,
even with dissociated methanol vehicle technology. Wich a
high-price oil scenario, the feedback of higher oil prices to
methanol production from either remote natural gas or coal
would be only significant enough to modestly i6,prove the
viability of neat methanol from remote natural gas and leave
coal-to-methanol uneconomic. In the lower price scenario, on
the other hand, neat methanol is uneconomic over the forecast
period.
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5.	 Environmental Analysis
(1) The total quantity of organic emissions from methanol-fueled
vehicles could be reduced below what is considered the
practical limit for gasoline-fueled vehicles because methanol
and formaldehyde, the major components of exhaust from
methanol-fueled engines, are much more easily oxidized by
catalysts than are the high-molecular-weight hydrocarbons of
gasoline. The emerging technology, based on the catalytic
dissociation of methanol using exhaust heat from the engine,
would further reduce organic emissions from methanol-fueled
vehicles.
(1) Methanol has a relatively low flame temperature and thus
produces inherently lower emissions of NO x
 than most other
fuels. Emissions of NO x
 from methanol-fueled engines are
about 50% lower than emissions from engines fueled with
petroleum-based fuels. Thus, methanol has the potential to
produce lower NO x
 emissions from both mobile and stationary
sources.
(3) The emission of NO x
 from methanol-fueled vehicles illu-
strates the complex relationship between emission levels and
fuel efficiency. For example, when the emissions of NO, for
the methanol-fueled 1981 Ford Escorts used in the Los Angeles
County fleet test were reduced from 1.0 g/mile to 0.25 g/mile,
fuel consumption increased by 26%. Thus, in the near term,
when the primary supply of neat methanol-fueled vehicles is
through conversion of gasoline-fueled vehicles, care must be
taken in interpreting fuel efficiency data and in setting
environmental requirements to consider both emissions and
efficiency. In the long run, optimized neat methanol-fueled
vehicles are not expected to have to sacrifice efficiency for
lower emission levels.
(4) Methanol could form part of an effective strategy for the
control of photochemical smog in Los Angeles. Under
optimistic patterns of neat methanol-fueled vehicle adoption
developed in Chapter 8 of the Technical Report, the impact of
methanol on peak ozone concentration in the South Coas t Air
Basin by the year 2000 is projected to be a reduction of 2.5%
to 4.0%. This modest impact is determined by the methanol
contribution to the automobile stock, which will be limited to
10% to 15% of the total by 2000, given a rate of penetration
consistent with diesels since 1971. In the much longer run
(i.e., 2000), methanol could contribute more substantially to
abatement of ozone concentration given a longer period for
neat methanol-fueled vehicles to affect the composition of the
automobile fleet. Thus, in the nearer term (i.e., 1992),
there would be no measurable impact on air quality from
methanol use in vehicles, and in the longer term (i.e., 2000),
it would be a marginal c-retribution (i.e., 2.5% to 4%) to peak
ozone reduction. It is only in the much longer term (i.e.,
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2020 and beyond) that methanol could make a significant
contribution to Los Angeles basin air quality improvement.
Thus, it is unrealistic to rely on methanol us.? as .
significant instrument in meeting air-quality goals for
timeframes up to and including the year 2000.
6.	 Utilities
(1) The most significant potential market for methanol (up to
80,000-ton/day) is composed of existing utility steam turbine
and combined-cycle knits that currently fire oil and gas. Thae
actual extent of this market will, of course, depend strongly
on future cost and availability of oil and gas. A switch to
methanol would be most cost-effective for combined-cycle units
(about 6000-ton/day) that may otherwise have to rely on
expensive distillate oil.
(2) Southern California Edison is the most likely large-scale
utility user of methanol in California because of a large
inventory of modern oil- and gas-fired units, strong
environmental pressures, and some coriccrn over access to
natural gas.
(3) Existing industrial boilers and heaters (80,000-ton/day) and
future industrial cogeneration systems (10,000-ton/day) also
represent potential markets of substantial size for methanol,
but they currently use natural gas in most cases and have
higher priority than the utilities for obtaining gas.
(4) In order for methanol to be competitive in utility markets,
its price per unit of energy will have to be competitive with
the prices of residual oil for utility boilers, distillate oil
for combined-cycle and industrial units, natural gas (if
available), and other synfuels. Some adjustments for such
factors ab modification costs and environmental benefits will
be appropriate in this comparison, but they will probably have
• second-order effect in the absence of legislative action or
• major change in PUC policy.
(5) Comparing projected methanol prices with demand curves based
on oil and gas price scenarios developed in the study, it is
seen that in the baseline scenario methanol will not be
competitive with conventional boiler and turbine fuels in the
next 20 years (with the possible exception of distillate oil
applications under the most extreme scenarios for emission
reduction requirements). In the high-price oil scenario, the
feedback effects on methanol production costs are sufficiently
strong to keep methanol from being viable in stationary
applications.
(6) If methanol were to become cost-competitive sooner than
expected, a phased development period would be expected before
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ri,V full market potential could be real iLvd.	 I h L s pettod
would last from 4 to 8 years, depending on the urgency of the
circumstances that led to methanol becoming competitive. (The
buildup of the methanol supply would probably take longer than
this.)
(7) Within the utility market, methanol is not competitive with
distillate, residual oil, or natural gas under the baseline
oil price scenario. In the high-price oil scenario, methanol
still does not become competitive in utility markets because
of feedback effects to methanol production costs. It does get
close by 1997 to being competitive in combined-cycle units
with a fuel demand of 6000 ton/day, but only in the case where
natural gas is unavailable.
(8) For industrial markets, methanol is riot competitive in the
baseline scenario with either oil or gas. In the case,
however, of the high-price oil scenario, methanol would reach
virtual price parity with a small market of approximately 1000
ton/day of methanol demand. The larger markets remain
uncompetitive for methanol if natural gas is available. Thus,
the key issue is whether gas is available to industrial
customers.	 It seems highly likely that gas will be available
to industry, especially in the high-price oil case, where
general business activity declines.
7.	 Policy
(1) The rationale for the public sector attempting to influence
the likely market outcomes for methanol has been examined and
in general the evidence to date does not justify intervention
in the market process. The difference between the "business
as usual" case and the "derived likely roles" resulting from
government policy are not significantly different.
(2) Methanol production costs are sufficiently high that even
granting methanol a premium for its environmental benefits
would not be sufficient to overcome its cost differential
versus conventional. fuels.
(3) Import security premiums should be instituted at the national
level rather than by the State of California. Any premium
which could be _justified solely by benefits within California
would not overcome: methanol's cost disadvantage.
(4) The next step for California policy to encourage methanol us,
is best directed toward further research, experimentation, or
demonstration. There do not appear to be any sensible policies
to induce widespread utiliz,tion in the private passenger car
market or stationary applications market in the near term.
F
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